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    External Validity: Is There Still a Problem?
    Philosophy of Science 82 (5): 1308-1317. 2015.
    I first propose to distinguish between two kinds of external validity inferences, predictive and explanatory. I then argue that we have a satisfactory answer to the question of the conditions under which predictive external validity inferences are good. If this claim is correct, then it has two immediate consequences: First, some external validity inferences are deductive, contrary to what is commonly assumed. Second, Steel’s requirement that an account of external validity inference break what …Read more
  •  44
    Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race isn’t a cause. I object that their argument is invalid and that its key premise is unwarranted. I also criticize the criterion, which I call ‘Holland’s rule’, the counterfactual approach relies on to distinguish causes from non-causes. Finally, I argue that racial discrimination cannot be causally explained unless one assumes race to be a cause. I conclude that the view that race is not a cause lacks support and that th…Read more