Alfie Polistico

This study seeks to trace the philosophy of education of Dietrich von Hildebrand in his value theory borne out of his phenomenological realism. To achieve this aim, the study analyzes von Hildebrand’s phenomenological explorations in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, anthropology, and philosophy of love, which are anchored on the polarity of value on the side of the object and value-response on the side of the subject. Behind the interaction of these two fundamental realities in the said areas of philosophy is von Hildebrand’s philosophy of education, which aims at forming the three centers of the human person: the mind, the will, and the heart. The quality of the value-responses of the three centers—cognitive, volitive, and affective—depends solely on value conformity. The nature of this educative formation is values education that enables the human person to become a genuine personality. This study argues for the following: First, von Hildebrand’s philosophy of education is based on values. In relation to this, the nature of von Hildebrand’s education is values education or value conformity, the purpose of which is to transform the human being from being a person to becoming a personality. A genuine personality is someone who has overcome the challenge of egoism. Second, personality formation consists of the education of the mind, the will, and the heart, whose harmony is manifested by the appropriateness of the human person’s value-response to a value at hand. Third, to concretize such education, the study lays down the following: the aims of values education, the method of education, the curriculum, the role of the teacher, and the role of the student.

The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica (henceforth, ST) since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate (henceforth, Dv), there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief.

The paper argues that Roque J. Ferriols [1924-2021] and Leonardo N. Mercado [1935-2020] simultaneously converge and diverge in their understanding of the value of the Philippine languages in the flourishing of Filipino philosophy. On the one hand, these philosophers converge in seeing the vitality of local languages in philosophizing. On the other hand, they diverge because Ferriols' trajectory is centrifugal while Mercado's is centripetal. Ferriols' centrifugal orientation is conditioned by his belief that there is no Filipino philosophy and that developing one is a pointless endeavor. Mercado's centripetal orientation is conditioned by his belief that a local language is a locus for philosophical investigation because it mirrors a worldview. In this paper, I first show their point of convergence by exploring the context that disposes them to focus their attention on a local language. Second, I show that their point of divergence is seen in the way they see a local language: Ferriols sees it as a way to express a worldview, while Mercado sees it as a way to investigate a worldview. Third, I propose that a synthesis of the thoughts of these two influential Filipino priest-philosophers contributes to the ongoing study on the development of Filipino philosophy in the postmodern Philippines.

The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate, there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief.