Allysson Rocha

The Trilema of Agrippa most commonly seen in its contemporary discussion as the Regress Problem. However, I argue that this perspective is in need of revision given certain recent developments in the debate concerning the problem in the analytic tradition. I began with an intuitive description of the problem, followed by the traditional reconstruction of the Trilem as the Regress Problem. The passage from an intuitive view of the problem to a theoretical one is delicate. And the details involved in this passage should not be ignored, as they illustrate how the prevailed perspective of the problem in the debate issues from important assumptions. However, recent authors decided to return to the Pyrrhonian skepticism behind the problem and man-aged to defend that the regress is not the problem actually. I argue that this strategy became a point of no return for the debate where we no longer should consider the Trilema as establishing the regress as a problem. I end with a suggestion concerning which way the debate should go if we are to address its skepticism properly.

The Trilema of Agripa is most commonly seen in its contemporary discussion as the Regress Problem. However, I argue that this perspective is in need of revision given certain recent developments in the debate concerning the problem in the analytic tradition. I began with an intuitive description of the problem, followed by the traditional reconstruction of the Trilem as the Regress Problem. The passage from an intuitive view of the problem to a theoretical one is delicate. And the details involved in this passage should not be ignored, as they illustrate how the prevailed perspective of the problem in the debate issues from important assumptions. However, recent authors decided to return to the Pyrrhonian skepticism behind the problem and managed to defend that the regress is not the problem actually. I argue that this strategy became a point of no return for the debate where we no longer should consider the Trilema as establishing the regress as a problem. I end with a suggestion concerning which way the debate should go if we are to address its skepticism properly.

Na literatura contemporânea da Epistemologia da memória existe o debate entre preservadorismo e gerativismo. A primeira posição indica que à memória cabe apenas preservar o conhecimento ou a justificação epistêmica gerada em outras fontes no passado. A segunda defende que a memória é sim capaz de gerar crenças com status epistêmico positivo, chegando em algumas ocasiões a estar em pé de igualdade com a experiência perceptiva. Nesta oportunidade, trago argumentos que favorecem o gerativismo. Começo circunscrevendo este debate como centrado no papel epistêmico da memória. Delimito, então, alguns destes papéis a partir das teorias propostas, e procuro argumentar em favor da ausência de um elemento relevante para o devido entendimento do papel epistêmico desta capacidade. Por fim, defendo que o fenômeno da atenção é essencial para esta lacuna, e que sua inserção favorece teorias de cunho gerativista. O papel epistêmico da memória defendido, ao final, é o de permitir a inserção bem-sucedida de um conteúdo do passado no presente contexto.

There is a difference between the tasks of interpreting Sextus Empiricus and contesting his arguments. Usually, one does the latter relying on some version of the former. Though this seems obvious, it is easy to make mistakes in this endeavor. From this point, I draw two basic recommendations which we should follow, lest we take Sextus to hold implausible positions regarding his Five Modes. However, these recommendations lead us to interpret Sextus’ Pyrrhonism as a limited skepticism. In the final section, as I suggest a counter-example to this commitment, I reconsider the notion of infinite (apeiron) in the Five Modes to better explain interpretation and criticism of Sextus’ arguments.