Alyssa D'Ambrosio

This essay critically examines David Lewis's proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox and argues that it fails to provide a coherent account of time and causality. Lewis’s approach hinges on the ambiguity of the word 'can,' which he claims is context-dependent and relative to different possible worlds. By accepting that Tim both can and cannot kill his grandfather, Lewis attempts to resolve the paradox, but this leads to a contradiction that undermines the logical consistency necessary for a robust theory of time travel. The essay counters Lewis’s view by drawing on the arguments of Garrett and Vihvelin. Garrett critiques Lewis's reasoning, pointing out that the impossibility of changing the past does not equate to Tim’s inability to kill his grandfather; rather, it simply means that Tim will not kill him. This distinction is crucial for understanding the limits of time travel without falling into logical inconsistencies. Vihvelin further challenges Lewis by emphasizing that Tim’s inability to kill his grandfather is not a matter of context or possibility but a consequence of the deterministic nature of temporal events. The essay also explores McTaggart's distinction between the A-series and B-series of time to reinforce the argument against Lewis. By examining the B-series, which treats time as a series of fixed events rather than a flowing present, the essay illustrates a more stable and coherent framework for understanding time travel. This perspective discredits Lewis’s reliance on possible worlds by showing that it does not resolve the fundamental issues posed by the Grandfather Paradox. In conclusion, the essay argues that Lewis’s solution is ultimately flawed because it fails to address the core temporal and causal issues of the paradox. In contrast, the arguments presented by Garrett and Vihvelin offer a more consistent and logically sound approach, leading to a more coherent understanding of time and its implications for time travel.

This essay critiques the Western colonial ideology of exploiting natural resources for profit and its detrimental impact on ecosystems and Indigenous communities. It advocates for recognizing the rights of non-human entities, exemplified by the Magpie River in Quebec, which was granted legal personhood. I contrast the Western profit-driven worldview with Indigenous ontologies, which emphasize the intrinsic value of nature and its interconnectedness with human and other- than-human entities. The paper explores how Indigenous perspectives challenge the commodifica- tion of land and water, advocating for a more harmonious and sustainable coexistence. I draw on the concept of “Pluriverse Worlding”, which recognizes multiple ways of understanding the world and rejects the Western “One-World World” mentality that imposes anthropocentric dominance. By adopting Indigenous ontologies, the paper argues, we can protect ecosystems and counter the profit-driven mindset. The paper also critiques the Western legal system’s failure to adequately protect the environment, emphasizing the need to incorporate Indigenous worldviews into environmental protection laws. This shift requires embracing Indigenous knowledge systems, fostering dialogue between Indigenous and Western perspectives. Through legal, philosophical, and practical strategies, the paper emphasizes the importance of safeguarding ecosystems and other-than-human entities for the benefit of the planet and humanity.