Alexandre Le Nepvou

This article proposes a fundamental reversal in metaphysical orientation: instead of grounding existence in being, it interprets being as a local articulation within a more primary ontological condition. Drawing from phenomenology, process philosophy, and structural realism, the paper develops a non-substantialist ontology of configuration, wherein entities are not primitives but outcomes of differential stabilization. Existence is not treated as a genus, a property, or a quantifier, but as a transcendental operator of ontological effectuation, a pre-categorial regime that enables the emergence, articulation, and intelligibility of being. This framework challenges classical ontologies and redefines the role of general philosophy as the epistemology of effectuation, rather than the doctrine of objects. The model introduces a stratified account of ontological configurations, to be further developed in subsequent work.

This paper proposes a structural account of scientific laws as stabilized residues of constraint regimes, rather than as metaphysical primitives or regularities. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of science and structural ontology, we argue that lawhood arises from the persistence of invariant patterns across admissible variations within a regime of constraint. Our framework reconceives laws as functional invariants extracted from the internal architecture of scientific models, formalized via projection operators and local neighborhoods in constraint space. This structural residue approach captures the operational role of laws in guiding prediction, explanation, and theoretical unification, while remaining neutral on ontological commitments to universals or modal realism. We compare our proposal with alternative accounts of lawhood, including counterfactual stability (Lange) and interventionist invariance (Woodward), and conclude by outlining the implications of our framework for the natural and social sciences.

Article accepted by Erkenntnis. This paper proposes a structural account of scientific laws as stabilized residues of constraint regimes, rather than as metaphysical primitives or regularities. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of science and structural ontology, we argue that lawhood arises from the persistence of invariant patterns across admissible variations within a regime of constraint. Our framework reconceives laws as functional invariants extracted from the internal architecture of scientific models, formalized via projection operators and local neighborhoods in constraint space. This structural residue approach captures the operational role of laws in guiding prediction, explanation, and theoretical unification, while remaining neutral on ontological commitments to universals or modal realism. We compare our proposal with alternative accounts of lawhood, including counterfactual stability (Lange) and interventionist invariance (Woodward), and conclude by outlining the implications of our framework for the natural and social sciences.