Ali Akbar Abdolabadi

One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical intuitionism relates to its scope. Does Moore's ethical intuitionism only relate to the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, or beside those terms and judgments or propositions, it relate to the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them? In this paper, we will try to show, by an analytic - critical method, that contrary to some of Moore's interpreters/critics, the scope of Moore's ethical intuitionism never includes the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, but confines to the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them. At the same time, we will try to show that among the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, only the adjective “Good” and the ethical judgments or propositions containing the predicate “Good” are the objects of Moore's ethical intuitionism.

The concept of “Transcendental” is the most fundamental concept of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Hence, understanding Kant’s epistemology is based on understanding the meaning, the use, and the function of this concept in his view. Regarding some instances of the concept of “Transcendental” in Kant’s Critique of pure reason, we will try in this paper, by using a descriptive-analytic method, to show that in what sense and how Kant’s theoretical philosophy, unlike all the “Transcendent-centered” rationalistic and empiricist philosophies before him, is a “Transcendental-centred” philosophy. To do this, we will try, by presenting Kant’s analysis of the logical structure and function of the judgments of understanding, to illustrate the presence of the concept of “Transcendental” in Kant’s epistemology in the form of a series of non-empirical elements, especially the element of “the unity of pure self-consciousness”.

In this paper, I have tried to present, by a descriptive – analytic method, an analytical description of, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid's ethical theory - which is known as "Common-Sense Intuitionism" – on the way of perceiving and acknowledging the moral values and norms, and through this analytical description, answering these two questions: "How far does the scope of Reid's ethical intuitionism contain?" and "What is Reid's explanation of the origin of moral error?" With reference to the above-mentioned analytical description, and by clarifying some of the pros and cons of Reid's ethical theory, I have tried to show, first, "Whether Reid's ethical theory is a justified, defensible and acceptable theory in justifying the validity of ethical knowledge?" And then, “Whether Reid's explanation of the origin of men's moral error is a sufficient explanation?"

One of the fundamental questions about Moore's ethical intuitionism is that what role the intuition plays in the formation of ethical concepts and judgments. In this paper, I have scrutinized Moore's answer by an analytic method, and by differentiating the two meanings of “Intuition” in his views, i.e. the intuition of the property of “Goodness”-which I have called “Intuition ”- and the intuition of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”-which I have called “Intuition ”-I have reached these results: 1) Intuition influences on the formation of ethical concepts by the concept of “Goodness” as the cause of the ethical concepts; 2) Intuition influences on the formation of ethical judgments by the simple concept of “Goodness”; 3) Intuition influences on the formation of the complex ethical concepts by the simple predicate “Good”; 4) Intuition, by virtue of the self-evidence and necessary truth of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”, influences on the formation of other propositions or judgments.