Amanda Askell

Askell investigates what the epistemic consequentialist will say about _epistemic enkrasia principles_, principles that instruct one not to adopt a belief state that one takes to be irrational. She argues that a certain epistemic enkrasia principle for degrees of belief can be shown to maximize expected accuracy, and thus that a certain kind of epistemic consequentialist is committed to such a principle. But this is bad news for such an epistemic consequentialist, according to Askell, because epistemic enkrasia principles are problematic.

In this chapter, Amanda Askell takes up the question of whether there is a case for favoring interventions whose effectiveness has stronger evidential support, when expected effectiveness is equal. Of course, in practice expected effectiveness might well not be equal: as Askell notes, given a sceptical prior, it might be only in the presence of substantial positive evidence that any intervention can have an expected value significantly higher than that of “doing nothing”. But is there a case for favoring evidence-backed interventions over and above this contribution of evidence to expected value? Askell argues that in fact the reverse is true: when expected value is equal one should prefer to invest in interventions that have less evidential support, on the grounds that by doing so one can acquire evidence of their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) that may then be valuable for future investment decisions.

We argue that even if you accept that the future matters just as much as the present from a moral point of view, there are important reasons to focus on the near-term consequences of our actions for the purpose of decision-making. These reasons include causal diffusion of our action’s consequences, epistemic diffusion of our action’s predictable consequences, and both optimism and pessimism about existential risk and moral uncertainty. It follows that the practical consequences of not discounting the future are less revisionary than they might initially appear. We concede that we are not entirely sure ourselves whether this chapter constitutes an attack on or defense of longtermism, and leave it for the reader to decide.

Most objections to atheism focus on the evidence that we have to be theists or on the purported effect that atheism has on our moral behaviour. Could it be in our own interests to believe in God and, if so, do the prudential reasons we have for believing in God constitute a different kind of objection to atheism? In this chapter, I focus on this question. I argue that in order for prudential objections to atheism to get off the ground, we must believe that we can have prudential reasons for and against believing things. I argue that a modest version of this view is more plausible than it may initially seem. I consider two kinds of prudential reasons for belief: personal benefits like consolation, health, and community; and Pascal's contention that we are more likely to experience an infinitely good afterlife if we believe in God.

Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, e.g., by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. Such offsetters typically believe that, by offsetting, they change the deontic status of their behaviour, making an otherwise impermissible action permissible. Do they succeed in practice? Some philosophers have argued that they do, since their offsets appear to reverse the adverse effects of their emissions. But we show that they do not. In practice, standard carbon offsetting does not reverse the harms of the original action, nor does it even benefit the same group as was harmed. Standard moral theories hence deny that such offsetting succeeds. Indeed, we show that any moral theory that allows offsetting in this setting faces a dilemma between allowing any wrong to be offset, no matter how grievous, and recognising an implausibly sharp discontinuity between offsettable actions and non-offsettable actions. The most plausible response is to accept that carbon offsetting fails to right our climate wrongs.

It is possible that the world contains infinitely many agents that have positive and negative levels of well-being. Theories have been developed to ethically rank such worlds based on the well-being levels of the agents in those worlds or other qualitative properties of the worlds in question, such as the distribution of agents across spacetime. In this thesis I argue that such ethical rankings ought to be consistent with the Pareto principle, which says that if two worlds contain the same agents and some agents are better off in the first world than they are in the second and no agents are worse off than they are in the second, then the first world is better than the second. I show that if we accept four axioms – the Pareto principle, transitivity, an axiom stating that populations of worlds can be permuted, and the claim that if the ‘at least as good as’ relation holds between two worlds then it holds between qualitative duplicates of this world pair – then we must conclude that there is ubiquitous incomparability between infinite worlds. I show that this is true even if the populations of infinite worlds are disjoint or overlapping, and that we cannot use any qualitative properties of world pairs to rank these worlds. Finally, I argue that this incomparability result generates puzzles for both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories of objective and subjective permissibility.