Alper Gungor

Artifact kinds have members—e.g., this and that chair—have normative properties—e.g., a chair is supposed to be sat upon—and they may change—e.g., pipe cleaners were used for cleaning smoking pipes, now they serve as craft materials (Carlson & Parsons, 2008). A theory of artifact kinds should therefore satisfy these desiderata (KIND MEMBERSHIP, NORMATIVITY, CHANGE). This paper aims to raise an alternative anti-essentialist account about artifact kinds that can satisfy the desiderata. I first explain the distinction between essentialism and anti-essentialism about artifacts, situating the proposed account in the anti-essentialist terrain. I then refine the pluralistic anti-essentialist account (PAA) by adopting Kendall Walton’s distinction between standard, contra-standard, and variable properties. By adopting Walton’s distinctions to all artifact kinds, I show that PAA can satisfy each desideratum.

According to the prominent accounts of artifacts, artifacts are objects produced to serve a function (Hilpinen, Theoria 58:58–82, 1992 ; Preston, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022a ). If, as commonly suggested, artworks are artifacts then the lack of a viable functional account of artworks generates a problem and leaves us with one of the three following options: (i) Artworks are not artifacts, (ii) Artworks are a special kind of artifacts (Levinson, Creations of the mind: Theories of artifacts and their representation, 2007 ; Evnine, Making objects and events, 2016 ), (iii) If we follow pluralism about ‘artifact’, artworks can be captured by a distinct concept of artifacts. (i) is hard to defend. Being an artifact seems to be a necessary condition of being an artwork. To me, (ii) is already hinting at a form of pluralism in our artifact concepts. Ultimately, I conclude that (iii) provides a useful route to spell out what kind of pluralism is at stake and how it can be used to resolve the tension that arises from the artifactual status of artworks and functions.