Alicia Alvarez

El objetivo del presente artículo es mostrar que una parte del kantismo puede ser reinterpretada en formas útiles para el debate contemporáneo sobre la emancipación femenina y, en particular, estableciendo ciertos paralelismos entre la noción kantiana de la salida de la minoría de edad y la liberación frente a lo que Miranda Fricker denomina injusticias epistémicas. En la primera parte del artículo, desarrollamos la teoría de la injusticia epistémica de Miranda Fricker y defendemos que de su contrario puede deducirse una noción de resistencia epistémica. En la segunda parte, analizamos el concepto de mayoría de edad kantiana, al que queremos entender como otra forma de resistencia epistémica compatible con Fricker. Examinando las conexiones entre ambas nociones, proponemos por último una definición de emancipación epistémica que encuentra ejemplos en algunos aspectos del feminismo contemporáneo.

La agroecología tiene como objetivo el conocimiento de los elementos y procesos claves en el funcionamiento de los agrosistemas, para su eficaz gestión en armonía con el ambiente. La protección vegetal ha sido enfocada tradicionalmente, bajo el concepto de lucha y control, utilizando arsenales químicos o biológicos y, en estos momentos, biotecnológicos. La aplicación de criterios ecológicos en protección vegetal ha permitido desarrollar procesos como la biofumigación, fundamentada en la utilización de los gases resultantes de la biodescomposición de la materia orgánica para el manejo de organismos patógenos de los vegetales. Es de esperar que el futuro de la agricultura muestre una mayor preocupación por el ambiente, la conservación de los recursos naturales, la salud de las personas y se destaque su contribución a la reducción de la pobreza, así como su aportación al desarrollo de los agrocombustibles.

This paper addresses the increasing discussions concerning the normative nature of epistemic injustice. I argue that epistemic injustice is best described as a global failure of recognition: one that downgrades and attacks the normative standing of the individual as a whole. First, I discuss the role of epistemic agency in the global cluster of identity and show that it is both essential and inseparable to the development of autonomous and ethical agency. Second, I engage with contemporary articulations of epistemic injustice as a phenomenon of (mis)recognition and argue that these could be expanded in two important ways: epistemic injustice should be redefined as involving abuse, disrespect, and insult at the same time and not only in epistemic terms. Third and finally, I reinforce my redefinition of epistemic injustice as a global failure of recognition by revealing how the lived experience of epistemic injustice strikes victims’ self-perception globally.

Literature on epistemic injustice has grown tremendously as an increasingly rich and diverse body of work in recent years. From the point of view of intercultural and anticolonial discussions, contemporary contributions have also helped to illuminate how epistemic injustice and other forms of cultural domination might be related to essential processes within the structures of colonial and racial supremacy. This proposal aims to contribute to such relevant and illuminating discussions by focusing on the role that language and culture might have in phenomena of epistemic injustice, particularly, hermeneutical injustice. Despite the central role played by semantics in epistemic injustice studies, the question about whether certain languages could also themselves be the recipients of epistemic injustice has been rather undertheorized. Simultaneously, recent movements to advocate for minority language rights, such as the Linguistic Human Rights Movement (LHR), raise important questions in this connection. In the present paper, I argue that attending to the intercultural context reveals a new sort of hermeneutical injustice, one that, surprisingly, has never been articulated before. In particular, I am referring to a kind of HI that is essentially “linguistic” and “culture-specific”. I will be presenting two different subtypes for this kind of hermeneutical injustice: The first concerns the possibility of considering certain languages themselves as genuine objects of hermeneutical injustice,while the second has to do with certain specific culturally-established expressions or forms of talking.

Literature on epistemic injustice has grown tremendously as an increasingly rich and diverse body of work in recent years. From the point of view of intercultural and anticolonial discussions, contemporary contributions have also helped to illuminate how epistemic injustice and other forms of cultural domination might be related to essential processes within the structures of colonial and racial supremacy. This proposal aims to contribute to such relevant and illuminating discussions by focusing on the role that language and culture might have in phenomena of epistemic injustice, particularly, hermeneutical injustice. Despite the central role played by semantics in epistemic injustice studies, the question about whether certain languages could also themselves be the recipients of epistemic injustice has been rather undertheorized. Simultaneously, recent movements to advocate for minority language rights, such as the Linguistic Human Rights Movement (LHR), raise important questions in this connection. In the present paper, I argue that attending to the intercultural context reveals a new sort of hermeneutical injustice, one that, surprisingly, has never been articulated before. In particular, I am referring to a kind of HI that is essentially “linguistic” and “culture-specific”. I will be presenting two different subtypes for this kind of hermeneutical injustice: The first concerns the possibility of considering certain languages themselves as genuine objects of hermeneutical injustice, while the second has to do with certain specific culturally-established expressions or forms of talking.