University of Southern California
School of Philosophy
PhD, 2018
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Moral Psychology
  •  7
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5, edited by Mark Timmons (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (6): 784-786. 2018.
  •  51
    Are My Temporal Parts Agents?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub‐personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, might the temporal…Read more
  •  85
    Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3): 497-510. 2018.
    The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are fou…Read more
  •  82
    Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations
    Utilitas 31 (1): 106-115. 2019.
    Effective altruism (EA) is a movement devoted to the idea of doing good in the most effective way possible. EA has been the target of a number of critiques. In this article, I focus on one prominent critique: that EA fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change. One version of this critique claims that EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics. Defenders of EA have objected that this charge either fails to identify a problem with EA's core idea that each of us shou…Read more
  •  65
    What We Together Ought to Do
    Ethics 126 (4): 955-982. 2016.
    I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective reasons can.