Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera

While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some rival definitions of fictional characters found in the literature, explaining why FIST is preferable. Finally, I briefly delve into the implications of FIST for other issues related to the nature of fictional characters.

La intuición de que uno sólo puede ser responsable de sus propios actos es extraordinariamente fuerte y parece establecer un vínculo entre la identidad personal y la responsabilidad moral. Las teorías neo-lockeanas de la identidad personal obtienen parte de su atractivo por su capacidad para dar cuenta de dicho vínculo. En este artículo analizo cómo el problema de la duplicación para las teorías neo-lockeanas afecta a su capacidad para dar cuenta del vínculo entre la identidad personal y la responsabilidad moral. Concluyo que, dentro de un marco neo-lockeano, las teorías cuatridimensionalistas son las que mejor pueden dar cuenta de dicho vínculo.

Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen in real life. Then, I explain how this model can be adapted to account for the suspension of disbelief that occurs in the special case of identification with fictional characters.

This article presents a critical assesment of Dennett’s narrative self theory as a personal identity theory. First it is contextualized in regard to the debate on personal identity in the decade of 1980, then Dennett’s theory is presented in the light of Strawson’s analysis of Narrativity, the criticisms received by Dennett’s theory and by narrative theories in general are put in relationship, and finally it is shown how Dennett’s theory could help the actual supporters of narrative identity theories to reformulate their arguments in defense to the received criticisms. Thus I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Dennett’s theory and to claim for its relevance in the actual debate about personal identity in analytic philosophy

Los viajes de Gulliver, de Jonathan Swift, es una de las obras más conocidas de la literatura universal. Sin embargo su recepción actual, al menos en España, se produce sobre todo a través de adaptaciones en las que no se puede apreciar la profundidad de la obra literaria original. En este estudio se pretende profundizar en el análisis de Los viajes de Gulliver a través de una comparación con Don Quijote en lo que al uso de sus recursos paródicos se refiere: mientras Don Quijote parodia los libros de caballerías, Los viajes de Gulliver parodia los libros de viajes. El principal objetivo de esta comparación no será tanto demostrar una influencia de la obra de Cervantes sobre la de Swift, como iluminar algunos aspectos de Los viajes de Gulliver.

In a successful series of papers, Schroer and Schroer presented a reductionist narrative account of personal identity. They claimed that their reductionist account had advantages over traditional narrative theories. In this paper I intend to show that they were wrong. Although it is possible to defend a reductionist narrative account, the Schroers’ theory has a problem of circularity. And solving that problem will cause their theory to have much more problems than non-reductionist narrative theories. Consequently, they should either present a new and improved reductionist narrative account, or accept that non-reductionist narrative theories are better suited to account for the problem of personal identity.

We have a strong intuition that personal identity is a determinate relationship. Parfit famously challenged this intuition. In this paper I explain how narrative identity theories can face that challenge and defend that personal identity is determinate thanks to what I call the social narrativity thesis. This move will raise some concerns regarding the also strong intuition that personal identity is what matters when we care about our future existence. I address this concern to show that narrative identity theories can account for both intuitions at the same time.

RESUMENEl cine de Wong Kar-Wai es, principalmente, un cine sobre el tiempo. El director chino explora en sus películas la relación del sujeto con la temporalidad en la que se encuentra, mostrando el complejo entramado que une el pasado, el presente y el futuro en una tela que, al igual que la de Penélope, se teje tanto como se desteje. Quizá el mejor exponente de esta situación sea esa suerte de trilogía formada por Días salvajes (1990), Deseando amar (2000) y 2046 (2004), unida no por su argumento sino por la temática que abordan: el conflicto que viven unos personajes al encontrarse atrapados dentro de una temporalidad que sienten ajena o injusta.PALABRAS CLAVEWONG KAR-WAI, 2046, MEMORIA, IDENTIDADABSTRACTThe films by Wong Kar-Wai are primarily about time. This Chinese director explores in his films the subject’s relationship to the temporality in which he is, showing the complex network that links the past, the present and the future in a cloth which, like that of Penelope’s, is as much woven as unravelled. Perhaps the best example of this situation is that sort of trilogy formed by Days of Being Wild (1990), In the Mood for Love (2000) and 2046 (2004), linked not by their argument but because they address the same issue: the conflict that the characters live since they are trapped within a temporality that they feel alien or unfair.KEYWORDSWONG KAR-WAI, 2046, MEMORY, IDENTITY

In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ criticisms and justify the use of thought experiments in the debate of personal identity. This will allow us to see why Beck and Wagner were both half right and half wrong in their discussion.

Narrative theories of personal identity have traditionally taken literary characters as models to better understand how our identities are constituted through the narratives of our lives. However, there have been several recent criticisms of these comparisons, showing that philosophers of personal identity paid no attention to the nature of literary characters, and consequently, these philosopher’s comparisons were under-motivated. In the present article, I rely on a cognitive framework to define literary characters. From that point of view, I assert that it is fruitful to compare ourselves with literary characters to understand the role that the narratives told by others about ourselves play in the constitution of our own personal identities.

En este artículo argumento a favor de dos tesis. Primero, defiendo que las teorías narrativas de la identidad personal deben comprometerse con la intuición de que la identidad es una relación determinada. Segundo, muestro cómo las teorías narrativas pueden ser exitosas en este empeño dando cabida a la dimensión social de nuestra existencia en tanto personas. Para organizar mi exposición me centro en uno de los casos más conflictivos para las teorías de la identidad personal: los casos de duplicación. Ante estos casos, las únicas opciones disponibles parecen ser bien aceptar que la identidad personal es indeterminada, o bien dar una respuesta arbitraria que permita conservar la determinación de la identidad a costa de vaciar la relación de identidad de toda su importancia práctica. Argumentaré por qué las teorías narrativas pueden escapar de ese dilema mediante una tercera vía.