•  1
    Sex as a Pedagogical Failure
    Yale Law Journal 129 (4). 2020.
    In the early 1980s, U.S. universities began regulating sexual relationships between professors and students. Such regulations are routinely justified by a rationale drawn from sexual-harassment law in the employment context: the power differential between professor and student precludes the possibility of genuine consent on the student’s part. This rationale is problematic, as feminists in the 1980s first observed, for its protectionist and infantilizing attitude toward (generally) women student…Read more
  •  276
    No Platforming
    In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom, . pp. 186-209. 2018.
    This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of…Read more
  •  100
    VII — Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2): 127-156. 2019.
    We suffer from genealogical anxiety when we worry that the contingent origins of our representations, once revealed, will somehow undermine or cast doubt on those representations. Is such anxiety ever rational? Many have apparently thought so, from pre-Socratic critics of Greek theology to contemporary evolutionary debunkers of morality. One strategy for vindicating critical genealogies is to see them as undermining the epistemic standing of our representations—the justification of our beliefs, …Read more
  •  61
    How to Do Things with Philosophy
    European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 1410-1416. 2018.
  •  114
    Disagreement Without Transparency
    In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 9--30. 2013.
    What ought one to do, epistemically speaking, when faced with a disagreement? Faced with this question, one naturally hopes for an answer that is principled, general, and intuitively satisfying. We want to argue that this is a vain hope. Our claim is that a satisfying answer will prove elusive because of non-transparency: that there is no condition such that we are always in a position to know whether it obtains. When we take seriously that there is nothing, including our own minds, to which we …Read more
  •  60
    Philosophy and Ideology
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (3): 371-380. 2016.
    What is it for an analytic philosopher to do ideology critique? Just how useful are the proprietary tools of analytic philosophy when it comes to thinking about ideology, and in what sense ‘useful’, and to whom? And to what end might analytic philosophers pursue ideology critique? Here I attempt to say something about these questions by commenting on a recent contribution to analytic ideology critique, Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works.¿Qué significa para un filósofo analítico hacer crítica d…Read more
  •  108
    The Ineffable and the Ethical
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1): 215-223. 2018.
  •  152
    The Aptness of Anger
    Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2): 123-144. 2018.
  •  4
    Feminism and Metaethics
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 595-608. 2017.
  •  244
    Are We Luminous?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 294-319. 2015.
    Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of t…Read more
  •  251
    Normativity without Cartesian privilege
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 273-299. 2015.
  •  91
    The Archimedean Urge
    Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 325-362. 2015.