This paper examines Martine Nida-Rümelin’s pseudonormal vision case as a challenge to both conceptual functionalism and psychofunctionalism. While functionalists may attempt to rescue their view through a hypothesis of developmental neural retuning, I argue that such a response lacks empirical support and subtly abandons functionalism’s core commitments. The pseudonormal vision hypothesis therefore poses a significant limitation for pure functionalist accounts of color experience.
This paper ori…
Read moreThis paper examines Martine Nida-Rümelin’s pseudonormal vision case as a challenge to both conceptual functionalism and psychofunctionalism. While functionalists may attempt to rescue their view through a hypothesis of developmental neural retuning, I argue that such a response lacks empirical support and subtly abandons functionalism’s core commitments. The pseudonormal vision hypothesis therefore poses a significant limitation for pure functionalist accounts of color experience.
This paper originated as an undergraduate term paper at Indiana University Bloomington (2024); this version has been lightly revised for clarity.
