Ana Falcato

This paper discusses the relevance and the conceptual role, within Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, of a fleeting impression of shame that reverts the threat of solipsism looming over any project of transcendental philosophy. In reading Sartre’s masterpiece, I underscore two methodological points that tend to be bypassed in standard interpretations and lengthy discussions of the book. On the one hand, I safeguard the strictly descriptive core of Sartre’s presentation of the impression of shame and what it reveals about the formal structures of the (pre-reflective) cogito, as Sartre understands it. On the other hand, my analysis explores the different phases of the (conceptual) narrative of the For-Itself, which Sartre inherits from the Idealist tradition in modern philosophy and applies to the concreteness of a phenomenological description of the main stages of one’s experience of the outside world.

This book presents new philosophical work on delusions and their impact on everyday human behavior. It explores a cluster of related topics at the intersection of philosophy of mind and psychiatry, while also charting the historical development of work on delusions. Within psychiatry, there are several disputes about the nature and origin of delusions. Whereas some authors see only an abnormal phenomenon that needs to be treated by psychological or pharmacological means, others hold that delusions can be psychologically adaptive and even have epistemic benefits. This book brings together an interdisciplinary group of contributors to build consensus around what delusions are and how they impact the human mind. Part 1 provides readers with an informed historical discussion of delusions and carefully examines the contemporary impact of these historical perspectives. Part 2 analyzes the impact of contemporary views of delusions on the mental and emotional life of human agents. Finally, Part 3 explores the normative frameworks of delusions and analyzes the impact of some of their behavioral consequences on the daily life of subjects and their caregivers. The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions is essential reading for researchers and graduate students working at the intersection of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology.

In this introductory chapter, we discuss some recent theoretical approaches to the relations between Western Philosophy and Literary Modernism, and at the same time, we get back to some classic contrasts drawn between the two creative enterprises in the foundational texts of each tradition, which make them seem irreconcilable. Recent rapprochements made by commentators on twentieth-century philosophy and the cultural breakthrough of Modernism in the last decade of the nineteenth-century have insisted on a disenchanted rupture with all kinds of metaphysical worldviews, which had theretofore played a stabilizing role in human beings’ lives and in Western societies at large. Usually this demystifying gesture is associated with a concentration of theoretical attention on the role played by language itself. In terms of the development of philosophical methods in the twentieth-century, this has been especially associated with the so-called ‘linguistic analysis’. You could conceive of the linguistic turn as a new metaphysical framework. This framework would equally encompass the whole of reality in a single, unifying principle. In this book we mean to avoid this essentialist worldview by drawing on highly differentiated resources from human language itself, be it poetry, the novel, the theatre or the plastic arts.

Philosophers writing on J. M. Coetzee’s literary project have described it as “realist-modernist”. This is due to a combination of the prose’s stylistic features and more substantial issues developed in his novels. Coetzee’s prose is extremely sober, compact, dry, and overtly self-conscious; it contains his reflections on features of the prose itself and on the historic-literary conflict between realism and modernism in the modern novel. In this paper, I discuss the relevance of Coetzee’s use of the split page in Diary of a Bad Year, focusing on its role in undermining “ersatz ethical thought”, and develop a model for explaining Coetzee’s realist modernism. This model is situated within a broader, self-critical project that traces the significance of my analysis for the form of philosophical discourse.

In a similar way to what happens when a wave of electricity impacts the animal body and provokes a convulsive stir of muscles and nerves which can burn and ultimately paralyze the affected surface, some rough emotional experiences may lead us to sudden numbness. Keeping abreast with the most sophisticated phenomenological tools to account for an extremely damaging kind of psychological experience that can ultimately defeat the purpose of a sheer descriptive approach, this chapter does provide a descriptive analysis of the kind of emotional shock that risks threatening the moral integrity of an agent. I shall zoom in my analysis on the typically acknowledged moment when disturbing information from a socially shared context outside ourselves comes suddenly to the fore of our attention, thus disrupting the focus even of the the most trivial perceptive input. I argue that in the longer run the outcome of such an experience may amount to a reconfiguration of the subject’s core values, daily routines and even her life-long expectations and projects.

As it is well known, the Philosophical Investigations are formally structured as a set of paragraphs numerically sequenced, and a more arbitrary group of thematic remarks. In the Prologue and in a justifying way of putting it, Wittgenstein States that: «Thus this book is really only an Album». Taking it as an exhibition of a series of sketches, we can read the book as a collection of «pictures of thought». However, as I will argue, in a wider understanding of the Philosophical Investigations, the idea of an album has deeper implications than the methodological ones. With a somewhat spenglerian inspiration, the book follows a sort of cultural-transcendental perspective in accordance to the organic model of a philosophical approach to forms of life which have a primary linguistic configuration.

This paper corrects a historical injustice that has been perpetrated against Kant for some time now. Mostly on good grounds, Kantian ethics have been accused of neglecting the role played by the emotions in moral deliberation and in morally informed action. However, the contemporary moral philosophers who have put forth such a claim tend to bypass textual sources, on the one hand, and to downplay the role played by the anthropological writings on Kant’s practical philosophy as a whole, on the other. Relying on highly relevant pre-critical texts in which Kant sketches future argumentative patterns and discusses the role of negative emotions like shame on the improvement of the human species, I address a mistaken conclusion about Kantian ethics as a whole that is common in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Finally, I raise some paradoxical conclusions that follow from Kant’s argument, once its implicit premises have been brought to light.

Produced on the fringes of philosophy and literary criticism, this book is a pioneering study which aims to explicitly address and thematize what may be called a “critical philosophy in the condition of modernism”. Its most important and original contribution to both disciplines is a self-conscious reflection on possible modes of writing philosophy today, and a systematic comparison with what happened in literary modernism at the beginning of the twentieth-century. The volume is divided into six sections, where internationally renowned scholars discuss such pressing topics as the role of an unreliable narrator in a major philosophical treatise, the different mediums of art-production and how these impact on our perception of the Work itself, the role of narrative in animal ethics and the filmic adaption of a Modernist classic.

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue that this is a misleading assumption and justify this by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions leaves Bach’s proposal in an invisible region of the literalism/contextualism debate.

No seu livro de 1998 — What we owe to each other — T. M. Scanlon defendeu sistematicamente que a noção de “razão” é primitiva e não definível noutros termos quando se trata de explicar um curso de acção moralmente relevante. Suportando o seu argumento num modelo muito intuitivo para pensar o que são razões em termos de racionalidade prática, Scanlon defende que qualquer explicação conduz sempre à mesma ideia: uma razão é uma consideração que conta em favor de algo. E conta como tal na medida em que fornece uma razão para aquilo que justifica, explica ou legitima. Parece, portanto, que este é o limite da definição. O meu argumento neste trabalho confronta a posição hiper-racionalista de Scanlon com o exemplo da Acrasia ou fraqueza da vontade, por se tratar de um típico curso de acção que não apenas seria erradamente caracterizado com racional, mas onde o próprio agente falharia sistematicamente na provisão de razões para o seu comportamento.

RESUMO: Com um estilo sóbrio e minimalista, a prosa literária de J. M. Coetzee é um espaço criativo onde diferentes identidades literárias são constantemente baralhadas e uma perigosa sobreposição de alter-egos é sistematicamente ensaiada. Pensando sobre todas essas nuances, filósofos contemporâneos a trabalhar sobre a obra do escritor sul-africano têm descrito o seu trabalho como "realista-modernista'. Neste artigo, discuto uma obra específica de Coetzee - focando sobretudo a estranha técnica gráfica da tripartição da página em três vozes literárias e a respectiva relação com a ideia de "pensamento ético de substituição" -, confrontando-a com a sua obra como um todo. Num segundo momento, apresento um modelo filosófico para explicar o seu "realismo modernista" e termino traçando o impacto desse modelo filosófico sobre a própria filosofia que o apresenta. ABSTRACT: Dispassionate and sober, J. M. Coetzee's prose is a space in which literary identities are continually unsettled, methodological subtleties both revealed and explored. Given these features, philosophers have described Coetzee's style as "modernist realist". In this paper, I discuss the relevance of Coetzee's use of the split page in Diary of a Bad Year, focusing on its role in undermining "ersatz ethical thought". In the second part of the paper, I develop a model for explaining Coetzee's modernist realism. This model is situated within a broader, self-critical project that traces the significance of my analysis for the form of philosophical discourse.