Alexander V. Gheorghiu

Sandqvist gave a proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) for classical logic (CL) that explicates the meaning of the connectives without assuming bivalance. Later, he gave a semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). While soundness in both cases is proved through standard techniques, the proof completeness for CL is complex and somewhat obscure, but clear and simple for IPL. Makinson gave a simplified proof of the completeness of classical propositional logic by directly relating the P-tS to the logic’s extant truth-functional semantics. In this paper, we give an elementary, constructive, and native—in the sense that it does not presuppose the model-theoretic interpretation of classical logic—proof of the completeness of the P-tS of CL using the techniques used for IPL. Simultaneously, we give a proof of soundness and completeness for first-order intuitionistic logic (IL).

The _logic of bunched implications_ (BI) can be seen as the free combination of _intuitionistic propositional logic_ (IPL) and _intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic_ (IMLL). We present here a base-extension semantics (B-eS) for BI in the spirit of Sandqvist’s B-eS for IPL, deferring an analysis of proof-theoretic validity (in the sense of Dummett and Prawitz) to another occasion. Essential to BI’s formulation in proof-theoretic terms is the concept of a ‘bunch’ of hypotheses, a notion familiar from relevance logic. Bunches amount to trees whose internal vertices are labelled with either the IMLL or the IPL context-former and whose leaves are labelled with propositions or units for the context-formers. This structure presents significant technical challenges in setting up a base-extension semantics for BI. Our approach starts from the B-eS for IPL and the B-eS for IMLL and provides a systematic combination. Such a combination requires that base rules carry bunched structure, and so requires a more complex notion of derivability in a base and a correspondingly richer notion of support in a base. One reason why BI is a substructural logic of interest is that the ‘resource interpretation’ of its semantics, given in terms of sharing and separation and which gives rise to Separation Logic in the field of program verification, is quite distinct from the ‘number-of-uses’ interpretation of propositions in linear logic. This resource reading of BI provides useful intuitions in the formulation of its proof-theoretic semantics. We discuss a simple example of the use of the given B-eS in security modelling.

The development of logic has largely been through the deductive paradigm: conclusions are inferred from established premisses. However, the use of logic in the context of both human and machine reasoning is typically through the dual reductive perspective: collections of sufficient premisses are generated from putative conclusions. We call this paradigm, reductive logic. This expression of logic encompass as diverse reasoning activities as proving a formula in a formal system to seeking to meet a friend before noon on Saturday. This paper is a semantical analysis of reductive logic. In particular, we provide mathematical foundations for representing and reasoning about reduction operators. Heuristically, reduction operators may be thought of as ‘backwards’ inference rules. In this paper, we address their mathematical representation, how they are used in the context of reductive reasoning, and, crucially, what makes them valid.

Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is the approach to meaning in logic based on _proof_ (as opposed to truth). There are two major approaches to P-tS: proof-theoretic validity (P-tV) and base-extension semantics (B-eS). The former is a semantics of arguments, and the latter is a semantics of logical constants. This paper demonstrates that the B-eS for _intuitionistic propositional logic_ (IPL) encapsulates the declarative content of a version of P-tV based on the elimination rules. This explicates how the B-eS for IPL works, and shows the completeness of this version of P-tV.

Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is an innovative approach to grounding logical meaning in terms of proofs rather than traditional truth-conditional semantics. The point is not that one provides a proof system, but rather that one articulates meaning in terms of proofs and provability. To elucidate this paradigm shift, we commence with an introduction that contrasts the fundamental tenets of P-tS with the more prevalent model-theoretic approach to semantics. The contribution of this paper is a P-tS for a substructural logic, intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic (IMLL). Specifically, we meticulously examine and refine the established P-tS for intuitionistic propositional logic. Subsequently, we present two novel and comprehensive forms of P-tS for IMLL. Notably, the semantics for IMLL in this paper embodies its resource interpretation through its number-of-uses reading (restricted to atoms). This stands in contrast to the conventional model-theoretic semantics of the logic, underscoring the value that P-tS brings to substructural logics.

The reductive, as opposed to deductive, view of logic is the form of logic that is, perhaps, most widely employed in practical reasoning. In particular, it is the basis of logic programming. Here, building on the idea of uniform proof in reductive logic, we give a treatment of logic programming for BI, the logic of bunched implications, giving both operational and denotational semantics, together with soundness and completeness theorems, all couched in terms of the resource interpretation of BI’s semantics. We use this set-up as a basis for exploring how coalgebraic semantics can, in contrast to the basic denotational semantics, be used to describe the concrete operational choices that are an essential part of proof-search. The overall aim, toward which this paper can be seen as an initial step, is to develop a uniform, generic, mathematical framework for understanding the relationship between the deductive structure of logics and the control structures of the corresponding reductive paradigm.

Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is the paradigm of semantics in which meaning in logic is based on proof (as opposed to truth). A particular instance of P-tS for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) is its base-extension semantics (B-eS). This semantics is given by a relation called support, explaining the meaning of the logical constants, which is parameterized by systems of rules called bases that provide the semantics of atomic propositions. In this paper, we interpret bases as collections of definite formulae and use the operational view of them as provided by uniform proof-search—the proof-theoretic foundation of logic programming (LP)—to establish the completeness of IPL for the B-eS. This perspective allows negation, a subtle issue in P-tS, to be understood in terms of the negation-as-failure protocol in LP. Specifically, while the denial of a proposition is traditionally understood as the assertion of its negation, in B-eS we may understand the denial of a proposition as the failure to find a proof of it. In this way, assertion and denial are both prime concepts in P-tS.

We give a novel approach to proving soundness and completeness for a logic (henceforth: the object-logic) that bypasses truth-in-a-model to work directly with validity. Instead of working with specific worlds in specific models, we reason with eigenworlds (i.e., generic representatives of worlds) in an arbitrary model. This reasoning is captured by a sequent calculus for a _meta_-logic (in this case, first-order classical logic) expressive enough to capture the semantics of the object-logic. Essentially, one has a calculus of validity for the object-logic. The method proceeds through the perspective of reductive logic (as opposed to the more traditional paradigm of deductive logic), using the space of reductions as a medium for showing the behavioural equivalence of reduction in the sequent calculus for the object-logic and in the validity calculus. Rather than study the technique in general, we illustrate it for the logic of Bunched Implications (BI), thus IPL and MILL (without negation) are also treated. Intuitively, BI is the free combination of intuitionistic propositional logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, which renders its meta-theory is quite complex. The literature on BI contains many similar, but ultimately different, algebraic structures and satisfaction relations that either capture only fragments of the logic (albeit large ones) or have complex clauses for certain connectives (e.g., Beth’s clause for disjunction instead of Kripke’s). It is this complexity that motivates us to use BI as a case-study for this approach to semantics.