Ali Sharaf

This paper focuses on the role played by doubt in shaping faith as a mental state in humans. In contemporary discussions on faith, doubt refutes a theory or supports another. However, the crucial question remains: is doubt an essential element inherent in faith? This paper argues that doubt is a fundamental and necessary component of faith, especially when considering faith as a virtue. The first part of this paper sets the framework for this study by addressing some crucial relevant questions, such as what the necessary aspects of faith are. Is faith a virtue? The second part argues that, given the account of faith developed in the first part of the study, doubt is a necessary element and component of faith for it to be considered a virtue. This study’s methodology is founded on critically examining primary and secondary sources relevant to faith as a virtue and engaging in conceptual and argumentative analyses.

This paper explores the phenomenon of moral shock in the context of the Palestinian conflict, with a view to understanding its implications for global ethical reactions. It suggests that moral shock may have moral significance and the potential for a positive impact at the global level. The paper is structured in three sections. The first explores the concept of moral shock. The second examines the armed conflict in Palestine through a moral shock perspective, highlighting specific aspects and incidents within the conflict that could potentially lead to moral distress. The third section discusses the broader implications of moral shock in this context. It suggests that moral shock may lead to positive outcomes by highlighting global responses to the ongoing events and showing how people worldwide react to these events.

In the Buddhist tradition, there is an expansive collection of texts that explore the topic of ethics, addressing moral questions concerning the right and wrong behaviors, virtues, vices, and so forth. However, when examining the main texts of this tradition, we find an absence of a structured moral philosophy that systematically and critically analyzes moral values and principles. Therefore, Buddhist scholars have responded in different ways to the perplexing situation in which Buddhism largely lacks an explicit theory in moral philosophy. Some scholars argue that we should read Buddhist moral teachings as one of the contemporary ethical theories, such as consequentialism or virtue ethics. Damien Keown is one of the scholars who claims that “virtue ethics” is the best way to understand Buddhist ethics. This paper analyzes and critiques Damien Kewon’s reading of Buddhist moral teachings as Virtue ethics. I argue that such interpretation poses problems, primarily because it may overlook key aspects of Buddhist beliefs deemed inconsequential to contemporary ethical debates, and secondly, it could result in the imposition of non-authentic Buddhist ideas on Buddhist ethics.

In _Moral Saints_, Susan Wolf raises a question for morality in general: should we strive to be perfectly moral, even though being a moral saint does not entail having a perfectly good life? Wolf answers that moral saints represent an undesirable and unattractive human ideal because they lack the “ability to enjoy the enjoyable in life” (Wolf 424). Accordingly, Wolf objects to both utilitarianism and Kantianism, claiming that these ethical theories present moral sainthood as an ideal. While this paper does not object to Wolf’s account of moral sainthood, it argues against Wolf’s objections to Kantianism in three parts. First (1), I explain Wolf’s argument and objections to Kantianism; second (2), I respond to Wolf’s objections against the ‘non-ideal’ Kantian saint interpretation; and third (3), I respond to Wolf’s objections against the ‘ideal’ Kantian saint interpretation. This paper concludes that Kantianism does not present moral sainthood as a human ideal.__.