Alexander Wentzell

This paper examines the connection between two distinct mental phenomena: attention and phenomenal consciousness. I identify two types of views. Equivalency views maintain that attention is both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Dissociationist views deny this. This paper presents a novel argument for dissociationism, by way of an empirical phenomenon called “inattentional blindness.” Inattentional blindness occurs when subjects engaged in an attention-demanding task fail to see an otherwise visible but task-irrelevant stimulus. Dialectically, IB is unanimously cited by proponents of equivalency views as providing empirical support for their claims. I argue this thinking is backward: short of evincing equivalency views, inattentional blindness experiments create a dilemma. Resolved in one way, this dilemma falsifies the sufficiency claim. Resolved in the other, it falsifies the necessity claim. Thus, short of supporting the view, IB shows equivalency views are false. I close by considering how this result also limits which dissociationist view enjoys empirical support as well.

The Molyneux question asks: would a blind person, who knows spheres and cubes only from touch, be able to recognize these shapes visually immediately upon becoming sighted, without touching them? Molyneux himself answered no. Locke accepted Molyneux’s negative answer. But Locke’s answer appears inconsistent with the doctrine of common sensibles, according to which some ideas are given in more than one sense modality. Motivated by alleviating this tension, philosophers have put forth several interpretations of Locke’s views on shape perception. Here I motivate a novel interpretation of Locke that can better resolve the tension.

The goal of this thesis is to provide an account of phenomenal unity, the togetherness felt between our conscious experiences. I begin in the first chapter by spelling out the target phenomenon in more detail. I organize the discussion around the analysis question—what does phenomenal unity consist in or reduce to?—and clarify the desiderata we want an answer to the analysis question to meet. In the second and third chapter, I look at answers to the analysis question, organized under two broad headings. In the second chapter, I examine a slate of monistic theories, which argue that phenomenal unity consists in a single relation which holds between phenomenal experiences. In the third chapter, I examine pluralistic theories, which argue that phenomenal unity consists in a plurality of relations between phenomenal experiences. My overall aim is twofold: 1) argue for a pluralistic approach to the analysis question, and 2) argue for a specific pluralistic account, the many relations account. Once I have argued for my specific pluralistic account, I apply it to other questions surrounding phenomenal unity in chapter 4.