Ana Katić

For over a century, Darwin's theory of natural selection has provided the foundational core of evolutionary biology. This framework, however, is rooted in a reductionist and substance-oriented ontology that focuses on the selection of discrete traits. The integrative, holistic methodologies of systems biology now challenge this view, shifting the focus towards the dynamic processes and relations that constitute living systems, arguing that selection primarily acts on the adaptive potential and regulatory logic of entire developmental systems. This review argues that systems biology does not overturn but fundamentally expands the Darwinian paradigm, catalyzing the development of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. By examining concepts such as gene regulatory networks, phenotypic plasticity, and dynamic organism-environment interactions (illustrated through examples like plant photomorphogenesis and the adaptive responses of Gasterosteus aculeatus), we demonstrate that evolution operates as a multi-level process governed by reciprocal causation and feedback loops. Crucially, this scientific shift necessitates a parallel philosophical transition: from a static, substance-based ontology to a processual one. It challenges the primacy of reductionism, linear causality, and the nature-nurture dichotomy, advocating instead for a relational ontology where emergence, agency, and becoming are fundamental. We conclude that systems biology fulfills Darwin's vision by providing a process-oriented framework adequate to the breathtaking complexity of the living world, one where evolution is understood as a dynamic interplay of recursive interactions between organisms and their environments. In the following, we explore four interrelated dimensions of contemporary evolutionary biology: the limitations of reductionism, the nature of dynamic interactions, the regulatory logic encoded in gene networks, and the evolutionary role of phenotypic plasticity.

This paper explores whether extraterrestrial or other forms of cognition and morality that are unobservable and incomprehensible to humans constitute an existential risk (X-risk) or an existential opportunity (X-opportunity) for humanity. It is being argued that the human epistemological apparatus is fundamentally limited, rendering certain forms of life—both extraterrestrial and potentially terrestrial—imperceptible and incomprehensible (which is also a novel solution to the Fermi paradox that we propose). By integrating philosophical reasoning with empirical insights from (astro)biology, the paper examines the potential implications of interacting with such entities. It will be concluded that extra-terrestrial or other sentient forms of cognition and morality could represent both a risk and an opportunity, with the likelihood of a favorable outcome increasing in correlation with scientific progress and cognitive and moral enhancement of humanity.

Tema rada su dva tipa emergencije unutar razumevanja bioloških entiteta: a) epistemološka i b) ontološka emergencija. Iako postoji obimna literatura posvećena ovom pojmu (njegovim tipovima, čak i vrstama), tvrdimo da se pojam ontološke emergencije najčešće pogrešno primenjuje u naučnim i filozofskim objašnjenjima kompleksnih sistema, stoga ga formulišemo na drugačiji način. Da bismo istakli u čemu je distinktivno svojstvo jednog tipa u odnosu na drugi, i time dali doprinos boljem razumevanju kompleksnosti biosfere, za tip a) koristimo konvencionalno prihvaćen model za reprezentovanje genetičkih regulatornih mreža, dok za tip b) obrazlažemo zašto treba da bude predstavljen egzaptacijama. Cilj naše analize je da ukaže, polazeći od osnovnih pretpostavki sistemske biologije, na koji način pojam emergencije ima značajno mesto u današnjoj filozofiji nauke i teorijskoj biologiji.

Giere’s analysis of the epistemic role of fiction in science and literature is the representative of antifictionists. Our research finds the three inconsistencies in his main paper regarding the comparison of fiction in scientific models and literary works. We analyze his argument and offer our solution to the issue favoring the perspective of fictionalism. Further, we support a typological differentiation of false representation in science into fictional and fictitious. The value of this differentiation we demonstrate by giving the example of digital organisms in system biology. The paper aims to help better understanding of fiction in science and to avoid the oversimplification of literary fiction.

Now that we know that Earth-like planets are ubiquitous in the universe, as well as that most of them are much older than the Earth, it is justified to ask to what extent evolutionary outcomes on other such planets are similar, or indeed commensurable, to the outcomes we perceive around us. In order to assess the degree of specialty or mediocrity of our trajectory of biospheric evolution, we need to take into account recent advances in theoretical astrobiology, in particular (i) establishing the history of habitable planets’ formation in the Galaxy, and (ii) understanding the crucial importance of “Gaian” feedback loops and temporal windows for the interaction of early life with its physical environment. Hereby we consider an alternative macroevolutionary pathway that may result in tight functional integration of all sub-planetary ecosystems, eventually giving rise to a true superorganism at the biospheric level. The blueprint for a possible outcome of this scenario has been masterfully provided by the great Polish novelist Stanisław Lem in his 1961 novel Solaris. In fact, Solaris offers such a persuasive and powerful case for an “extremely strong” Gaia hypothesis that it is, arguably, high time to investigate it in a discursive astrobiological and philosophical context. In addition to novel predictions in the domain of potentially detectable biosignatures, some additional cognitive and heuristic benefits of studying such extreme cases of functional integration are briefly discussed.

We consider the Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (SETI) activities from a bioethical standpoint. In particular, we argue that there is a moral duty to search for other intelligent beings in the Universe. Some of them could – and are likely to be – morally enhanced in the sense that they are not only capable of unmistakable moral reasoning but are also capable of consistently acting upon the results of such deliberations. Even if the probability of finding such morally superior beings is small, it is higher than zero in any case; in fact, our astrobiological knowledge suggests that this probability is significant. Hence, there are both deductive and inductive arguments for the proposition that our duty is to search for such morally superior extraterrestrial beings. In other words, there is a duty to undertake and support our SETI efforts. The argument to that effect runs parallel to some of the arguments deployed in current debates on human moral enhancement.