Anatolii Kozlov

© 2015 Elsevier B.V.A search for double-beta decays of 136Xe to excited states of 136Ba has been performed with the first phase data set of the KamLAND-Zen experiment. The 01+, 21+ and 22+ transitions of 0νββ decay were evaluated in an exposure of 89.5 kg⋅yr of 136Xe, while the same transitions of 2νββ decay were evaluated in an exposure of 61.8 kg⋅yr. No excess over background was found for all decay modes. The lower half-life limits of the 21+ state transitions of 0νββ and 2νββ decay were improved to T1/20ν>2.6×1025 yr and T1/22ν>4.6×1023 yr, respectively. We report on the first experimental lower half-life limits for the transitions to the 01+ state of 136Xe for 0νββ and 2νββ decay. They are T1/20ν>2.4×1025 yr and T1/22ν>8.3×1023 yr. The transitions to the 22+ states are also evaluated for the first time to be T1/20ν>2.6×1025 yr and T1/22ν>9.0×1023 yr. These results are compared to recent theoretical predictions.

As Nelson Goodman highlighted, there are two main senses of “abstract” that can be found in discussions about abstract art. On the one hand, a representation is abstract if it leaves out certain features of its target. On the other hand, something can be abstract to the extent that it does not represent a concrete subject. The first sense of “abstract” is well-known in philosophy of science. For example, philosophers discuss mathematical models of physical, biological, and economic systems as being abstract in this sense. However, it is the second sense that dominates discussions of abstract art in aesthetics. For example, abstract art was (and is) considered revolutionary precisely for being non-figurative. Through an analysis of artists including Kandinsky, Malevich, and Mondrian, we develop a reading of this second sense, which we call “generative abstraction,” as opposed to “subtractive” abstraction. Generative abstraction is a process in which a new artifact is created which does not represent the initial concrete target system that inspired it (if there was one), where the artifact’s features are explored for their own sake, and where the “language” of the new artifact is in some way more “universal.” Focusing on this sense of abstraction is helpful in revealing the complexity of the process of crafting an abstract artifact, in problematizing the notion that abstraction can always be un-done (or concretized), as well as revealing new ways for abstractions to be epistemically (un)successful.

For a long time, emotions were seen as incompatible with rationality and objectivity of science, and so were a marginal topic in the philosophy of science. This trend has changed progressively since it was determined that objectivity is much linked to social factors while rationality can’t do without emotions. As a result, emotions are now slowly finding their way into our understanding of what science is. Here, I make an overview of some aspects of science where emotions and scientific reasoning seem to come into tight contact. For my survey, I will consider such themes as scientific motivation, scientific evaluations, scientific explanations, scientific understanding, scientific imagination, and coherence in science. Using these examples, I discuss the epistemic role of emotions in scientific progress. In conclusion, I advocate for a nuanced view of emotions in science as values that contribute to both epistemic and humanistic dimensions of science.

Some experimental results in science are productively surprising or beautiful. Such results are disruptive in their epistemic nature: by violating epistemic expectations they mark the phenomenon at hand as worthy of further investigation. Could it be that there are emotions beyond these two which are also useful for the epistemic evaluation of scientific experiments? Here, I conduct a structured sociological survey to explore affective experiences in scientific experimental research. I identify that learning the results of an experiment is the high emotional point in the experimenting process. Thus, experimental results can be challenging, beautiful, or boring, and they can worry, amuse, make one sad, and so on. They can also drive meta-cognitive evaluations as well as motivate specific research-related actions. From this, I advance two claims: that emotions beyond surprise and disruptive beauty are epistemically useful in empirical research, and that emotions help to overcome specific challenges of reasoning about new experimental results.