Alexis Karpouzos

The Question of a Spacetime without Centre From Aristotle to Kant, Western philosophy approached space and time primarily as conditions of the possibility of experience or as properties of reality. In the Aristotelian tradition, space is defined topologically — as the place of bodies — and time arithmetically — as 'the number of motions with respect to before and after'. In Kantian critical philosophy, space and time become a priori forms of intuition, transcendental conditions of all phenomenal experience. Yet in both traditions a common assumption is preserved: space and time are structures that organise phenomena from a — however implicit — centre of reference. Alexis Karpouzos radically challenges this assumption. The Spherical Spacetime he introduces is neither place nor intuition; it is a dynamic ontological structure that refuses every privileged point of reference, every external centre, every principle that precedes the very movement of the world. The question posed from the outset is this: what does it mean to think a spacetime that does not 'contain' beings but is the very manner in which beings are? And what ontological consequences does this displacement carry for the understanding of existence, consciousness, and truth? Pan-Centricity: The Overcoming of the Metaphysics of the Arché Western metaphysics was shaped in large measure as a search for a first principle — a privileged point of departure that explains and grounds all others. Thales declared water to be the arché, Anaximander the apeiron, Pythagoras number. In the great metaphysical tradition that followed, this principle assumed different names — God, Logos, Subject, Spirit, Will — but always preserved the structure of a privileged centre from which meaning radiates outward. Even where Western philosophy appears to abandon this model — as in Nietzsche's 'death of God' — it continues to define itself negatively in relation to it: the absence of a centre is experienced as loss, as nihilism, as a crisis of meaning. Karpouzos takes a different step: he does not mourn the absence of a centre, nor does he seek a new centre to replace the lost one — he proposes that the very structure of existence is pan-centric. Pan-Centricity as an Ontological Position For there to be no privileged centre does not mean there is no structure at all. It means that every point of existence is simultaneously centre and periphery — that every being, in its singularity, expresses a relation to the whole that cannot be reduced to any common denominator. This position appears, on first reading, paradoxical: how can every point be a centre if there is no centre? Karpouzos's answer is that the paradox arises from the insistence on the geometric image of the centre — a unique point from which all others are defined. If we relinquish this image, pan-centricity becomes intelligible as mutual constitution: each being is defined by its relation to every other, and none precedes ontologically the relations that constitute it. The closest parallel position in the Western tradition is found in Spinoza: the Substantia as absolute totality expressing itself in infinite attributes and infinite modi, each of which expresses the single substance in its own manner. Yet in Spinoza the Substantia remains — at least stylistically — a privileged foundation. In Karpouzos there is no such foundation: the totality does not precede the relations, but is precisely those relations in their dynamic mutual constitution. The Heraclitean tradition offers a fertile convergence here. For Heraclitus, 'everything flows' — reality is flux, and flux has no fixed point of departure. The One that emerges through the Many is not a separate principle standing apart from the Many, but the very manner in which the Many sustain one another in their opposition. Spherical Spacetime takes up this intuition and gives it systematic ontological articulation.