Ana Vieyra

My aim in this paper is to begin arguing for how a philosophically defensible theory of truth can indeed follow from Hegel’s notion of ‘the idea’ as the culmination of the logic in the unity of the ‘concept’ and ‘objectivity’. I introduce the argument by showing how the coherence of the logical shape of truth Hegel presents in the final stage of the Logic involves no uncritical commitment to an independent metaphysically inflationary entity or reality. I do so by firstly considering some recent approaches to Hegel’s ‘theory’ of truth and responding to the challenge put forth by Mark Alznauer regarding the requirements of a post-critical doctrine of conceptual evaluation in the Science of Logic.

In this paper I suggest an alternative reading of the value of Hegel’s systematic approach to nature from the perspective of environmental philosophy. Taking the paradigmatic example of the “new materialist” ontologies, I present the problems with an inflationary justification for the argument for the need of a shift in the “scientific” representation of nature. On the basis of these problems, I suggest that Hegel’s view of nature as axiologically impotent sheds light into why emancipatory environmental theory needs not hinge on a determinate understanding of nature. In my reading, this rejection can be harmonized with the asymmetric nature of our responsibility towards non-human nature.