Alice Baderin

Political theory promises guidance about how we ought to organize our political lives. For example, how do we fairly share resources in contexts of scarcity? What are the proper limits to democratic authority? Who should bear the costs of tackling climate change? These topics - the subject matter of normative inquiry in political theory - are commonly also the focus of social scientific research that explains and describes the political world. This raises challenging questions about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. Should theories of distributive justice reflect popular beliefs about fairness? Does evidence about what happens in real world deliberations disrupt deliberative democratic theory? If political theorists should take empirical evidence seriously, what kinds of data should they be most interested in? How deeply does this evidence enter into normative inquiry, and what are the challenges involved in bringing it to bear? This volume brings together scholars working at the intersection of political theory and social science to address these questions. It combines detailed discussion of examples of interdisciplinary research with a wider reflection on the normative significance of empirical evidence. In Part One, contributors explore the role of different forms of social scientific inquiry, including ethnography, qualitative interviewing, and survey research. Part Two shows how work on specific topics in contemporary political theory either has been or should be informed by empirical evidence. By presenting diverse models of data-sensitive political theory, the authors aim to generate new insights into why, and how, empirical evidence matters to normative thinking about politics.

Contemporary egalitarian theory has been shaped by a debate between distributive and relational perspectives. Relational egalitarians argue that equality is primarily about the character of our social and political relationships, rather than the pattern of distribution of goods. But they often also claim that distributive and relational ideals are connected in practice, because material inequality impairs our ability to stand as social and political equals. Using a survey experiment, we assess the impact of material inequality on relational equality. We show that priming income inequality increases perceptions of unequal social status; but it does not affect perceived equal political standing, or the extent to which respondents affirm the ideal of relational equality. We argue that this empirical approach yields deeper payoffs for conceptual and normative questions about relational equality; and it contributes to wider methodological debates about the role of survey data in normative political theory.

In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the academic arena, to illuminate problems in how political theorists treat empirical data in the course of their normative work. Drawing on examples from the literature on the social bases of self-respect, I show that political theorists too are vulnerable to the motivationally biased treatment of data. I suggest that this problem can helpfully be located on the same broad terrain Galeotti outlines, between lying and mistakes. I also identify some potential analogues, for the academic sphere, of Galeotti's proposed remedies for political SD. The paper goes on to reflect on how Galeotti herself employs empirical evidence in developing her account of self-deception. In particular, I challenge the empirical basis of her assumption that political self-deception is significantly more predictable, and therefore preventable, than political lying. My discussion seeks to show that, in addition to its intended contribution to the study of political deception, Political Self-Deception offers a valuable perspective on recent debates about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. However, approaching the book from this methodological angle reveals, in turn, some weaknesses in the empirical foundations of one of Galeotti's own key normative claims.

This paper explores contemporary debates about the meaning and value of realism in political theory. I seek to move beyond the widespread observation that realism encompasses a diverse set of critiques and commitments, by urging that we recognize two key strands in recent realist thought. Detachment realists claim that political theory is excessively abstract and infeasible and thereby fails adequately to inform actual political decision-making. Displacement critics, on the other hand, suggest that political theory threatens or disrespects real politics. Not only are these visions of realism very different, there are also important tensions between them. I focus, in particular, on clarifying and evaluating the more complex charge that political theory displaces politics.

How should political theorists go about their work if they are democrats? Given their democratic commitments, should they develop theories that are responsive to the views and concerns of their fellow citizens at large? Is there a balance to be struck, within political theory, between truth seeking and democratic responsiveness? The article addresses this question about the relationship between political theory, public opinion and democracy. I criticize the way in which some political theorists have appealed to the value of democratic legitimacy in an attempt to justify a more opinion-sensitive approach to their work. Specifically, I identify a problematic model in the existing literature, which I term ‘democratic restraint’: an approach on which the theorist moderates her normative principles in response to evidence about public attitudes in order to enhance the legitimacy of her account. This model renders the discipline newly vulnerable to an otherwise misguided objection that political theory seeks to pre-empt democratic politics. I trace the problem with the democratic restraint model to its flawed underlying conception of democratic legitimacy. The article then outlines a more appealing ‘democratic underlabourer’ view of the status of political theory and draws out the implications of this alternative account for the role of public opinion.

The paper explores whether the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) in ethics and political philosophy should be individual or public in character. I defend a modestly public conception of RE, in which public opinion is used specifically as a source of considered judgments about cases. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in delivering judgments that are untainted by principled commitments. A case-based approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation of popular attitudes. This conception of RE is situated in relation to alternative accounts, including those of Daniels, Rawls, and Wolff and de-Shalit.