Allen Buchanan

There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation as a means of promoting social progress, including progress in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We then identify four challenges: the information problem (experiments may not yield relevant information), the selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks). Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all four problems, rendering social experimentation a less reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its value.

The chapter aims to draw philosophical attention to the neglected enterprise of figuring out whether the existence of international legal human rights is morally justified. Philosophers usually focus on whether moral human rights exist, which is often rather controversial. As is argued here, however, the existence of a moral right not to be imprisoned for debt (say) is neither necessary nor sufficient for an international legal human right not to be imprisoned for debt to be morally justified. The chapter proceeds to indicate how rich and complex the issues involved in morally justifying an international legal human right really are; and to show how much philosophical distance there is between such a justification and the existence of a relevant moral right. Finally, the chapter draws some lessons from its analysis for the methodological debate over political approaches to human rights.

This chapter summarizes the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, and shows that both ‘evoconservative’ and ‘evoliberal’ authors have relied upon this account in their discussions of moral progress. It goes on to explain why the standard evolutionary account is unable to accommodate cases of sweeping, progressive moral change—cases that call into question the conception of human moral nature that evoliberals and evoconservatives presuppose. It then sketches an alternative evolutionary model of moral psychological development that can make sense of these progressive shifts—one that takes institutions seriously whilst giving moral psychology its due—and then brings this model to bear on questions concerning the efficacy and plausibility of BME. The chapter concludes that cultural innovations that make use of our understanding of the evolutionary development of human morality stand the best chance of meeting our ethical goals.

This essay provides a comprehensive and critical introduction to ideology. It traces the origins and development of various conceptions of ideology, articulating both what they have in common and their differences. Among the distinctions that we develop are the contrasts between pejorative and nonpejorative conceptions, functionalist and causal conceptions, and conceptions that limit ideologies to supporting existing oppressive orders and those that allow for ideologies that challenge such orders. We also explain the role that ideologies can play in either preventing or facilitating social movements to overturn or improve existing institutions. The concluding section of this essay provides a list of important topics for future research on ideology and emphasizes that, in each case, an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand them fully.

COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This “flu-risk standard” is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: having developed a vaccine, raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions.

Some ideological beliefs are harmful, both to those whose beliefs they are, and to others, insofar as those beliefs motivate harmful behavior toward others. Ideological beliefs are often recalcitrant to correction, because ideologies typically include belief-management processes that insulate beliefs from corrective measures. Consequently, rational argumentation and the presentation of evidence may not suffice to expunge pernicious ideological beliefs and nonconsensual, coercive means may be required for correction. In this article, I argue that nonconsensual, coercive interventions to correct pernicious ideological beliefs are justifiable in principle, even if they are undertaken on paternalistic rather than other-regarding grounds. I show that some of the effects of ideologies, including the disabling of ‘theory of mind’ – the ability to make reliable inferences about other persons' intentions and beliefs on the basis of their behavior – are closely analogous to serious mental illness. Accordingly, I argue in favor of ‘remedial soft paternalism’: interventions to restore a person's competence when they have become incompetent due to impairments of normal cognitive abilities.

While acknowledging the potential benefits of pharmacogenomics as a methodology, a number of comprehensive reports in the past several years examine a multitude of ethical, legal, and social factors that may limit the extent to which these benefits are realized — and realized in ethically acceptable ways. This article aims to identify and explore the most basic ethical and regulatory issues that are likely to arise if pharmacogenomics becomes widely enough used to have a significant impact on research and clinical practice. First, however, it addresses the question of whether pharmacogenomic tests are unique when compared to other genetic tests and thus deserving of more or less stringent ethical and regulatory requirements.

We offer an account of the nature and structure of the immorality of colonialism. We distinguish between the fundamental wrong of colonialism and the other wrongs that the fundamental wrong facilitated. On our view, the fundamental wrong was that colonizers regarded the colonized as incapable of managing their own affairs, in effect relegating them to the status of minors or mentally incompetent adults. We call this the nonautonomy assumption. It could also be called the inferior status assumption, for reasons that will become clear as we proceed. We argue that, in addition to the nonautonomy assumption, the most serious wrongs of colonialism were severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation, and that these wrongs can reasonably be seen to be facilitated by or grounded in the fundamental wrong. We make the case that our analysis has two virtues: it provides a more comprehensive characterization of the wrongs of colonialism and the relationships between them than extant philosophical accounts and it helps make sense of the concepts of neocolonialism and internal colonialism, which extant accounts are unable to do. This has the added advantage of bringing discussions that have hitherto taken place in fields such as political theory, postcolonial studies, history, and critical theory into the ambit of analysis by political philosophers, using tools and concepts that philosophers have at their command, such as the notions of autonomy and inferior status. After developing our own view, we offer a critical appraisal of three prominent recent attempts to identify “the wrong” of colonialism, the views of Anna Stilz, Massimo Renzo, and Lea Ypi. We argue that by focusing on defects of the political structure of colonialism such as the deprivation of collective self‐determination, these accounts do not clearly identify the fundamental wrong of colonialism and either completely ignore or pay insufficient attention to severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation; and that they also render the notions of neocolonialism and internal colonialism unintelligible. While acknowledging that the nonautonomy assumption encouraged colonialists to deprive the colonized of collective self‐determination and recognizing that this was a serious wrong, we deny that the deprivation of collective self‐determination was the fundamental wrong of colonialism, as the denial of autonomy is more basic than the denial of political self‐management. The analysis we offer makes it clear that colonialism is not a topic of merely historical interest. The most serious wrongs suffered by colonized people did not end with decolonization, that is, the achievement of independent statehood. The fundamental wrong of colonialism was grounded in inequalities of power that persist today and that continue to contribute to economic injustices and to the failure to regard the weaker as equals, in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to the case of formerly colonized peoples.

This essay explores the range of phenomena that can be explained by application of a suitably broad but contentful concept of ideology. According to this concept, an ideology is an evaluative map of the social world, typically featuring an ingroup-outgroup distinction, at least in the case of political ideologies. This concept allows for ideologies that support the existing order and those that challenge it, including revolutionary ideologies. I refute the claim that the concept of ideology is not needed because “voluntary servitude” can be explained as a failure of collective action. I show that ideologies can inhibit revolutionary action as well as stimulate and guide it. They can inhibit revolutionary action by convincing the oppressed that their predicament is natural or inevitable or that they are not being oppressed. They can stimulate and guide revolution by debunking oppression-supporting ideologies and by supplying moral motivation that avoids the calculation of costs and benefits that cause failures of collective action.

: Two basic criticisms of managed care are that it erodes patient trust in physicians and subjects physicians to incentives and pressures that compromise the physician's fiduciary obligation to the patient. In this article, I first distinguish between status trust and merit trust, and then argue (1) that the value of status trust in physicians is probably over-rated and certainly underdocumented; (2) that erosion of status trust may not be detrimental if accompanied by an increase in well-founded merit trust; and (3) that under conditions of managed care the physician's commitment to traditional medical ethics cannot serve as an adequate basis for merit trust. Next, drawing on an analogy between managed care organizations and polities, I argue that (4) the most appropriate basis for merit trust in managed care is a conception of organizational legitimacy that includes procedural justice, empowerment of constructive criticism within the organization, and organizational accommodation of the noninstrumental commitment to patient well-being that is distinctive of medical professionalism. I then explore the conditions necessary for robust competition for merit trust among managed care organizations and indicate the kinds of public policies needed to facilitate such competition. Finally, I show how the account of organization-based merit trust can accommodate the special fiduciary obligation of medical professionals, without indulging in the delusion that it is the physician's fiduciary obligation always to provide all care that is expected to be of any net benefit to the patient.

My aim in this essay is to argue for a better moral-conceptual framework and for institutional innovation in preparation for the next pandemic. My main conclusions are as follows. (1) The primary moral principle that should guide responses to the next pandemic is the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms. (2) A proper understanding of the moral foundations and scope of the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms requires rejecting both Extreme Nationalism and Extreme Cosmopolitanism. (3) A better response to the next pandemic requires transforming the moral landscape through institutional innovation by developing an international institution that can perfect indeterminate duties (i) by identifying duty-bearers, (ii) by specifying their duties to provide medical resources and other forms of aid, (iii) by allocating the specified duties to various public and private entities in such a way as to ensure effective coordination and that the costs of providing aid are fairly distributed, and (iv) by providing effective mechanisms for compliance with the specified duties. (4) Institutional innovation is morally required, regardless of whether the harm prevention and mitigation duties of the better-off are duties of justice or of beneficence, because without institutionalization, some duties of justice, including those requiring the prevention and mitigation of serious harms, suffer some of the same indeterminacies that are present in duties of beneficence.

This chapter critically examines the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the notion that nature is like a master engineer. It compares and contrasts intentional genetic modification (IGM) with unintentional genetic modification (UGM) as to their potential for improving human life. The chapter first argues for two main theses. First, UGM operates under constraints that severely limit its ability to realize what human beings rightly value, including their own survival and improvement. Because IGM can remove these constraints, it is potentially more effective in promoting human well‐being. Second, IGM is also potentially morally preferable to UGM, since the latter is wantonly destructive of life, often involves suffering on a massive scale. The chapter then articulates the kernel of truth in appeals to the wisdom of nature, arguing for the need to develop appropriate cautionary heuristics for IGM.

Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the Age of Rights. In moral philosophy it is now widely assumed that the two most plausible types of normative theories are Utilitarianism and Kantian theories and that the contest between them must be decided in the end by seeing whether Utilitarianism can accommodate a prominent role for rights in morality. In political philosophy even the most bitter opponents in the perennial debate over conflicts between liberty and equality often share a common assumption: that the issue of liberty versus equality can only be resolved by determining which is the correct theory of rights. Some contend that equal respect for persons requires enforcement of moral rights to goods and services required for the pursuit of one's own conception of the good, while others protest that an enforced system of ‘positive’ rights violates the right to liberty whose recognition is the essence of equal respect for persons. The dominant views in contemporary moral and political philosophy combine an almost unbounded enthusiasm for the concept of rights with seemingly incessant disagreement about what our rights are and which rights are most basic. Unfortunately, that which enjoys our greatest enthusiasm is often that about which we are least critical. My aim in this essay is to take a step backward in order to examine the assumption that frames the most important debates in contemporary moral and political philosophy – the assumption that the concept of a right has certain unique features which make rights so especially valuable as to be virtually indispensable elements of any acceptable social order.

Theorizing about the legitimacy of international institutions usually begins with a framing assumption according to which the legitimacy of the state is understood solely in terms of the relationship between the state and its citizens, without reference to the effects of state power on others. In contrast, this article argues that whether a state is legitimate vis-a-vis its own citizens depends upon whether its exercise of power respects the human rights of people in other states. The other main conclusions are as follows. First, a state’s participation in international institutions can contribute to its legitimacy in several ways. Second, when international institutions contribute to the legitimacy of states, their doing so can contribute to their own legitimacy. Third, a theory of international legitimacy ought to recognize reciprocal legitimation between states and international institutions.

: Pharmacogenetics offers the prospect of an era of safer and more effective drugs, as well as more individualized use of drug therapies. Before the benefits of pharmacogenetics can be realized, the ethical issues that arise in research and clinical application of pharmacogenetic technologies must be addressed. The ethical issues raised by pharmacogenetics can be addressed under six headings: regulatory oversight, confidentiality and privacy, informed consent, availability of drugs, access, and clinicians' changing responsibilities in the era of pharmacogenetic medicine. We analyze each of these categories of ethical issues and provide policy approaches for addressing them.