Amy L. McLaughlin

Charles Peirce’s model of inquiry is supposed to demarcate appropriate methods of inquiry from specious ones. Cheryl Misak points out that Peirce’s explicit account fails, but can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own system. While Misak’s criticism is a propos, her own attempt to fortify Peirce’s account does not succeed, as it falls prey to the same criticism she raises against Peirce’s explicit account. The account provided in this paper—the ‘open path’ alternative—draws from Peirce’s corollary to his “first rule of reason”, that one should not block the road to inquiry. The ‘open path’ account is able to withstand Misak’s objections, and when combined with other aspects of Peirce’s work, shows us why the optimal way to conduct inquiry is to follow the path of greatest resistance. Inquiry, however, is rarely conducted in optimal conditions. Actual, constrained conditions of inquiry require a measure of economy in terms of what can be reasonably pursued and how. The question, then, is how to conduct our inquiries so that they are as nearly optimal as possible given actual constraints. As a working scientist, Peirce was acutely aware of the need to economize in research. Nicholas Rescher has recognized this issue’s significance for Peirce, and noted its neglect in discussions of Peirce’s work. One issue that has been largely neglected in the literature on Peirce is what specifically he recommends, based on considerations of economy, for how to go about gathering evidence. Kronz & McLaughlin points out that Peirce’s primary recommendation is that in gathering evidence relevant to a particular hypothesis we should test for empirical consequences that would not have been expected otherwise. The view that is developed in this paper is that economy in research, according to Peirce, follows the general line of his theory of inquiry. Peirce’s theory of inquiry implies that pursuit of truth requires maximizing resistance. I argue that his considerations about how to navigate within the constraints introduced in the context of actual research are also best understood as recommendations for maximizing resistance

This paper provides a framework, based on Peircean pragmatism and a supplemental metaphysical principle, for reconciling realism and antirealism. Peircean polymorphism, the resultant position defended in the paper, is a realist position, accepting that there is a world that exists and has characteristics of its own, independently of our experience of it. The position denies, however, what I call the uniqueness assumption about truth -- that it is possible for one, unique representational approach to adequately represent reality. While Peirce does not explicitly address the uniqueness assumption, his account is sufficiently ambiguous on this point to have been understood as a uniqueness account. The supplemental metaphysical principle introduced here, that reality is polymorphic, serves to fortify Peirce's pragmatism against uniqueness. Briefly, the paper outlines some implications of accepting the fortified Peircean position, including greater explanatory power and more compelling motivation for continued scientific inquiry.

The dissertation project addresses what is required of a notion of scientific progress. Any viable notion of scientific progress must satisfy three requirements: show that theory comparison is possible, establish criteria for theory success, and outline an appropriate method for theory comparison. The dissertation begins with a discussion of the so-called 'incommensurability of theories'. The notion is defended against some influential sets of objections; nonetheless it is shown that there are ways of making comparisons among potentially incommensurable theories. Incommensurability is a matter of degree, and the dissertation outlines ways in which incommensurability is resolved. Next, the dissertation addresses the issue of theory success. Typically, success is construed in terms of how well a theory captures truth. An appropriate account of truth is therefore required. The views of Charles Peirce provide the substantial basis for the account. Peirce construes truth as a regulative ideal, and as promoting inquiry. The dissertation addresses these two aspects of Peirce's system, which are appropriately interpreted so as to fend off some important objections. Peirce's pragmatic account of truth cannot, on its own, explain how incommensurability comes about; nor can it account for its conditions of resolution. Thus, Peirce's account of truth needs supplementation. Nelson Goodman's insights about the relationships among theory, observation, and interpretation prove useful in helping to make sense of the possibility of incommensurability and its resolution. Such insights point to a particular metaphysical principle, the principle of multi-faceted realism. This principle is shown to conform with Peirce's pragmatism and to explain why Peirce's approach to scientific inquiry is most fruitful. Armed with this characterization of truth, the dissertation suggests a blueprint for an account of scientific progress. What is of primary importance is leaving open the door to future inquiry, and the conclusions that can be drawn from the foregoing considerations provide information about which avenues of inquiry to pursue and which to avoid in order to ensure that science can be conducted in as progressive a way as possible