Alexander Velichkov

The standard account of guilt states that it is fitting (and/or deserved) for an agent to feel the emotion of guilt only if she is blameworthy. This chapter proposes and defends the Moral Debt Account of guilt, according to which guilt is fitting when an agent has a moral debt in virtue of a disrupted moral relationship. This allows for guilt to be fitting when the agent is morally innocent, for example, when she is in a state of epistemic uncertainty, possesses inequitable benefits, or all-things-considered justifiably harms or wrongs another. Furthermore, the Moral Debt Account has the resources to accommodate the intuition that agents do not deserve to suffer the pain of guilt when they are not blameworthy.

This essay investigates how Søren Kierkegaard’s leap of faith can be viewed as a sublime esthetic experience along the lines of the theories of Longinus and Edmund Burke. In Kierkegaard leaps of faith incorporate feelings of terror and passion. Grounded in notions of eternity and truth, they create occasions for particular kinds of sublime experiences. To Kierkegaard the leap of faith is the step by which one grows into one’s authentic self. This essay suggests that the leap of faith is significant also because of its intrinsic esthetic value.