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34What is the acquisition argument?In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. 2003.Semantic realism, as I shall understand it it in this paper, is the combination of the views that sentential understanding is constituted by grasp of truth conditions and that the notion of truth which figures therein is essentially epistemically unconstrained. In a single slogan, understanding a sentence consists in some cases in grasp of potentially recognition-transcendent truth conditions. For example, a semantic realist about the past holds that our understanding of 'Caesar sneezed fifteen …Read more
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2Kripke's Wittgenstein, factualism and meaningIn Daniel Whiting (ed.), The later Wittgenstein on language, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.
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1Kripke's Wittgenstein and Kripke's causal-historical picture of referenceIn Martin Gustafsson, Oskari Kuusela & Jakub Mácha (eds.), Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein: The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond, Routledge. 2023.
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55An Introduction to Contemporary MetaethicsPolity. 2003.This introduction provides a highly readable critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth-century and contemporary metaethics. It traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent arguments between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A highly readable critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth century and contemporary metaethics. Asks: Are there mo…Read more
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248A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1997.This volume provides a survey of contemporary philosophy of language. As well as providing a synoptic view of the key issues, figures, concepts and debates, each essay makes new and original contributions to ongoing debate.
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4Michael Dummett (1925–)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Frege and Wittgenstein on the objectivity of sense Dummett's challenges to realism Anti‐realism Limitations and prospects Other work.
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70Meaning ScepticismIn Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Quine on Indeterminacy of Translation: The Argument from Below Quine on Indeterminacy of Translation: The Argument from Above Kripke's Wittgenstein's Attack on Meaning Conclusion.
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155The Argument From Queerness and the Normativity of MeaningIn Martin Grajner & Adolf Rami (eds.), Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz, Ontos. pp. 107-124In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or “ Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non- factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state fa…Read more
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35Judgement-Dependence, Tacit Knowledge and Linguistic UnderstandingIn Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis, Ontos. pp. 405-428. 2011.
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169Semantic Realism and the Argument from Motivational InternalismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 345-362. 2012.In his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke develops a famous argument that purports to show that there are no facts about what we mean by the expressions of our language: ascriptions of meaning, such as “Jones means addition by ‘+’” or Smith means green by ‘green’”, are according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein neither true nor false. Kripke’s Wittgenstein thus argues for a form of non-factualism about ascriptions of meaning: ascriptions of meaning do not purport to state …Read more
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9IntroductionIn Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.), Rule-Following and Meaning, Mcgill-queen's University Press. pp. 1-15. 2002.
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245Rule-Following and Meaning (edited book)Mcgill-Queen's University Press. 2002.The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This de…Read more
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65Wittgenstein, Quine and Dummett on Conventionalism about LogicThought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4): 292-301. 2014.
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129What is the manifestation argument?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4). 2002.I consider the well known “manifestation challenge” to semantic realism propounded by Michael Dummett, and further developed by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. I distinguish between strong and weak versions of the challenge, and show that anti–realists effectively concede that realism can meet the strong version. I then argue that the weak version is unmotivated. Building on work by John McDowell and Peter Strawson, and responding to criticisms from Wright, I argue further that the semantic realist…Read more
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265The Significance of Semantic RealismSynthese 136 (2): 191-217. 2003.This paper is concerned with the relationship between the metaphysical doctrine of realism about the external world and semantic realism, as characterised by Michael Dummett. I argue that Dummett's conception of the relationship is flawed, and that Crispin Wright's account of the relationship, although designed to avoid the problems which beset Dummett's, nevertheless fails for similar reasons. I then aim to show that despite the fact that Dummett and Wright both fail to give a plausible account…Read more
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102Thoughts, oughts and the conceptual primacy of beliefAnalysis 68 (3): 234-238. 2008.No Abstract
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187Rule-Following, Meaning, and Primitive NormativityMind 128 (511): 735-760. 2019.This paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s W…Read more
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232Rule-following and externalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 127-140. 2004.John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow
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66Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Acta Analytica 30 (2): 171-178. 2015.It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology f…Read more
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112Realism and AntirealismIn Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 983. 2006.This article questions whether, once the conception of metaphysics as grounded in the philosophy of language has been jettisoned, Dummett's arguments against semantic realism can retain any relevance to the realist/antirealist debate. By focussing on realism about the external world as an example, it reaches the conclusion that even without Dummett's conception of philosophy as grounded in the theory of meaning, his arguments against semantic realism do retain a limited but nevertheless genuine …Read more
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90Horwich, meaning and Kripke's WittgensteinPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 161-174. 2000.Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'us…Read more
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143Horwich, Meaning and Kripke’s WittgensteinPhilosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 161-174. 2000.Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'us…Read more