Alvin Plantinga

Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful and so we need not accept its conclusion. In this paper, we respond to Churchland’s argument. After we briefly recapitulate Plantinga’s argument and state Churchland’s argument, we offer three objections to Churchland’s argument: (1) its first premise has little to recommend it, (2) its second premise is false, and (3) its conclusion is consistent with, and indeed entails, the conclusion of Plantinga’s argument.

This chapter argues that there are such things as natural laws, and that they enjoy a sort of necessity. The necessity of natural laws is not a “broadly logical” necessity, but instead a sort of creaturely inviolability: natural laws are such that no creature (as opposed to the Creator) can change or abrogate them. The chapter goes on to consider three ways in which the laws are related to God: secondary causalism, decretalism, and as counterfactuals of (divine) freedom. The second and third suggest occasionalism. Since the very idea of creaturely causation is at least somewhat obscure, the chapter tentatively suggests that we should award the palm to occasionalism.

In this chapter, a segment from my book _Warrant and Proper Function_, I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects. In particular, I examine various ways in which the concretist might explain what it is for a proposition to be possible or necessary. I then demonstrate that the concretist is forced either to count far too many propositions as necessary or hold that blatant contradictions are possible. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that abstract objects, such as propositions, can stand in causal relations. Thus, the fact that propositions are not concrete does not entail the falsity of the causal requirement – i.e., the requirement that a knower stands in a causal relation to the object of knowledge.

In the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the grades of modal realism, and that it is really a case of modal reductionism. In particular, I demonstrate that Counterpart Theory is a rejection of the view that objects have properties accidentally or essentially. Moreover, I claim that Lewis merely models things such as propositions, possible worlds or state of affairs, and that he, in fact, is an antirealist with regard to such entities.

In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but is entailed by every property – and then give a more adequate definition of actualism based on its disagreement with possibilism. Pollock argues that the property of _nonexistence_ is such that objects exemplify it in worlds in which they do not exist and based on this fact concludes that serious actualism is false. I give an argument that _nonexistence_ is necessarily unexemplified and a separate argument for the conclusion that serious actualism is true. I conclude the essay by arguing that it does make a difference whether we accept existentialism or essentialism.

Existentialism is the claim that quidditative properties and singular propositions are ontologically dependent upon the individuals they involve. In this essay, I consider two arguments for existentialism and find them both unconvincing. I then give an argument against the existential thesis that singular propositions are ontologically dependent on contingent objects. I conclude the essay by defending my argument against potential existentialist objections. In the process, I defend the claim that serious actualism – i.e., the view that no object could have had a property without existing – is true.

In this essay, I raise three topics with regards to Roderick Chisholm's account of the idea of an individual essence. First, I give an argument for the claim that objects have more than one essence. Second, I defend the view that someone can know a proposition entailing someone else's essence. Third, I argue that existentialism (a view committed to the claim that a proposition or state of affairs _P_ directly about an object is ontologically dependent upon _x_ in that it is not possible that _P_ exist and _x_ fail to exist) is false. I demonstrate this by pointing out that existentialism's central claim – that the proposition _E_ exists and the object _x_ does not (where _E_ is a state of affairs or proposition which is dependent on _x_) is impossible – is false; this proposition turns out to be possible after all on the existentialist account of possibility.

The Fregean view of proper names is that proper names express properties. I begin the essay by pointing out the inadequacies of anti‐Fregean views with respect to puzzles presented by empty proper names, negative existentials containing proper names, and by propositional identity in the context of propositional attitudes. I then develop the Boethian view, which claims that (1) proper names do indeed express properties, (2) proper names express essences, and (3) different proper names of an object can express logically equivalent but epistemically inequivalent essences of that object. The Boethian view is a compromise because it holds that proper names only express essences and that the reference of proper names, in at least some cases, is determined in the way the anti‐Fregeans suggest. Finally, in light of the Boethian compromise, I revise my account of proper names given in _The Nature of Necessity_, and endorse the position that different proper names of the same object can express different essences.

In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as _there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists_ – an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.

The Classical Argument for possible nonexistent objects depends on both the possibility of singular negative existentials and the Ontological Principle. The Ontological Principle is the principle that any world in which a singular proposition is true, is one in which there is such a thing as its subject, or in which its subject has being if not existence. In this chapter, I show that the Ontological Principle is false and that whatever plausibility it enjoys is explained by the truth of a similar principle, namely, the Restricted Ontological Principle (which is the Ontological Principle applied only to predicative singular propositions). Thus, the Classical Argument fails. Moreover, I give an account of how fictional names function in order to show that statements about fictional subjects, for example, “Othello is a Moor”, do not express predicative singular propositions.

The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.

I begin the essay by introducing the ideas of _states of affairs_, _possible worlds_, and truth in a possible world. Making use of these concepts, I argue that each object not only has some properties essentially but also has an essence. (An essence is a property that an object _x_ has essentially and which is such that it is not possible that there be an object distinct from _x_ that has it.) I then respond to the objection that my account suffers from the Problem of Transworld Identification. I end the essay by giving a sound modal argument for the claim that human persons are essentially immaterial.

I begin the chapter by considering the distinction between modality _de re_ and modality _de dicto_ in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G. E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm. I then consider two similar objections to modality _de re_ brought by William Kneale and W. V. Quine. Both of these objections fail because they depend on a _de re/de dicto_ confusion. Moreover, I formulate a general rule for correlating propositions that express modality _de re_ with propositions that express modality _de dicto_. The formulation I offer relies heavily on proper names and I conclude by suggesting further routes of inquiry into the connection between proper names and essentialism.

This dissertation argues that a naturalistic metaphysics cannot provide an adequate account of moral obligation. ;Chapters I and II consider the contemporary Oxford rejection of such questions. That rejection, it turns out, is really a rejection of philosophical ethics involves several dubious assumption about meaning and language. Moreover, the chapter argues, the rejection is self-referentially inconsistent in that it pre-supposes a philosophical position of the very kind it tries to eliminate. ;Chapters III and IV examine John Dewey's instrumentalist ethics. Chapter III traces several apparently inconsistent strands in the theory: Chapter IV argues that Dewey's "actualistic naturalism" makes it impossible for him to provide an adequate account of moral obligation. The chapter goes on to argue that no actualistic naturalism could provide for moral obligation. ;Chapter V illustrates the contention of Chapter IV by examining Jean Paul Sartre's metaphysics of freedom. That theory, it shows, though radically ethical in its aim and motivation, undercuts the possibility of morality. ;Chapter VI resumes the argument of Chapter IV, turning to a "non-actualistic" metaphysical ethics, that presented in Paul Weiss' Man's Freedom. This theory, it argues, though more promising than the others considered, finally falls short of providing an adequate account of moral obligation. The chapter concludes that no naturalistic metaphysics could provide such an account. ;The Epilogue briefly presents some suggestions towards a theistic ethics. It argues that such an ethical theory, though clearly superior to a naturalistic ethics, faces difficult problems of its own. The Epilogue concludes with an examination of some of those difficulties

Iš anglų kalbos vertė ir pratarmę parašė Pranciškus Gricius(Oksfordo universitetas, Vilniaus universitetas) Alvino Plantingos (g. 1932) straipsnis, kurio lietuviškas vertimas pristatomas skaitytojui, – tai vienas pirmųjų bandymų suderinti aktualistinę ir kontingentistinę modalinę metafiziką su Saulo Kripkės išplėtota galimų pasaulių semantika1. Aktualizmas – tai nuostata, kad nėra ir negalėtų būti neegzistuojančių objektų, o kontingentizmas – tai pažiūra, kad yra ar galėjo būti atsitiktinai egzistuojančių objektų. Įprasta kvantorinės modalinės logikos galimų pasaulių semantika, Plantingos teigimu, yra nesuderinama su aktualizmu ir kontingentizmu. Pagrindinė problema čia ta, kad galimų pasaulių semantikoje numatoma, jog kiekvieno pasaulio kvantifikavimo sritis jau duota. Taigi, jei priimama kontingentistinė nuostata, kad galėjo egzistuoti objektas, kuris faktiškai neegzistuoja, privalu pripažinti, jog egzistuoja nefaktinio pasaulio kvantifikavimo sritis, kurioje yra neegzistuojantis objektas. Vadinasi, esama neegzistuojančių objektų, nes aibės (taigi ir kvantifikavimo sritys) egzistuoja tik jei egzistuoja jų nariai. Teiginys, kad esama neegzistuojančių objektų, prieštarauja aktualistinėms nuostatoms.Plantinga šią problemą sprendžia trimis žingsniais. Pirma, jis priima nuostatą, kad teiginiai, savybės, ryšiai ir panašios esatys egzistuoja ne atsitiktinai, o būtinai. Antra, tarp šių esačių jis identifikuoja objektų esmes (kur objekto esmė – tai esminė ir būtinai unikali objekto savybė). Trečia, Plantinga pasiūlo alternatyvią kvantorinės modalinės logikos semantiką, kurioje modalinių sakinių teisingumo sąlygos nusakomos nurodant ne objektus, o objektų esmes ir pastarųjų koinstanciaciją su kitomis savybėmis. Versta iš:Alvin Plantinga. 1976. Actualism and Possible Worlds.Theoria 42: 139–160.

We ordinarily think that the content of a belief, or an intention, or an undertaking is relevant to the actions caused by beliefs, intentions, and undertakings. Not only do we ordinarily think these things; they are no more than the sober truth. I attempt to argue that if materialism about us human beings (either reductive or nonreductive) were true, then these things would be false: it would not be by virtue of their contents that beliefs, intentions, and undertakings cause what they do. If materialism were true, facts about the content of beliefs, intentions, and undertakings would be irrelevant to their causal powers. If this argument is correct, then embracing materialism exacts a substantial cost: giving up these obvious and commonsense truths.

This is a reissue of a book which is an exploration and defence of the notion of modality 'de re', the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. It is one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus and others have contributed. The argument is developed by means of the notion of possible worlds, and ranges over key problems including the nature of essence, trans-world identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence of unactual objects in other possible worlds. In the final chapters Professor Plantinga applies his logical theories to the clarification of two problems in the philosophy of religion - the Problem of Evil and the Ontological Argument.