Anca Gheaus

The division of labor is gendered: women and men specialize in different types of work. Jobs themselves display a division of labor between women and men, with certain professions being (highly) dominated by members of one group or the other. There is much disagreement when it comes to the factors explaining this phenomenon and its evaluation: Is the gendered division of labor desirable, and are its consequences fair? Most of this chapter provides a general overview of the questions that bear on the potential resolution of these debates. It then turns to the disagreement about what to do about the gendered division of labor and about justifications for policies aimed at changing it.

Feminism has always been a diverse intellectual tradition and activist movement, difficult to define as such. Today that difficulty is compounded by the deep disagreements about the concept of “woman.” An ecumenical understanding of feminism seeks to avoid the disagreement about “woman.” Any attempt to define “woman” (and, implicitly, “man”) that is rooted in metaphysical disagreements and undergirded by apparently irreconcilable ethical commitments is essentially contested. A better understanding of feminism avoids any appeal to “woman,” thus bypassing the metaphysical trouble and capturing the deepest normative aspirations of traditional feminism. Feminism can be defined as an attempt to abolish unjustified gender norms. These are social or legal requirements that specify people’s virtues, rights, and duties as ultimately grounded in their sexual characteristics; these norms can be explicit or implicit and are backed up by sanctions for noncompliance. This definition should be acceptable to the most prominent contemporary strands in both academic and activist feminism: transinclusive feminists and gender critical feminists.

Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals’ commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties.

The chapter advances two claims: first, that commitment to one’s spouse is only instrumentally valuable, adding no intrinsic value to the relationship. Moreover, commitment has costs: it partially forecloses the future, thus making one less attentive to life’s possibilities; therefore, it would be desirable for people to achieve the same goods without commitment. The second, more ambitious, claim is that commitment in general, and marital commitments in particular, are problematic instruments for securing the good of romantic and sexual love. It makes sense to prefer that another person’s (perhaps especially, romantic or sexual) love for you is sustained by inclination rather than commitment. In addition, the pragmatic reasons for commitment are weak in relation to activities that, ideally, are process-oriented rather than goal-oriented—such as loving another person.

Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children: Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from and more objectionable than parental environmental shaping. I introduce a distinction between procreative decisions one makes qua mere procreator—that is, without the intention to rear the resulting child—and procreative decisions one makes qua procreator-and-future childrearer. Genetic shaping is objectionable when undertaken in the latter capacity: Both selection and enhancement are objectionable because they introduce an unnecessary and avoidable inequality in the parent–child relationship; in the case of enhancement, this also results in harm to the future child.

I submit that an important role of philosophy — whether done in conference rooms and journal articles, in classrooms, or in more public venues — is to reduce polarisation. Well-executed public philosophy is needed to show how the deepest disagreements of our age might involve people who are all motivated by the same fundamental principles and values, yet focus their attention on individual pieces of the practical puzzles at the expense of the general picture. To gain such understanding, philosophers must assume that the puzzles really are puzzling, that they lack obvious solutions.

There is broad egalitarian agreement that inheritance results in distributive injustice and indirectly delegitimises the political process; we should abolish it. But until we do this, and put in place public safety nets, parents do no wrong in insuring their children against destitution. Both procreative liability and parental love generate duties that justify some bequests, limited in size and form. In the aggregate, however, the bequests are likely to be substantial, impeding egalitarian reforms. The stringency and demandingness of procreative and parental duties provide (would-be) parents with special and powerful reason to support justice and, in particular, public safety nets.

Two work-related crises are looming large: technological unemployment and a crisis of care. We should think about them together, rather than in isolation, because each provides practical and justificatory solutions to the other. Their coexistence means that large numbers of people will become involuntarily unemployed, while the physical and emotional needs of numerous people remain unmet. Because not all care work should be automated, the demand for care created by one crisis can meet the supply of labour created by the other. The care crisis fills a gap in arguments to the conclusion that we should respond to automation by minimising involuntary unemployment. Reasons for the latter concern the goods of work, which are important contributors to a good life, as well as considerations having to do with individuals’ preference to avoid involuntary unemployment. If automation were to eliminate all necessary work, realising some of the goods of work would be precluded, making the aspiration to serve needs unfulfillable, and providing re-training and new jobs would be very wasteful. At the same time, the unemployment crisis is relevant to the care crisis because it shows that we can meet care needs without departing from the liberal principle of freedom of occupational choice.

In societies where rewards attached to positions of advantage generate excessive inequalities, the generally endorsed principle of fair equality of opportunity for such positions does not apply. There are no claims to equal opportunities for positions that are banned by justice. I argue that the various considerations supportting the principle of fair equality of opportunity in just societies do not vidicate it in unjust ones. This entails that widely shared beliefs about, for instance, reasons to discourage some forms of parental partiality or to wellcome social mobility are miguided insofar as current societies are in fact unjust. I also breach the question of what distributive justice requires in such societies; even in unjust circumstances there might be claims grounded in principles of need or of luck egalitarian equal opportunities, whose validity does not depend on schedules of rewards.

Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and activists. Most importantly, the concept should make good trans people's understanding of their own gender identities and help understand why misgendering is a serious harm and why it is permissible to require information about people's gender identities in public life. I conclude that none of the available accounts meets these essential criteria, on the assumption that the gender norms of femininity and masculinity are unjustified. But we can, and should, pursue the feminist project without “gender identity”. Such feminism can include trans people because it is possible to account for the specific harm of misgendering without assuming a claim to the recognition of our gender identities. I conclude that we should eliminate the concept of “gender identity.” To understand the phenomena that are putatively captured by “gender identity,” we are better off employing other concepts, such as “sexual dysphoria,” (assigned or aspirational) “gender roles,” and (internalised or endorsed) “gender norms”. These concepts can usefully replace “gender identity” in an individual evaluation of each of the trans people's claims to inclusion into particular spaces.

It is not easy to be an egalitarian with a conservative sensitivity, especially in unjust societies. You can be one by turning to value pluralism—as G. A. Cohen and Christine Sypnowich suggest. I explore another way, which makes sense of conservatism in terms of its function of protecting attachments. This solution identifies responsiveness to the preciousness of embodied value as the normative driver of what Cohen calls “conservatism” (which turns out to be a misnomer) and paves the way towards a reformist, rather than revolutionary, egalitarianism. I also examine the most serious conservative challenge to one stripe of egalitarianism: the difficulty of accommodating conservative sensitivities into an account of egalitarian justice that requires individuals to internalize the costs of their preferences. Conservative attitudes illustrate particularly well the expensive tastes problem, insofar as people harbor them to very different degrees and nonconservative options are (much) cheaper. Living in ways that reflect conservative attitudes is likely to be resource-intensive. Treating them as handicaps which warrant compensation seems inadequate, yet refusing to socialize their cost imposes apparently unreasonable burdens on individuals.

Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship status – that is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, ruling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non‐burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equals, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators ‐ whether or not gestational ‐ equally liable.

Axel Gosseries considers, and partly defends, several strategies to address the non-identity problem (NIP). We engage critically with two strategies endorsed by Gosseries: the severance strategy and the overlap strategy. The latter comprises two different sub-strategies: the containment sub-strategy and the indirect sub-strategy. We believe that severance is less promising than Gosseries suggests. It comes at a high theoretical cost, which is important to acknowledge even if, ultimately, there is reason to pay it. The sub-strategies that comprise the overlap strategy are more promising, and they can justify more in terms of the scope and content of inter-generational justice than Gosseries suggests in his book. Endorsing the overlap strategies is attractive because doing so limits the need for impersonal considerations in theories of inter-generational justice.

There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

John Tillson argues, on grounds of children’s well-being, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and antiperfectionist reasons against initiating children into religions.

Gebärende Mütter haben in der Regel ein moralisches Recht, ihre Neugeborenen aufzuziehen. Dieses Recht gründet in der gegenseitigen Bindung, die während der Schwangerschaft zwischen der austragenden Mutter und dem Fötus entstanden ist. Diese Bindung ist zum Teil durch die Belastungen der Schwangerschaft entstanden und dient dem Interesse des Neugeborenen; aber auch die austragende Mutter hat ein starkes Interesse am Schutz dieser Bindung. Das Recht, das ausgetragene Kind aufzuziehen, kann aufgrund seiner moralischen Grundlagen nicht beliebig auf andere Personen übertragen werden, die als soziale Eltern des betreffenden Kindes fungieren wollen. Dies zeigt, dass Leihmutterschaftsverträge illegitim sind und daher als nichtig angesehen werden sollten.

Defiendo la opinión de que la infancia es intrínsecamente valiosa en lugar de tener valor solo en la medida en que conduce a una buena edad adulta. Ni la visión de los “niños como adultos inacabados” ni la más extravagante de “los adultos como niños defectuosos” son convincentes por sí mismas porque ambas son formas incompletas de contar la historia de la infancia y la edad adulta. Un breve artículo no puede resolver la cuestión del valor relativo de la niñez y la adultez, pero sugiero que es plausible que algunos tipos de valor que podemos disfrutar plenamente como niños sean, en el caso de la mayoría de las personas, diferentes de aquellos que podemos disfrutar como adultos. A medida que nos hacemos adultos mejoramos nuestros conocimientos y habilidades: acumulamos experiencia y controlamos mejor nuestras emociones. Por lo tanto, nos volvemos capaces de una plena agencia moral. Además, nos volvemos más decididos y adquirimos las habilidades ejecutivas necesarias para perseguir nuestros objetivos de manera efec-tiva y, por lo tanto, tenemos nuevos tipos de logros disponibles. Al mismo tiempo, en la transición a la edad adulta perdemos, en promedio, no solo habilidades físicas deseables como la agilidad y la flexibilidad, sino también gran parte de la plasticidad mental, la imaginación, la curiosidad y la percepción vívida, a veces sinestésica, del mundo (es decir, la capacidad de experimentar el mundo a través de más de un sentido a la vez). En el proceso, la capacidad de imaginar mundos radicalmente diferentes y las habilidades filosóficas y artísticas que teníamos de niños se pierden en general o al menos se reducen en gran medida. Por lo tanto, el cambio de la niñez a la edad adulta puede no ser en todos los sentidos un progreso, como diría la visión de los “niños como adultos inacabados”, o una regresión, como sugiere la visión de los “adultos como niños defectuosos”. Más bien, es una transformación de un tipo de ser humano intrínsecamente valioso a un tipo diferente de ser humano intrínsecamente valioso. Mi relato se basa en el trabajo en filosofía con niños y en nuevas investigaciones en psicología del desarrollo. Si bien hablo de los niños en general, no hace falta decir que las afirmaciones sobre las habilidades de los niños se aplican de manera diferente a los diferentes grupos de edad; sin embargo, asumo que la distinción entre “infancia” y “edad adulta” es, como tal, pertinente.

This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pandemic has made clearer than ever. The first is to ensure that, in schools as well as outside them, children have ample opportunities to enjoy goods that are particular to childhood: unstructured time, to be spent playing with other children, discovering the world in company or alone, or indeed pursuing any of the creative activities that make children happy and help them learn. I refer to these as “special goods of childhood.” The second desiderata is to turn childrearing into a more communal practice, with lesser parental monopoly of care. For this, we need to give children access to multiple caring adults, and thus more opportunities to form secure and protected relationships.

This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of ‘keeping oneself company’, as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people’s ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder.

This paper explains alternative views about the nature and value of childhood, and how particular conceptions of childhood matter to a practical issue relevant to the topic of the book: children's voting rights. I don't defend any particular view on this matter; rather, I explain how recent accounts of what is uniquely good or bad about being a child bear on arguments for and against enfranchising children. I also explain why children who live in a society in which many adults fail to comply with their duties of intergenerational justice have a weightier interest in voting, and hence why the case for children's enfranchisement is stronger in such cases.

Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals’ commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties.

In “Tragedy and Resentment” Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified in feeling non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration, or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong example to use when arguing for the possibility of justified non-moral resentment—and why, therefore, Carlsson’s claim remains unsubstantiated. Pace Carlsson, people who fail to return our love are not best described as harming us, but as merely failing to benefit us by saving us from harm. Moreover, their role in the causal chain that results in our coming to harm is insufficient to warrant our resentment; more plausibly, we ourselves play a greater and more direct causal role in this process. This is a welcome result: Responding with resentment to someone’s failure to return our love indicates that our love has not taken the form of a genuine gift. When we put conditions on successful gifting by allowing for justified resentment if the gift is not returned we are not in fact giving gifts but making a bid for an exchange: I love you so that you love me back.

The chapter advances two claims: first, that commitment to one’s spouse is only instrumentally valuable, adding no intrinsic value to the relationship. Moreover, commitment has costs: it partially forecloses the future, thus making one less attentive to life’s possibilities; therefore, it would be desirable for people to achieve the same goods without commitment. The second, more ambitious, claim is that commitment in general, and marital commitments in particular, are problematic instruments for securing the good of romantic and sexual love. It makes sense to prefer that another person’s (perhaps especially, romantic or sexual) love for you is sustained by inclination rather than commitment. In addition, the pragmatic reasons for commitment are weak in relation to activities that, ideally, are process-oriented rather than goal-oriented—such as loving another person.