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94. The Reasons that Goodness GivesIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 98-127. 2014.
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69Privacy and justificationRes Publica 12 (3): 223-248. 2006.In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel’s claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture’. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel’s desire to leave the social and …Read more
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7BibliographyIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 213-220. 2014.
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75. The Consistency ArgumentIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 128-160. 2014.
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70Luck egalitarianism and what valuing responsibility requiresCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2): 193-217. 2018.
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182. Perfectionist GoodsIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 37-67. 2014.
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97. ConclusionIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 202-212. 2014.
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106. The Location of UnfairnessIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 161-201. 2014.
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111. Perfectionism: Some Basic DistinctionsIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 16-36. 2014.
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93. Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and ObjectionsIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 68-97. 2014.
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1361Copyright and Freedom of Expression: a Philosophical MapIn Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano & Alain Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, Basingstoke & N.y.: Palgrave Mcmillan. 2008.
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87Reactive Attitudes, Forgiveness, and the Second-Person StandpointEthical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5): 1309-1323. 2016.Philosophers discussing forgiveness have usually been split between those who think that forgiveness is typically virtuous, even when the wrongdoer doesn’t repent, and those who think that, for forgiveness to be virtuous, certain pre-conditions must be satisfied. I argue that Darwall’s second-personal account of morality offers significant theoretical support for the latter view. I argue that if, as Darwall claims, reactive attitudes issue a demand, this demand needs to be adequately answered fo…Read more
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70. IntroductionIn Liberal Perfectionism: The Reasons That Goodness Gives, De Gruyter. pp. 1-15. 2014.
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |