Alexander Lee

Climate change leaves conservationists facing unprecedented uncertainty and indeterminacy that make it hard to measure conservation success. The novelty of future ecosystems generates axiological challenges that leave conservation without clear action guidance. In this paper, we argue that our best tool to navigate competing viewpoints is through deliberative democratic mechanisms that bring as many voices to the table as possible. We do this largely by comparing two different wolf reintroduction efforts and emphasizing the epistemic, practical, and political challenges presented by climate futures (which have no present analog) that ecologists and conservation biologists anticipate climate change will bring. Rather than trying to solve these issues through resolving disagreements about environmental value, we suggest that centering democracy around deliberation allows for a more pluralist and practical way to sort out our obligations regarding nature. Our view offers an ahistorical, adaptive, and holistic approach to conservation in a modern and dynamic world.

In a human changed world, many non-human organisms face a host of challenges related to their ability to migrate or remain in place. We argue for a right to a livable locality for non-human organisms further developing and applying arguments for a right to livability in the context of human climate migration. We argue that the right to a livable locality for non-human organisms emerges from the social practice of the international state system. We demonstrate that non-human organisms can be understood as a type of by-catch within the territorial net this social practice casts. Incorporating a right to a livable locality of non-human organisms into conservation practice is advantageous because it frees conservation from a dominant historical and normative evaluative scheme—in situ conservation. In a changing and warmer world, an over emphasis on in situ conservation makes conservation success difficult to achieve. A shift to livability considerations in conservation can guide normative evaluation in emergent conservation paradoxes and problems that arise due to environmental and climatic change.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 marked a fundamental rupture in human history, reshaping our collective imagination of catastrophe and extinction. This article examines how post-atomic discourse has developed an ‘annihilation imaginary’ – a cultural and aesthetic framework through which societies mediate the possibility of obliteration. Drawing on Anders's critique of technological alienation, I explore how narratives of apocalypse often serve as ideological mediations rather than radical critiques. While the prospect of environmental collapse, nuclear annihilation, or technological singularity dominates contemporary speculative thought, these imaginaries frequently reinforce rather than challenge the capitalist logic they seek to critique.

This article discusses Kracauer’s analysis of mass ornament in light of Deleuze’s concept of ritournelle. Kracauer was interested in the spectacle of Tiller Girls and found the principle of the capitalist production process in its ornamental formations. Capitalism destroys any natural organisms for its means and excludes any resistance from its effective procedure. This operation necessarily comes along with calculation and mechanisation. All individuals have scaled up statistics charts and scrambled with machines completely. People have turned into masses who are no longer different in form but simple technical objects that can be equally employed at any point of the globe. Kracauer understood mass ornament as the surface-level expression of global capitalism, which revealed its unconscious. He emphasised the ambivalence of mass ornament and a possible line of escape from capitalist rationality through the emptiness of its formal excess. Deleuze’s concept of ritournelle may shed light on a similar question of mass ornament and push its scope beyond Kracauer’s analysis. The two philosophers seem to share the frame of formalism when they deploy their arguments concerning form and depth; however, Deleuze put forward the issue of temporality in his discussion of ritournelle, a crucial question that Kracauer omits.

In the South Korean film, The Parasite, the underling family, in an act of desperation, uses deceptive means to infiltrate the rich family. The term parasite refers nominally to the underling family, and their efforts to befriend and inhabit the class territory and social hierarchy of the rich family. How can this be of use for education? To answer this, we ask: what can we learn from Parasite to inform contemporary philosophy of education? Primarily, this experimental piece written from different philosophical viewpoints, suggests that the images, narrative, and social context of the film cannot be read stereotypically. Using a blend of Deleuze and Stiegler ‘cinema-theory’, we present a heuristic perspective on the Parasite from three viewpoints: (1) South Korean society, and how a pedagogy of the parasite helps to understand the dynamics of contemporary philosophy of education in a global context. South Korea is uniquely placed at the cusp and threshold of deterritorializing Western capitalism, given its position next to the only in-tact communist state system; (2) The film shows how theorizing an exceptional notion of time contributes to the overall pedagogy of the parasite. Here, being a parasite is about waiting to attach oneself to a host, yet this waiting is an anxious, perceptive, adherent time, a reciprocal time, and one internally interconnected to that of the host; (3) The ethics of the parasite. The parasite chooses a host from a certain viewpoint before attaching itself and trying to be absorbed into the host. The pedagogy of the parasite suggests a unique ethical treatment of these assimilative processes and allows us to consider cinema as a parasitic means to shake the passive audience out of its stupor when bearing witness to the violence in the film and its own collusion in the trauma and reality of contemporary capitalism.

This article explores the relationship between Gilles Deleuze's philosophical endeavours and Marxism, with a particular focus on his unfinished work, Grandeur de Marx. Despite the collapse of Soviet socialism, Deleuze acknowledged that his philosophical pursuits were profoundly intertwined with Marxist thought. His insistence on this connection was not a mere expression of regret or an apology for his political leanings. In the 1990s, as neoliberal globalisation spread beyond the United States and Europe, Marxism persisted as a rallying cry for resistance. The ascendancy of global capitalism was not a consequence of Marxism's failure; rather, it was a manifestation of what Marx had presciently predicted in his works. Thus, Deleuze's unfinished project on Marx can be viewed as a response to anti-Marxist reactionism from a distinct vantage point. While several interpretations of Deleuze's unwritten Marx exist, the argument in this essay is that Deleuze attempted to recreate the conditions for Marx's critical analysis by employing communism as an event.

Synthetic meat products promise to serve as inexpensive substitute proteins that can replace meat made through conventional animal agriculture. At least some of the excitement about these products stems from ethical and moral concerns regarding animal welfare, environmental costs, and human health. A governing idea behind the creation of substitute meat is that consumers will recognize the ethical and moral concerns of conventional production and substitute one (better) product for another (worse) product. This approach, however, overlooks a much more practical complication: the problem of indifference. That is,--consumer demand does not in practice greatly hinge on the well-known moral issues in conventional animal agriculture, as evident by the immense scale of the current meat market. In this paper, we ask how consumer indifference and producer strategy might influence the uptake of clean meat in the economic market. We suggest that thinking about the challenge in this way reveals powerful presuppositions that confuse our thinking about the potential of synthetic meat. Rather than understanding synthetic meat in terms of its substitution value, we propose approaching the challenge of synthetic meat from the standpoint of reasons-for and reasons-against. Doing so, we suggest, exposes the complications of “causal indeterminacy” that in turn implicate our thinking both about moral responsibility and the broader nature of technocratic solutions to environmental problems. We argue instead that synthetic meat offers an exciting and novel product, but likely not a substitute that will displace the conventional protein industry.