Alexander Montes

In this article, I argue that approximating virtues such as care and respectfulness are necessary to conduct an informed consent discussion for clinical trials adequately. I argue against Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism insofar as it claims that virtues do not have “advantages” over the principle of respecting autonomy. When we elaborate what it means to facilitate autonomy in a consent discussion adequately, we find we are describing the virtues. This is because virtues do have an advantage over principles insofar as virtues provide us with rich descriptions of not only what we should do (respect autonomy), but how to do so (with the virtues of respectfulness, care, etc.). Thus, the principle of respecting autonomy points back to the virtues. I conclude by showing how cultivation of these virtues can help rectify well-known shortcomings in the informed consent process.

In this article, I argue that approximating virtues such as care and respectfulness are necessary to conduct an informed consent discussion for clinical trials adequately. I argue against Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism insofar as it claims that virtues do not have “advantages” over the principle of respecting autonomy. When we elaborate what it means to facilitate autonomy in a consent discussion adequately, we find we are describing the virtues. This is because virtues do have an advantage over principles insofar as virtues provide us with rich descriptions of not only what we should do (respect autonomy), but how to do so (with the virtues of respectfulness, care, etc.). Thus, the principle of respecting autonomy points back to the virtues. I conclude by showing how cultivation of these virtues can help rectify well-known shortcomings in the informed consent process.

In recent decades, Western philosophy, including personalism, has had to face the question of how to respect the otherness of the personal Other, a challenge issued most famously by Emmanuel Levinas. In his Totality and Infinity, Levinas's conclusions about alterity are stark. The Other is beyond all conceptualization and precedes my activity as a subject. It is the Other who founds my own independent subjectivity as an "I."1 These are indeed radical conclusions, but they raise the question, Does the very term Other itself fully capture the alterity Levinas wishes to do justice to? The term Other (autrui) has a certain unavoidable generality and abstractness to it. Any person who is not myself, the world's population minus one, can be referred to by this term. Yet the Other is always richly distinguished in each case, for each Other is unique. I will argue that the personalist philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand reveals that the alterity of the Other rests on the more fundamental uniqueness of the content of our personhood. This content, which is a value, is disclosed in love, and it is indicated in the personal name. It is the name that, better than the term Other, captures the alterity of the personal Other.

In this article, I compare Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Dietrich von Hildebrand’s analyses of the look of the other to argue that personhood is more fundamental than individuality. Sartre restricts subjectivity to individual consciousness, which, qua individual, is defined as not being what others are. As a result, both freedom and selfhood for Sartre are defined as “nihilation.” By contrast, for von Hildebrand, the experience of the loving interpenetration of looks reveals both the self and the other as concrete values precisely insofar as they are persons. I conclude with the implications of this primacy of person over individual for understanding freedom. Both Sartre and von Hildebrand recognize our “fundamental” freedom of choosing our ends, which corresponds to our being individuals. However, only von Hildebrand recognizes that the highest freedom is not found in individual choice but, rather, in the “cooperative freedom” of personal love.