Are epistemic norms in tension with the norms that govern inquiry? Jane Friedman (2020) argues that they are. On her view, this tension motivates a radical revision of the epistemic norms. I argue that there is no genuine tension between epistemic norms and the norms of inquiry. I present a puzzle for the epistemic norms that Friedman considers. I show that each of these epistemic norms is in tension with itself. That is, each one produces the same sort of tension alone as it does with the norms…
Read moreAre epistemic norms in tension with the norms that govern inquiry? Jane Friedman (2020) argues that they are. On her view, this tension motivates a radical revision of the epistemic norms. I argue that there is no genuine tension between epistemic norms and the norms of inquiry. I present a puzzle for the epistemic norms that Friedman considers. I show that each of these epistemic norms is in tension with itself. That is, each one produces the same sort of tension alone as it does with the norms of inquiry. My preferred solution to this puzzle is to reformulate the epistemic norms timelessly. Timeless norms, unlike timestamped norms, do not specify when agents are to comply. While this distinction, based on Holly Smith Goldman’s (Citation1976) work in ethics, is rarely addressed in epistemology, I argue that timeless norms better capture what most philosophers who defend epistemic norms are interested in. Understanding epistemic norms as timeless not only solves the puzzle, it dissolves the tension between inquiry and the epistemic.
