Allan Bäck

Aristotelian science consists in demonstrations from its first principles, the axioms and definitions. For Avicenna, like Aristotle, a definition gives ‘a formula of the essence’ or quiddity. Avicenna recognizes quiddities in three respects: in themselves, in re, and in intellectu. He grounds definitions on quiddities in themselves. Yet how are we to grasp these quiddities so as to get at the definitions? This chapter summarizes Avicenna’s threefold distinction of quiddity (triplex status naturae), as well as his recognition of both intelligible and perceptible individuals. It will then give an account of how Avicenna thinks that we can come to grasp quiddities in themselves.

My general concern is how to translate modern formal semantics into medieval metaphysics, itself a theory about objects. I shall use the formal model in Nonexistent Objects by Terence Parsons as a test case for the modern formal system, and the philosophy of Avicenna as one for medieval metaphysics. My investigation has four parts: 1) a summary of Avicenna’s general metaphysical scheme, the threefold distinction of quiddity; 2) translating Parsons’s theory into medieval terms; 3) the location of nonexistent objects of various sorts in Avicenna’s theory; and 4) comparing the theories of Parsons, and concluding that the theories of Parsons and Avicenna are not incommensurate paradigms as Parsons suggests. Rather, they are different theories but under the same research tradition.

Jean-Baptiste Rauzy writes here on Leibniz’s theory of truth, construed broadly, mostly in Leibniz’s earlier periods. He focuses mostly on Leibniz’s logical theory, particularly as given in the logical papers, published only with Couturat and others, in 1901 and following. Unlike a lot of the secondary literature, Rauzy’s book gives much detail about how Leibniz’s various logical models work out and apply to more general issues such as the reduction of relations, the ontological square, haecceity, and the problem of universals.

This volume forms part of the translation series, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, with Richard Sorabji as General Editor. This series consists of English translations of parts of the Commentaria in Aristotelis Graeca. Like its companion volumes, the translation includes an introduction, the series introduction, and indices, including one from Greek to the English translations used. The book is well-produced with few typos, although I wonder a bit at not using the Greek font instead of Romanizing it.

Al comparar la visión de Avicena y Kant sobre la imaginación, encontramos una sorprendente congruencia en sus doctrinas. Las doctrinas de Kant sobre la síntesis de la imaginación en su Deducción Trascendental tiene notables similitudes con la visión de Avicena. Tanto para Avicena como para Kant, la imaginación sirve para conectar lo fenoménico con lo nouménico. Al menos esta comparación tiene el doble uso de colocar las doctrinas de Kant en el contexto de la tradición aristotélica y de iluminar la importancia moderna que tiene el pensamiento de Avicena. Dado que el pensamiento de Kant nos es más familiar que el de Avicena, podemos usar a Kant también para ayudar a comprender las tesis de Avicena. Por otro lado, esta comparación puede ayudar a sostener la tesis de que la comprensión de Kant yace en gran medida en sus raíces medievales y post-medievales —tal como ocurre con Copérnico, que, en su propia “Revolución Copernicana”, seguía ciertas tradiciones anteriores.

I give an analysis of the logical structure of statements describing duties in social roles. Role terms like ‘doctor’ should not be treated as simple predicates, as natural kind terms, like ‘human being’, are. When role terms are treated as simple predicates, fallacies may result. Rather, treat role terms (M) as complex predicates with a simple subject, a person (S), as a base; ‘S qua M’, and then analyze their reduplicative structure. I illustrate and support this analysis by considering sophisms, traditionally known as committing the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter, about conflicts of duties in different roles. I end with some remarks about personal integrity.