The paper explores the possibility of a philosophically rigorous dialogue between Islam and Buddhism through a comparative analysis of the ontological frameworks of Ibn ʿArabī and Nāgārjuna. Rather than pursuing doctrinal reconciliation or metaphysical synthesis, it advances a method of structural analogy without conceptual reduction, identifying parallel philosophical strategies while preserving the internal coherence and irreducible differences of each tradition. The central claim is that both…
Read moreThe paper explores the possibility of a philosophically rigorous dialogue between Islam and Buddhism through a comparative analysis of the ontological frameworks of Ibn ʿArabī and Nāgārjuna. Rather than pursuing doctrinal reconciliation or metaphysical synthesis, it advances a method of structural analogy without conceptual reduction, identifying parallel philosophical strategies while preserving the internal coherence and irreducible differences of each tradition. The central claim is that both thinkers articulate sustained critiques of intrinsic existence and substantialist metaphysics, convergent in structure and soteriological intent, even though they diverge decisively in their ultimate ontological commitments. The paper proceeds in four stages. First, it establishes a methodological framework grounded in philosophical analysis rather than theology, understanding this as a choice of register rather than a denial of either tradition’s religious character. It uses the term “tradition” to avoid imposing unshared categories such as revelation, prophecy, or divine agency, brackets doctrinal closure rather than soteriological motivation, and resists politically or irenically motivated harmonization. Second, it reconstructs Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology within philosophical Sufism by examining the primacy of Being (wujūd), the conceptual status of quiddity (māhiyya), and the experiential significance of fanāʾ as the realization of ontological dependency. Third, it reconstructs Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy through the doctrine of the Two Truths and dependent origination, emphasizing the denial of svabhāva (more precisely rendered as “without metaphysical substrate”) and the non-reifying function of emptiness (śūnyatā). Emptiness is interpreted not as an ultimate substance, but as a critical method for dismantling essentialist assumptions in service of liberation. The final section brings these frameworks into dialogue by focusing on three shared concerns: the denial of intrinsic existence, the relational constitution of phenomena, and the nature of ultimate insight. While Ibn ʿArabī negates finite autonomy in order to affirm absolute Being, Nāgārjuna negates reification without affirming any ultimate metaphysical ground. The paper concludes by presenting this comparison as an example of complementarity in intertraditional philosophy – aimed not at conversion or synthesis, but at mutual understanding and philosophical enrichment – demonstrating how meaningful dialogue between theistic and non-theistic traditions can proceed without reduction.