Alexander Shevchenko

The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.

The paper is a critical analysis of minimalistic interpretations of the notion of moral obligation. The main grounds and arguments for this interpretation are the liberal understanding of justice and priority of negative rights and obligations over positive ones. To move to a more expansive morality we need to change the balance between negative and positive obligations by reconsidering the status of general and positive obligations. However, raising the status of positive obligations immediately leads to the problem of “moral overburden”. One possible way to overcoming moral minimalism could be based on treating positive obligations as a correlate of a set of rights that cannot be ignored. An important qualification is that the recognition of the right to a resource does not automatically mean placing an obligation on all persons satisfying some eligibility criteria. Instead, it could lead to a moral division of labor when different people take on the responsibility to meet positive moral obligations to those with a legitimate “natural right”. An additional consequence is that this approach helps to cope with the “moral overburden” of a moral agent.

Growing philosophical interest in theories of obligation has many sources. Among the most important ones is the tendency to redefine the scope of the political. Then we are Inevitably confronted with the question about the nature and scope of our obligations towards others. An analysis of an important and popular distinction between obligations of justice and obligations of charity shows that their distinctive characteristics are seldom precise and clear-cut. Moreover, they are more superficial rather than substantive and do not allow to draw a clear line between obligatory and desirable behavior, or legally and morally obligatory behavior. In present-day ethical theory there is a tendency towards expanding the scope of obligations of justice and redefining their content. Actions whichtraditionally might have been considered as display of good nature are more and more often perceived as obligations avoidance of which is unjust. This also changes the role of institutions. The borders and content of individual obligations of justice should be considered in close connection with the problem of constructing just social institutions. The subjects of justice (the moral individual and the social institute) are interrelated and the search for an optimalbalance between two viewpoints – those of private interest and impartiality – becomes a unifying project both for political and moral philosophers.