This paper explores the concept of friendship by examining the way this relationship is accommodated within two of the three major models within normative ethics: specifically, Kantian Deontology and Aristotelianism. I argue that the models of friendship compatible with Kantian Deontology fail to give an adequate account in virtue of failing to provide the necessary robustness required in genuine friendships. Aristotelian accounts come under pressure for their emphasis on similarity and virtue m…
Read moreThis paper explores the concept of friendship by examining the way this relationship is accommodated within two of the three major models within normative ethics: specifically, Kantian Deontology and Aristotelianism. I argue that the models of friendship compatible with Kantian Deontology fail to give an adequate account in virtue of failing to provide the necessary robustness required in genuine friendships. Aristotelian accounts come under pressure for their emphasis on similarity and virtue mirroring, which may not reflect the diversity found in real-world friendships. The paper proposes a novel account of friendship, termed the adverbial model, which values the unique way individuals relate to their world. This model addresses the robustness requirement I propose as a necessary desideratum, and accommodates friendships between individuals with differing interests and values.
