Amie Thomasson

This book aims to change how we think about what metaphysics can do, and why it matters. Traditionally, metaphysics has been presented as aiming to discover deep truths about the world. But this leads to a rivalry with science, mysteries about how we could gain this knowledge, and a despairing skepticism about our ability to gain knowledge in metaphysics. Rethinking Metaphysics diagnoses the problems with traditional and many recent approaches to metaphysics as arising from a problematic assumption that all discourse functions in the same way. By drawing on work in linguistics, it shows how to develop a richer view of linguistic functions that enables us to see why this assumption leads us astray. A better understanding of the plurality of linguistic functions also enables us to disentangle ourselves from many old metaphysical problems. In place of the traditional model, we should think of metaphysics as work in conceptual engineering—including both reverse-engineering projects aimed at understanding how various parts of our language and conceptual scheme work and what functions they serve, and constructive-engineering projects that investigate what concepts and language we should use. Rethinking metaphysics as conceptual engineering in this way enables us to avoid the problems of traditional views of metaphysics, while also demonstrating the perennial importance of metaphysics to human life. For how we think and talk is centrally important to how we live and to how we organize our societies and our investigations. And our ways of thinking and speaking must constantly be rethought in situations of new knowledge, new technology, and evolving needs.

Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way for a form of Quietism that does not simply remain quiet about the explanatory demands of metaethics, but rather is able to diagnose where they go wrong. By combining a neopragmatic analysis of the discourse with an easy approach to ontology, , we can develop a form of Quietist Moral Realism that is far stronger than critics of quietism have appreciated.

The problem of how we could come to know modal facts has been notorious for centuries. In this paper, Theodore Locke and Amie Thomasson defend a ‘modal normativist’ approach to understanding claims about metaphysical necessity and possibility—a view that claims to be able to demystify metaphysical modal knowledge, by showing how modal knowledge may be acquired through conceptual mastery, reasoning abilities, and empirical knowledge. Antonella Mallozzi (this volume) argues that normativists cannot deflate modal knowledge in that way, for they must somewhere implicitly presuppose knowledge of ‘essentialist principles and information’ to justify their claim to know metaphysical modal facts. In response, the authors argue that that is not so, by clarifying the ways in which modal normativists think we can come to acquire modal knowledge—and by showing how the account can be extended to demystify our knowledge of essentialist principles and facts as well.

Two recurrent worries arise for the artefactual theory of fiction. One concerns negative existence claims—for it seems that claims like ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ are true, although (on the artefactualist view) the fictional character Holmes does exist. The second is the related ontological worry: that the artefactualist has to accept that there ‘really are’ such ‘things’ as ‘fictional objects’. Section 1 briefly responds to the problem of negative existence claims, which, in turn, will begin to make evident why the ontological worry is not at all worrisome—an issue covered in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 examine the fictionalist’s suggestion and whether it undermines the easy ontological methodology behind artefactualism. These sections argue that it does not, but that, on the contrary, the easy ontological approach poses important challenges for a great many fictionalist accounts—wherever they appear in metaphysics.

Crawford Elder’s Real Natures and Familiar Objects promises to give naturalistically inclined metaphysicians reason to accept an ontology that includes many common sense objects, including persons, organisms, and at least many artifacts, behaviors, customs, and so on. This is a brave book, running against the current of trends towards austerity in ontology, tackling centuries old problems about how modal facts may be empirically discovered, and defending a commonsense ontology from a strictly naturalistic approach rather than via traditional appeals to ordinary language or common sense.

ABSTRACTA ‘sceptical’ approach to easy arguments involves reducing our confidence in the supposedly uncontroversial premise with which the arguments begin. Here I address the question: if we accept Yablo's new version of a sceptical proposal, what difference might that make for the relevant meta-ontological debates? I argue that serious difficulties remain for even this ‘best’ version of a sceptical approach. Noting these difficulties might motivate us to look again at the alternative strategy—of reading the uncontroversial premise straightforwardly and thinking that doubts about the conclusion were based on artificial inflation or confusion.

I have argued elsewhere for a deflationary conception of metaphysics, which takes well-formed metaphysical questions to be answerable using nothing more mysterious than empirical information and descriptive and normative conceptual work. Here I examine the ways in which our practices of metaphysics should change, if we adopt the deflationary reconception of metaphysics. Adopting this approach does not mean abandoning metaphysics, but it does lead to important differences regarding which debates and positions are worth taking seriously. It also requires us to reevaluate which criteria for choosing metaphysical views are appropriate – particularly where debates about existence are concerned.

Those who aim to give an account of modal knowledge face two challenges: the integration challenge of reconciling an account of what is involved in knowing modal truths with a plausible story about how we can come to know them, and the reliability challenge of giving a plausible account of how we could have evolved a reliable capacity to acquire modal knowledge. I argue that recent counterfactual and dispositional accounts of modal knowledge cannot solve these problems regarding specifically metaphysical modal truths—leaving us with the threat of skepticism about large portions of metaphysics, and certain other areas of philosophy. I argue, however, that both of these problems look insuperable only if we assume that metaphysical modal discourse serves a describing or tracking function. If we adopt instead a normativist approach to metaphysical modal discourse, which sees the basic function of modal discourse as giving us perspicuous ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules, the problems show up very differently. The modal normativist can give a plausible response to both of the classic problems of how we can come to know metaphysical modal truths.

The common thought that Husserl was committed to a Platonist ontology of essences, and to a mysterious epistemology that holds that we can ‘intuit’ these essences, has contributed substantially to his work being dismissed and marginalized in analytic philosophy. This paper aims to show that it is misguided to dismiss Husserl on these grounds. First, the author aims to explicate Husserl’s views about essences and how we can know them, in ways that make clear that he is not committed to a traditional Platonism, or a mystical epistemology. Second, the author argues that Husserl’s approach was an important source for Carnap in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, where Carnap tried to overcome the empiricists’ qualms about referring to abstracta. Finally, the author will argue that Husserl’s approach can be reconstructed in contemporary analytic terms by appeal to the idea of pleonastic transformations. By seeing both Husserl’s views and their influences on later analytic work more clearly, the hope is to build bridges and make clear that the approach is of lasting value and interest.

One often hears talk about some entities being "higher-level" than others: social and cultural objects, for example, are often said to be "higher-level" entities than organisms; mental properties are often said to be "higherlevel" than physical or neurological properties; and so on. Sometimes this is expressed as the idea that reality comes in ontological levels, strata of being. I will argue, however, that metaphysics is better off without making use of the idea of "levels." The levels metaphor is misleading and can generate pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems.

In the dissertation I defend the view that there are fictional characters and develop the Artifactual Theory of fiction, according to which fictional characters are non-concrete entities dependent on authors, texts and readers. I argue that our best theory of intentionality asserts that all intentional acts have objects, even if these objects are fictional, for otherwise one cannot adequately analyze our apparent experiences of fictional characters. ;Since I treat fictional characters as dependent entities, the central chapters are dedicated to developing a general theory of existential dependence on the basis of which one can offer a clear analysis of fictional objects and dependent entities of all kinds. I begin with an historical study of dependence, proceed to a thematic study of existential dependence, and finally provide a formal model for the state of affairs ontology lying behind these definitions of dependence. ;This work on dependence provides the groundwork for delineating a system of ontological categories that reveals that fictional characters are not uniquely peculiar entities, but rather share important features with other dependent entities such as stories, works of music, theories, tools, churches, and universals. Most importantly, since fictional objects fall into the same category as literary works, one gains no parsimony by rejecting fictional objects and rephrasing apparent talk about them in terms of talk about stories. ;I return to address various problems which many have thought arise in the case of fictional objects, offering first a theory of how fictional names refer, secondly, a means to analyze predications of fictional objects and finally, identity conditions for fictional objects. I close by comparing the Artifactual Theory to other theories of fiction including Fregean and Pretense views, Meinongian theories, and the theories of Crittenden and van Inwagen. While prior studies treat fictional objects as presenting a strange special case, on my view fictional characters are simply some of the many kinds of familiar dependent entities. Consequently, this work on fiction serves as a case study that can help us to understand the structure of dependent entities of all kinds in the world around us

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating

In recent analytic metaphysics, the view that ‘ordinary inanimate objects such as sticks and stones, tables and chairs, simply do not exist’ has been defended by some noteworthy writers. Thomasson opposes such revisionary ontology in favour of an ontology that is conservative with respect to common sense. The book is written in a straightforward, methodical and down-to-earth style. It is also relatively non-specialized, enabling the author and her readers to approach problems that are often dealt with in isolation in a more unified way.Thomasson's arguments are mainly counter-attacks on six ‘eliminativist’ arguments against ordinary objects. A causal redundancy argument espoused by Trenton Merricks holds that to suppose that there are ordinary objects is to suppose that these objects have distinctive causal powers. However, the casual efficacy of a baseball, for example, is exhausted by that of some suitably arranged …

Several prominent attacks on the objects of 'folk ontology' argue that these would be omitted from a scientific ontology, or would be 'rivals' of scientific objects for their claims to be efficacious, occupy space, be composed of parts, or possess a range of other properties. I examine causal redundancy and overdetermination arguments, 'nothing over and above' appeals, and arguments based on problems with collocation and with property additivity. I argue that these share a common problem: applying conjunctive principles to cases in which the claims conjoined are not analytically independent. This unified diagnosis provides a way of defending ordinary objects against these common objections, while also yielding warnings about certain uses of general conjunctive principles