Alper Güngör

According to the prominent accounts of artifacts, artifacts are objects produced to serve a function (Hilpinen, Theoria 58:58–82, 1992 ; Preston, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022a ). If, as commonly suggested, artworks are artifacts then the lack of a viable functional account of artworks generates a problem and leaves us with one of the three following options: (i) Artworks are not artifacts, (ii) Artworks are a special kind of artifacts (Levinson, Creations of the mind: Theories of artifacts and their representation, 2007 ; Evnine, Making objects and events, 2016 ), (iii) If we follow pluralism about ‘artifact’, artworks can be captured by a distinct concept of artifacts. (i) is hard to defend. Being an artifact seems to be a necessary condition of being an artwork. To me, (ii) is already hinting at a form of pluralism in our artifact concepts. Ultimately, I conclude that (iii) provides a useful route to spell out what kind of pluralism is at stake and how it can be used to resolve the tension that arises from the artifactual status of artworks and functions.

Are the members of echo chambers blameworthy for their beliefs? If we follow Sarah Stroud's account of friendship, we end up with the following conclusion: if echo chambers involve friendship, then the individuals have strong reasons not to live up to epistemic demands or ideals when the friendships are formed in the echo chambers they are members of. This result stands in striking contrast with the received view, according to which the members of echo chambers are blameworthy for their epistemic vices and faulty beliefs. The received view uses individual epistemic vices to propose individualistic solutions for the problem of echo chambers. I argue that this is misleading, simply because the members of echo chambers are not blameworthy due to the friendships cultivated in the echo chambers.

We have a rough idea of what artifacts are: artifacts are objects made to serve a certain purpose. However, there is no consensus on how to specify this definition. Essentialists argue that objects are grouped into artifact kinds by sharing non-trivial artifact essences, while anti-essentialists argue that there is no such essence to be found. However, the prominent essentialist and anti-essentialist accounts suffer from extensional and definitional problems. I argue that the problems current essentialist and anti-essentialist accounts face mainly stem from the assumption of artifact concept monism. According to artifact concept monism, there is only a single way to group objects into artifact kinds. To remedy the problems that stem from artifact concept monism, this paper offers an alternative framework by drawing parallels from the debates on species concept pluralism and art concept pluralism.