Alice Serra

Atomic-scale computer simulation has been used to study the thermally activated atomic transport of self-interstitial atoms in the form of planar clusters in pure Cu and f -Fe. There is strong evidence that such clusters are commonly formed in metals during irradiation with high-energy particles and play an important role in accumulation and spatial distribution of surviving defects. An extensive study of the mobility of SIA clusters containing two to 331 interstitials has been carried out using the molecular dynamics simulation technique for the temperature range from 180 to 1200 K. The results obtained show that clusters larger than three to four SIAs are one-dimensionally mobile in both Cu and Fe. Large clusters of more than 100 SIAs in Cu and 300 SIAs in Fe have significantly reduced mobility. The problem of describing one-dimensional motion in three-dimensional space is discussed. An attempt is made to describe the mobility of SIA clusters within the approximation of 1D diffusion. For clusters in both metals the effective migration energy of 1D diffusion as estimated via the jump frequency of the cluster centre of mass is found to be independent of the number of SIAs in the clusters, although the cluster jump frequency decreases with increasing cluster size. Mechanisms of 1D mobility of interstitial clusters are discussed

In seinem Text „Le retour de l’événement“ (1972) greift Edgar Morin zunächst die Entgegensetzung zwischen Geschehen (événement) und Struktur auf: zwischen der Singularität, der Kontingenz, dem Zufälligen, dem Unwahrscheinlichen usw. des Geschehens einerseits, und dem Allgemeinen, der Regelmäßigkeit, der Wiederholbarkeit usw. der Struktur andererseits. Merkwürdigerweise ordnet er auch das Erlebnis (vécu) und den phänomenalen Zug (caractère phénoménal) dem Geschehen zu und versucht die Verbindung zwischen Geschehen-Zufall (accident-événement) und Struktur-System (système-structure) im Aufkommen des Lebens und des Menschen unter anderen Vorkommnissen zu begründen (Morin 1972, S. 8): immer dann, wenn die Entstehung als ursprüngliches Geschehen (événement originaire) gelte, dessen Fortleben durch organisatorische Strukturen ermöglicht werde, wie zum Beispiel nach der unvorhersehbaren Entstehung des Lebens seine strukturale Bewahrung durch Homöostase (Morin 1972, S. 10). Ausgehend von einer anderen Entgegensetzung – zwischen dem auf eine „zeitliche Ontologie“ hinweisenden Begriff des Geschehens und dem auf einer „räumlichen Ontologie“ begründeten Begriff des Elements – versucht er zu zeigen, dass die Zeitlichkeit des Geschehens auch für diejenigen Prozesse gelte, die zunächst aus dessen Negativität ausgeschlossen worden seien, vor allem die evolutiv-genetischen Ansätze aus den Naturwissenschaften, aber auch Richtungen der Geisteswissenschaften, für die weiterhin evolutionistische, mechanistische und kausalistische Paradigmen leitend seien (Morin 1972, S. 17f.). Die „Verdrängung des Geschehens“ solle insofern durch einige Ausrichtungen überwunden werden, wie u. a. die Dialektisierung des Verhältnisses zwischen Geschehen und System, der Einschluss des Katastrophalen als „kreative Kraft“ in einen sonst schlichten Evolutionismus, die Berücksichtigung des Zufälligen in systematischen Darlegungen in Bereichen der Anthropologie, Soziologie, Ethnologie usw (Morin 1972, S. 18f.).

Wie bereits dargelegt, führt das Denken der Spur zur Frage, inwieweit die Interferenzen des „Unteren“, des Parergonalen, des Verschatteten, der schweigenden Kräfte als eine besondere Strukturierung in der Phänomenalität des Bildes differenziert wirken. Nun geht es darum, das Motiv der Limitrophien zwischen phänomenologischen und poststrukturalistischen Ansätzen zu erweitern und die minimale Strukturierung des Bildgeschehens in weiteren Schriften Derridas, aber auch von Deleuze und schließlich im Hinblick auf ausgewählte Schriften von Didi-Huberman diese hier gennante minimale Strukturierung des Bildgeschehens eingehender zu berücksichtigen.

Nach der Legende über Dibutades Erfindung der Malerei stammt das Bild als Inschrift aus einem der Wand eingeschriebenen Nachvollzug des Schattens desjenigen, der weggegangen war. Das anwesende Bild entsteht aus dieser Begegnung – die sich aus einer Nichtübereinstimmung oder Abwesenheit ergibt – zwischen den Schatten, Verweisen auf etwas anderes, und den Spuren, die sich einem anderen Stoff einschreiben. Abwesenheit des vermeinten Anderen bzw. des fehlenden Gegenstands? Oder eines anderen Körpers und eines anderen Objekts, die erst beginnen hervorzutreten? Einige Autoren, die sich dem Bild als philosophischem Thema zuwenden, betrachten es als ein Quasi-Objekt, einen fragilen Vermittler zwischen den sogenannten realen Körpern und den Subjekten, die es zur Entstehung bringen oder die es als solches anblicken, wobei dieser Akt des ‚Als-Bild-Meinens‘ von manchen mit der Bild-Entstehung gleichgesetzt wird. ‚Vermittler‘ oder ‚Quasi-Körper‘, der jedoch nicht ohne, sondern mittels einer anderen Materie zutage tritt, die als Oberfläche, Träger, Medium bestimmt wird und sich vielfältig differenziert: Papier, Leinwand, Wasseroberfläche, Haut unter Farbe, Holz, Baumrinde, Bildschirm, Flecke.

Dieses Buch geht von der Frage aus, wie Bilder erscheinen und in ihrem Geschehen als Bild auf etwas hinweisen, das mit dem Phänomen selbst nicht zusammenfällt. Es wendet sich zunächst Husserls Analysen zum Bildbewusstsein zu und zeigt anhand einiger seiner Anmerkungen, wie in post-strukturalistischen Ansätzen und ihren Wirkungen im Denken von Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Hubert Damisch und Georges Didi-Huberman die Bildphänomenologie entfaltet oder verschieben wird. Zuerst lassen sich mit Jacques Derridas dekonstruktivem Denken in seinen intertextuellen Hinweisen auf Husserls Phänomenologie sowohl Beiträge der Phänomenologie zum Bildgeschehen als auch deren Grenzen hervorheben. Indem diese Schrift die phänomenologische Forschung im Kontext der "Ikonischen Wende" des 20. Jahrhunderts situiert, erweitert sie ebenso ihre Wirkungsgeschichte hin zu Fragen nach Zeichen und Bild, Dekonstruktionen des perspektivischen Blicks, zur Philosophie der Zeichnung und der Photographie. Sie richtet sich an in diesen Bereichen Forschende und an Phänomenologie, französischem Post-strukturalismus und zeitgenössischer Bildtheorie interessierte Lesende. This book departs from the investigation into how images appear and, in their event as images, points to something that does not quite coincide with the phenomenon itself. It first turns to Husserl's analyses of image consciousness and on the basis of some of his remarks shows how image phenomenology is deployed or displaced in post-structuralist approaches and their effects in the thinking of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Hubert Damisch and Georges Didi-Huberman. Principally based on the deconstructive thinking of Jacques Derrida in its intertextuality with Husserl's phenomenology, both the contributions and certain limitations of the phenomenology of image consciousness are emphasized. By situating phenomenological research in the context of the "iconic turn" of the twentieth century, this publication extends its scope to questions of sign and image, deconstructions of the perspectival gaze, philosophy of drawing and photography. It appeals to researchers working in these fields and readers with an interest in phenomenology, French post-structuralism and contemporary image theories. Based on the deconstructive thinking of Jacques Derrida in its intertextuality with Husserl's phenomenology, one can point out both the contributions and certain limitations of the phenomenology of image consciousness. This volume contributes to phenomenological research in the context of the "Iconic Turn" of the twentieth century and extends this legacy. It appeals to researchers and students working in the field.

This article focuses on possible convergences between phenomenology and anthropology and underlines their contributions to the analysis of a specific topic. In its reconstructive dimension it departs from Edmund Husserl’s positions in the letter he addressed to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in 1935, in particular on the relationship between humanity and the surrounding word (Umwelt) and on the opposition between historical societies and primitive ahistorical societies. After having noted some critical points emerging from Husserl’s considerations, this text retraces some of its repercussions on the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, whose diverging interpretations open up different ways of examining the relationship between the respective phenomenological and anthropological perspectives. Finally, with the aim of rethinking the contributions of these two fields to address the problem of the co-participation and the differentiations between the archaic and the current in descripted social structures by Lévy-Bruhl, this text turns to the specific temporality of totemic presentifications, which should become phenomenologically more detailed.

Dieser Text geht von der Frage nach der Wahrheit, die durch die Rekonstruktion der Auseinandersetzung zwischen drei Vertreter des zeitgenössischen philosophischen Denkens dargelegt wird, nämlich: Edmund Husserl, Jean-Luc Marion und Jacques Derrida. Wenn bei Husserl das Problem der Wahrheit mit der Analyse der verschiedenen Modalitäten der Anschauung zusammengehört, in denen sich das Phänomen bewusst eintritt, wiederum mag Marion de Darstellungsweise des Phänomens mit dem Begriff „Gegebenheit“ (donation) umfassen: somit schließt diese nicht nur die Modalitäten der Anschauung ein, sondern auch die Intentionalität selbst, die sich irgendein etwas wendet. Nun weißt Derrida durch die Dekonstruktion der phänomenologischen Begriffe Anschauung und Gegebenheit darauf hin, dass die phänomenologische Betrachtung nicht ausreicht, um Zusammenhänge und Umstände nachzudenken, in denen sich die Wahrheit ohne anschaulichen Zug, ohne subjektive Intentionalität und in Widerstand gegenüber ihrer eigenen Sichtbarkeit anzeigt. Solche Nuancen hebt Derrida hervor, indem er die Gegebenheit und die „Gabe“ (don) kontrastiert, und schließlich, indem er der Wahrheit den Charakter des Zeugnisses (témoignage) zuschreibt.

Linear elasticity theory and atomistic computer modelling were applied to study properties such as the formation energy, stress and displacement field for planar clusters of point defects and small dislocation loops. Two different interatomic potentials have been used to simulate perfect vacancy and interstitial clusters up to 6 nm in diameter in a {111} plane in a model of bcc Fe. The accuracy of the continuum description of formation energy, stress and displacement field depends on the cluster or loop size and the distance from its edge; it is better for large loops at large distance. However, even for the largest defect studied, the stress distribution, especially that inside the glide prism, calculated from the atomistic model is significantly wider than that estimated by elasticity theory. The difference between planar clusters of point defects and dislocation loops and the limitations of the linear elasticity description are discussed. It is concluded that clusters of up to about 2 nm in diameter cannot be described as dislocation loops in the isotropic continuum approach

RESUMO Este texto discute alguns problemas metodológicos e históricos concernentes à fenomenologia da consciência de imagem elaborada por Edmund Husserl e algumas de suas repercussões teóricas. Primeiramente será tematizado o escopo mais amplo em que a abordagem filosófica das imagens auferiu relevância no século XX, a saber, a assim chamada “virada icônica” ou “pictórica”, conforme as respectivas formulações de Gottfried Boehm e William Mitchell. Será situada nesse contexto a fenomenologia da imagem e, mais especificamente, a fenomenologia da consciência de imagem elaborada por Husserl, considerando-se, em especial, os eixos norteadores dos três direcionamentos que sobressaem nas teorias contemporâneas da imagem, a saber: as abordagens antropológica, semiótica e perceptiva. A partir da retomada de nuances semióticas remanescentes na fenomenologia da consciência de imagem, serão apresentados alguns pontos críticos acerca da classificação das análises de Husserl no escopo do direcionamento perceptivo e, finalmente, apontadas implicações do copertencimento à apresentação intuitiva da imagem daquilo que se denominará “circunstancialidade indicativa”. ABSTRACT This text addresses some methodological and historical problems concerning the phenomenology of image consciousness elaborated by Edmund Husserl as well as some of its theoretical repercussions. At first, I examine the broader scope in which the philosophical approach to images became relevant in the 20th century, the so-called “iconic turn” or “pictorial turn”, according to the respective terms proposed by Gottfried Boehm and William Mitchell. In this context I situate the phenomenology of image and, more specifically, the phenomenology of image consciousness elaborated by Husserl, considering, in particular, the guiding axes of three directions that stand out in contemporary theories of image, namely: the anthropological, the semiotic and the perceptual approach. By the resumption of semiotic nuances remaining in the phenomenology of image consciousness I present some critical points about the classification of Husserl’s analyses in the scope of perceptual approach. Finally, I point out some implications of the co-belonging to the intuitive image presentation of what can be called “indicative circumstantiality”.

In Critics of pure reason the notion of affection appears at first in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and is unfolded on the notion of self-affection in the "Transcendental Analytic". Husserl, in manuscripts written from 1918, presents some developments of these Kantian notions. If by affection Kant explains that something can be given to the subject from the sensibility, that is, something that affects oneself from the external and the internal sense, however, Husserl extends the analysis of affection toward a broad spectrum of underlying phenomena, such as volitive acts, imaginative acts, drives and affects. Husserl also analyzes from a phenomenological point of view the Kantian implicit condition that, if anything is given to the subject in the internal consciousness of time, the relationship to itself must be thought as a temporal process. I intend to show that Husserl’s analysis of affection and its modulations unveil possible theoretical directions departing from Kant, but in this step, involving a change of focus on the transcendental field, more specifically on the transcendental foundation of temporality.

Este artigo enfoca o modo como a teoria husserliana da lembrança se insere, por um lado, na estrutura significativa formulada primeiramente nas Investigações lógicas e, por outro, nos moldes da percepção como unidade temporal. Para tanto, apresenta-se, respectivamente na primeira e na segunda seções, o arcabouço das teorias husserlianas da significação e da percepção como retenção. Na terceira seção, é analisada a segunda forma de lembrança — a rememoração —, segundo o fio condutor em que Husserl a investiga nos contextos da atenção, retenção, afecção e inconsciente. Finalmente, será considerado se o núcleo teórico da primazia do significado e do fluxo da consciência é, de fato, uma base propícia para a compreensão da lembrança em seu caráter de signo. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This paper focuses on how Husserl's theory of memory is introduced, both in his significant structure, that was first formulated in the Logical Investigations and in the patterns of perception as a temporal unit. The first and second sections show, respectively, the framework of Husserl's theories of meaning and perception as retention. In the third section, the second mode of memory — recollection — is analyzed according to the thread that Husserl investigates in the contexts of attention, retention, affection and unconscious. Finally, we will consider whether the theoretical core of the primacy of meaning and the flow of consciousness is, in fact, an adequate basis for the comprehension of memory as a sign.

RESUMO: Este texto aborda alguns trabalhos contemporâneos em artes visuais que apresentam diferentes relações e disposições de um material dito natural: pedras. Ao retomar as distinções explicitadas por Heidegger, entre meras coisas, utensílio e obra de arte, bem como entre a pedra, o animal e o homem em relação ao mundo, serão discutidos deslocamentos acerca dessas distinções, com base em apontamentos da desconstrução. Pretende-se indicar alguns dos sentidos em que os enfoques desconstrutivos são frutíferos, para se pensar movimentos contemporâneos no âmbito do que Derrida denomina artes do espaço. ABSTRACT: This text approaches some contemporary works in the visual arts which present different relations and dispositions of a material taken to be natural: stone. I intend to revisit the distinctions presented by Heidegger between mere things, utensils and works of art, as well as between stone, animal and man in connection with the world. Furthermore, I will discuss dislocations regarding such issues, based on indications from deconstruction. I aim to indicate some of the meanings under which deconstructive approaches are fruitful for thinking about contemporary movements within the scope of what Derrida calls "spatial arts".

The concept Deckerinnerung (en. screen-memory), which appeared in Freud’s work in 1899, points towards the important epistemological question about the possibility of adequation or coincidence (Deckung) between past experience and the current act that is being presentified. This can take the form of remembering as such or be conceived as fantasy. In order to clarify the differences between fantasy and memory, or rather their interconnection in the Deckerinnerung, they need to be looked at phenomenologically, and in doing so various aspects should be analysed, such as: the character of positional and neutralised acts of presentification; the interference of conscious attention and the phenomenon of inhibition in the act of presentification; the state of memories in the unconscious and the possibilities of their association between themselves or modification by other current acts. While Freud introduces the subject without further analysing it, Husserl’s theories offer a valuable contribution here. In this context, there is first a need to outline the way in which Husserl’s investigations into memory come close to Freud’s discourse, in the sense that they lead to a “Phenomenology of the Unconscious” (Hua XI; Mat. VIII).