Amandine Catala

Autistics are often viewed and treated as a vulnerable population. But what does vulnerability mean in this context, based on first-person, autistic perspectives and our own self-understandings and community-grown reflections, rather than neuronormative expectations? To explore this, we focus on the phenomenon of autistic masking, and what masking and unmasking in different contexts enables and reveals. Drawing on feminist scholarship on conceptualizing vulnerability and treating neurodiversity as an axis of intersectionality, we argue that it is useful to distinguish between what we call openness vulnerability and harm vulnerability, in order to appreciate not only the risks but also the benefits of autistic unmasking. We begin with the notion of neuronormativity, how it is harmful to autistics, and how it institutes an unjust vulnerability economy. We then introduce the concepts of harm vulnerability and openness vulnerability at the core of our argument for a shift in the vulnerability economy toward more just allocations of vulnerability between autistics and neurotypicals. Next, we look more closely at how these unjust vulnerability dynamics play out in the contexts of higher education and healthcare. Finally, we consider strategies for resisting neuronormativity under the non-ideal circumstances of the status quo.

Recent accounts of epistemic agency and injustice have shown that both notions are greatly enriched and more accurately construed when they are taken to include not only propositional knowledge (knowing-that) but also experiential knowledge, including practical knowledge (knowing-how) and tacit, embodied, and affective knowledge (knowing what-it’s-like). What can such a pluralist account tell us about epistemic repair? This paper aims to tease out the implications of a pluralist account of knowledge, epistemic agency, and epistemic injustice for epistemic repair. The paper is divided into two main parts. I first introduce what has been termed a “pluralist” account of knowledge, epistemic agency, and epistemic injustice, explaining why it is descriptively more complete and normatively more inclusive, and why it might therefore be useful for projects of epistemic repair. I then draw on this pluralist account to develop an original account of epistemic repair. I propose a fivefold framework to flesh out what epistemic repair involves, centered around five questions: (i) what are we repairing, or the objects of epistemic repair; (ii) who is repairing, or the agents of epistemic repair; (iii) why or with what aim, or the goal of epistemic repair; (iv) where, or the sites of epistemic repair; and (v) how, or the mechanisms of epistemic repair. I illustrate my account of epistemic repair with two examples, focusing respectively on Indigenous relations and on neurodiverse relations.

The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people.

We suggest that performing arts help us to understand how to use embodied experience and agency to resist and transform oppressive social practices and environments. We draw from dance studies, 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive) cognition, and feminist epistemology to reveal connections between performing arts, embodied knowing, and epistemic and social justice. Epistemic injustice consists in being unduly undermined in one’s capacity as an epistemic agent, including because of inadequate understandings of the social experiences and capacities of marginalized groups. Following a pluralist account of epistemic agency, we argue that oppressive social environments yield differential distributions of affordances to members of oppressed groups, resulting in a differential understanding of what they can do (permission and capacity). Performing arts provide an opportunity to produce new understandings of one’s capacity which empower epistemic agents not to conform to oppressive social norms, thereby producing new understandings of what is allowed and fostering greater epistemic and social justice.

The neurodiversity movement has long advocated for "Nothing about us without us" or the necessity of including neurominoritized people, such as Autistics, in the production of public policies, social discourses, academic knowledge, and scientific research about neurominoritized profiles, including autism. Similarly, the scientific and academic communities are increasingly recognizing the importance for participatory research to be not only ethical but also emancipatory. Yet the call for "Nothing about us without us" is still too often ignored, inaccurately understood, or imperfectly applied, in ways that can be jarring and disrespectful at best, and violent and traumatic at worst. Drawing on my experience as an Autistic woman, academic, and self-advocate who has participated in studies on autism, I develop a proposal for how the principle of "Nothing about us without us," understood as reclaiming epistemic authority and agency, might best be implemented in emancipatory research with Autistic adults. Specifically, I turn to two frameworks that have so far been developed independently of each other, yet that prove to be particularly fruitful when used together in this context: namely, the frameworks of design justice and of epistemic injustice. Drawing on both frameworks, I identify four principles of justice so that participatory autism research can be conducted in both an ethical and an emancipatory manner that heeds the neurodiversity movement's call for "Nothing about us without us" – namely, the principles of thorough involvement, of nonnormative communication, of trust-building, and of accountability.

Epistemic injustice is inherently connected to epistemic power and epistemic agency: understanding and addressing the former allows us to better understand and address the latter, and vice versa. Yet, despite vast and rich discussions of epistemic injustice, which often invoke the notions of epistemic power and epistemic agency, both notions remain undertheorized and hence largely elusive. This book offers a systematic account of epistemic power and agency by turning to the dynamics of epistemic injustice - that is, the many forms epistemic injustice can take, the different sites and mechanisms through which it operates, and the various transformations consequently required to cultivate greater epistemic justice. Adopting standpoint theory both as a theory and as a methodology, the book focuses on several pressing social questions, such as deliberative impasses in divided societies, colonial memory, academic migration, the underrepresentation of members of non-dominant groups in certain fields, and the marginalization of minoritized minds, such as intellectually disabled people and autistics. By analyzing these social questions through the lens of the dynamics of epistemic injustice, the book develops a systematic account of epistemic power and agency.

In this symposium piece, I follow Lu-Adler’s lead in scrutinizing the connections between linguistic Othering and prevailing yet exclusionary academic practices of knowledge production, focusing on linguistic epistemic injustice in academia. Specifically, I suggest that in a global academic context marked by sharp inequalities of opportunity due inter alia to linguistic Othering, language often operates as a threefold criterion for knowledge validation and hence for the allocation of credibility and intelligibility. I submit that linguistic selection (i.e., which language is used for knowledge production and transmission), linguistic form (i.e., the way a given language is spoken or written), and linguistic content (i.e., the words or concepts a given language offers and uses to describe and make sense of the world) are all ways in which language can be used to validate or invalidate processes of knowledge production and thereby result in unjust allocations of credibility and intelligibility. I argue that language can thus sometimes function as what I have called elsewhere a “meta-epistemic filter,” which creates an unjust credibility and intelligibility economy by predetermining in a structurally biased way what kinds of epistemic contributions are (made) available or count as admissible or inadmissible in the first place. I close by exploring how we might foster greater linguistic epistemic justice in academia by cultivating meta-linguistic awareness and how this might be facilitated by attending to the role that experiential (as opposed to merely propositional) knowledge might play.

Autistic people continue to face considerable stigmatization. Much work remains to be done to identify and tackle the causes of this stigmatization. We identify two related assumptions that generate and perpetuate this stigmatization: one ontological; one epistemic. We argue that breaking the stigma around autism requires addressing these twin assumptions. The ontological assumption presupposes the pathologization of autism as a disorder. Addressing this first assumption requires taking neurodiversity seriously and moving away from neuronormativity. The epistemic assumption posits that “allistics-know-best” and prevents allistics from acknowledging the epistemic limits of their own perspective. Addressing this second assumption requires centering Autistics’ perspectives and experiences in the production, dissemination, and use of knowledge about Autistics. To make our case against these two problematic assumptions, we draw on the key epistemological notions of standpoint, ignorance, and epistemic injustice—which have implications for all fields that concern minoritized groups and the contents produced about or with them. Fruitfully connecting our original pluralist conception of epistemic agency (which centers crucial experiential knowledge beyond mere propositional knowledge) to 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enacted), we identify a new category of epistemic injustice: ecological epistemic injustice. We then illustrate the importance of addressing the widespread yet problematic ontological and epistemic assumptions underlying the stigmatization of autism by turning to the case of applied behavioral analysis (ABA), which instantiates both neuronormativity and epistemic injustice.

This chapter contributes to a more general research programme on the social epistemology of think tanks by exploring the issue of how the production and transmission of knowledge by think tanks can best be evaluated. Most evaluations of think tanks take each organization as a unit. The goal of the assessment becomes a ranking of organizations according to a set of criteria meant to capture what an ideal think tank would look like, most often in terms of impact or transparency. Although organizational-level evaluations can be valuable, we propose to evaluate think tanks at the level of ecosystems rather than at the level of individual organizations. Moreover, whereas existing evaluations conflate excellence with concerns such as ‘impact,’ we propose to evaluate them on the basis of their epistemic excellence. Thus, with the help of examples from Canada and elsewhere, this chapter illustrates how think tanks can be evaluated as ecosystems and on epistemic grounds. This chapter also concentrates on one specific component of epistemic excellence: the ways in which think tanks can hinder or foster epistemic justice. The chapter first lays out the benefits of an ecosystemic evaluation, then explains how a conception of epistemic excellence can apply to think tank ecosystems before exploring characteristics of ecosystems that can be conducive or detrimental to epistemic excellence.

The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people.

The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways.

The traditional blackface character Black Pete has been at the center of an intense controversy in the Netherlands, with most black citizens denouncing the tradition as racist and most white citizens endorsing it as harmless fun. I analyze the controversy as an utter failure, on the part of white citizens, of what Alison Jaggar has called multicultural literacy. This article aims to identify both the causes of this failure of multicultural literacy and the conditions required for multicultural literacy to be possible. I argue that this failure of multicultural literacy is due to hermeneutical injustice and to white ignorance. I close by considering possible avenues for fostering multicultural literacy.

This piece discusses the account of contested territories and of corrective justice Moore offers in A Political Theory of Territory. In Chapter 6, Moore offers an occupancy account of boundary-drawing. My discussion focuses on the status of Moore's occupancy account compared to the statist and nationalist accounts it aims to replace. Specifically, I consider whether these other accounts are as unsuccessful as Moore suggests, and whether Moore's account is as distinct from these accounts as she suggests. In Chapter 7, Moore offers a distinction between three different types of rights violations involved in the unjust taking of territory, and considers potential remedies for each. My discussion focuses on the arguments Moore offers to justify the presence or absence of certain remedies, in particular the right of return and the redistribution of land. I conclude that the territorial claims of historically wronged groups are too quickly dismissed, and I suggest that this is problematic from the point of view of Moore's own account.

Because secession centrally involves taking away a territory, a successful normative theory of secession must give a credible account of when a seceding group has a valid territorial claim. One of the most prominent types of normative theory of secession is remedial theories of secession. I argue that while remedial theories address the question of territorial justification, they fail to do so adequately, because their account is both arbitrary and internally inconsistent. I argue that addressing the question of territorial justification non-arbitrarily and consistently requires adopting a broader and morally more plausible conception of justice than that on which remedial theories explicitly rely; and I show that this broader conception of justice is implicit in remedial theories’ account of territorial justification. Recognizing this, however, has significant implications for remedial theories, as it considerably broadens the scope of valid territorial claims, and hence of valid secessionist claims.

I analyze the relation between deliberative democracy and trust through the lens of epistemic justice. I argue for three main claims: (i) the deliberative impasse dividing majority and minority groups in many democracies is due to a particular type of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘hermeneutical domination’; (ii) undoing hermeneutical domination requires epistemic trust; and (iii) this epistemic trust is supported by the three deliberative democratic requirements of equality, legitimacy, and accountability. In arguing for those claims, I contribute to the conceptualization of both epistemic injustice and domination, as well as to discussions of trust and deliberative democracy.

The recent crisis involving the territory of Crimea has been characterized both as a case of wrongful annexation and as one of rightful secession. Territory and competing territorial claims lie at the heart of the normative questions of secession and annexation. Any normative theory of secession or of annexation must therefore address their territorial aspect: It must explain why one agent rather than another has a valid claim to the disputed territory. One of the most interesting, yet controversial, normative accounts of secession has been offered by choice theorists of secession. Choice theorists adopt a rather permissive stance, based on the normative significance of political self-determination. Choice theories, however, have been widely criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of what legitimates the seceding group’s territorial claim. This article argues that it is possible to remedy choice theories’ failure to address the question of territorial justification adequately. To do so, this article offers a two-tier account of territory that is grounded in the normative significance of self-determination. It defends this account of territory by showing that it is implied by our normative condemnation of annexation. It argues that the same reasons that warrant opposition to annexation provide support for secession. In closing, this article revisits the case of Crimea in light of its two-tier account of territory, and considers what role international law and institutions might play in addressing this type of situation.

The philosophical debate on secession has hitherto revolved primarily around the question of self-determination rather than that of distributive justice. Normative theorists of secession have approached the question of secession mostly in terms of the right that the secessionist group has to secede. Much less attention has been paid to the extent and the nature of obligations or duties that the seceding group might have toward the group it is leaving behind. At best, secession theorists have introduced clauses to the effect that secession should not undermine the remainder state’s viability nor violate prior arrangements of reciprocal cooperation. While these clauses certainly reflect a certain concern for distributive justice, I argue that they are insufficient in two respects: they are problematically minimal in what they require, and the justification given for these clauses accounts only for part of the normative picture. In this paper, I address these two shortcomings by arguing that the seceding group might have significant duties of distributive justice toward the remainder group, and that these duties are associative in nature and stem from a concern to secure non-domination within the pre-secession polity. What is gained from my non-domination account, then, is that it is analytically more comprehensive and normatively more accurate. In arguing for claims and, the paper contributes both to the debate on secession as well as to the conceptualization of associative duties and of non-domination.