Alon Segev

This book explores the phenomenon of the Third Reich from a philosophical perspective. It concentrates on the ways in which the subjects and experiences of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism are conceived by eight German thinkers from the Continental tradition. These eight intellectuals include Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Jean Améry, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jan Assmann. Based on careful philosophical examinations of both known and unknown texts of these eight thinkers (including an English translation of two forgotten texts by Schmitt and Jünger), this study exposes and then explores the tension between ideology and philosophy, between submission to authority and genuine critical thinking, all of which constitute the essence of the Continental philosophical tradition. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.--Provided by publisher.

This paper offers a new reading of Hume’s much discussed Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779/2000) which shows that, in contrast to what commentators tend to ascribe to Hume, the crux of the text is not epistemological-ontological – that is, not the arguments in favour of and against God’s existence – but moral. It is shown that, although most of the epistemologicalontological pro-and-contra arguments are quite weak, Hume’s interlocutors nevertheless cling to their theses from beginning to end, with the reason for their dogmatism shown to be moral rather than epistemological-ontological. The paper is divided into four sections. The introduction to the argument is followed by a discussion of Hume’s rejection of substance as epistemologicallyontologically superfluous and as morally bad. Thereafter, it is first shown how the concept of a transcendental God undergoes deflation and consequently disappears. It is then shown that, even though their arguments are wrong, Cleanthes and Philo cling dogmatically to their starting points instead of trying to improve their claims and to rebuff the criticisms made against them. In conclusion, it is shown that the only way to account for their dogmatic inflexibility is in terms of their moral position: Cleanthes thinks that society and morals will collapse without the belief in a transcendental God, while Philo thinks it will function better if we discard this belief. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , September 2008, Volume 8, Edition 2

Pričujoči sestavek skuša ovrednotiti Gadamerjevo knjigo o Celanu glede njenega prispevka k fenomenologiji. Gadamer se zateče k poeziji kot fenomenološkemu orodju zaradi uvida, da fenomenologija ne more biti metoda in da lahko fenomen, bit, dosežemo le prek nenadnega prebliska, z »gnomično prezenco«. Pesnik s »pretresom« trdno uveljavljene kulturne ideje in pogleda na realnost omogoča uvid, da je »normativnost« samo ena omejena perspektiva realnosti in da so drugi vidiki potlačeni. Resnica, ki naj bi prišla na dan prek pesnika, je končna časovna bit človeške eksistence, kar pomeni, da vsaka perspektiva hkrati odkriva in zakriva samo realnost. Težava je v tem, da pesniku ne preostane nič drugega, kot da se zateče k utečeni rabi jezika. Od tu izhajata Celanov pesimizem in dvomi glede možnosti doseganja resnice prek poezije. Gadamer pa je na drugi strani videti optimističen in se drži prepričanja, »prvega načela«, da je fenomen s poezijo mogoče doseči. Tu raste napetost med fenomenologijo kot »nenadnim« dogodkom, eshatologijo in kot metodo.The aim of this paper is to evaluate the contribution of Gadamer’s Celanbook to phenomenology. Seeing that phenomenology cannot be a method and the phenomenon, the Being, can be achieved only by a sudden lightening, by “gnomic presence”, Gadamer turns to poetry as the phenomenological means. The poet, by “shaking up” one’s cultural fixed idea and perspective in regarding reality, enables one to see that the “normative” is only one limited perspective of it, while other aspects are being suppressed. The truth, which is supposed to come to light through the poet, is the finite temporal Being of the human existence, which means that each perspective of reality discovers it and covers it at the same time. The problem is that the poet has no better device to do it than the standard usages of language. Here lies the pessimism of Celan, his doubt as to the possibility of achieving truth through poetry. Gadamer, on the other hand, seems to be optimistic and holds to his opinion, to his “first principle”, that the phenomenon can be achieved in poetry. Here lies the tension between the phenomenology as a “sudden” event, as eschatology, and as a method.

The aim of this paper is to examine Heidegger’s critique of Hegel and to determine whether it is justified. Heidegger claims that Hegel tries to reduce everything to a single absolute entity, to the absolute knowing subject. The result is the identification of being and nothing, as Hegel formulates it at the beginning of his Logic. Hegel identifies being with nothing because being has no references, no predicates, no properties. Heidegger agrees with Hegel that being and nothing are the same, but in completely different respects. They are the same because only entity actually exists, i.e. as an existent being. But Being itself does not exist, and should be conceived in an utterly different way from entity. And since Being cannot “be” it is a non-entity and therefore nothing

The purpose of this article is, firstly, to expose the basic assumption in Hannah Arendt’s The Jewish Writings, and, secondly, to discuss her critique of Jewish life and the Zionist entity—later the Jewish state—in Palestine. As I will suggest, her basic assumption is that politics can exist only as a dynamic process, as an interplay between different players with different worldviews and interests. Thus, politics cannot be reduced to a state of inertia, what Arendt calls “inalterable substance.” According to Arendt, adherence to such inertia leads to the destruction of politics and the loss of any chance to conduct a normal and fully productive life. As it turned out, the Zionist movement was fixed from its very inception in a state of inertia and thus introduced into its own definition a permanent antagonism toward other nations. As a result, Israel is in a permanent state of war and conflict, in danger of being annihilated, in a perpetual arms race, and is degenerating into a modern Sparta. The nation-state is an embodiment of the state of inertia. Arendt believes that it is only by adopting a federal system instead of a nation-state system that the Zionist enterprise could turn into a dynamic political process and a place where one can conduct a productive and fruitful life. I will firstly present Arendt’s main claims and then criticize them, pointing at the merits and fl aws in her thesis.