Anda Zahiu

Digital duplicates (DDs), or artificial intelligence (AI) simulations of individual minds, are AI models designed to emulate real people. Depending on how they are trained, DDs can reproduce aspects or signs of a person’s psychology, values and communication style, enabling interaction with digital approximations of living, recently deceased or historical individuals. Proposed uses include education, advocacy, grief support, medical decision-­ making and the continuation of creative or personal projects. While potentially valuable, these applications also pose ethical risks such as privacy loss, misrepresentation, manipulation and the erosion of authentic human relationships. This paper argues that DDs should be treated as context-­ specific tools rather than general-­ purpose technologies. We outline a two-­ tier ethical framework grounded in considerations of harm and proportionality, supported by the values of information permission, transparency, authenticity and appropriate access. The framework unites diverse moral concerns under a single framework while allowing their relative weight to vary across domains such as medicine, education, memorialisation and entertainment. By situating ethical evaluation within a harm-­ reduction approach that is sensitive to context, we offer a practical basis for the responsible development and governance of human-emulating AI systems.

This article explores the normative significance of experiments in living within immersive social Virtual Reality (VR) environments. Building on John Stuart Mill’s insights into the value of experimentation, we argue that social VR platforms allow users to critically engage with their values, revise commitments, and explore with alternative ways of conducting one’s life under conditions of reduced social and material constraint. We distinguish between individual and collective experiments in living and contend that immersive virtual environments can scaffold both types by reducing feasibility constraints and enabling the enactment of alternative identities and community structures. Special attention is given to the role of avatars, customization practices, and the architectural features of virtual environments that support moral inquiry and self-exploration. Finally, we raise concerns about the symbolic marginalization of virtual experimentation, particularly when such practices are framed as socially deviant or escapist. We conclude that social VR should be recognized as a legitimate site of moral exploration and self-formation, with implications for how we understand agency, recognition, and the ethics of virtual life.

There is an ongoing debate about the ethics of research on lifespan extension: roughly, using medical technologies to extend biological human lives beyond the current “natural” limit of about 120 years. At the same time, there is an exploding interest in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to create “digital twins” of persons, for example by fine-tuning large language models on data specific to particular individuals. In this paper, we consider whether digital twins (or digital doppelgängers, as we refer to them) could be a path toward a kind of life extension—or more precisely, a kind of person extension—that does not rely on biological continuity. We discuss relevant accounts of consciousness and personal identity and argue that digital doppelgängers may at least help us achieve some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span extension, even if they may not count as literal extensions of our personhood on dominant philosophical accounts. We also consider relational accounts of personhood and discuss how digital doppelgängers may be able to extend personhood in a relational sense, or at least secure some of the goods associated with relevant relationships. We conclude by suggesting that a research program to investigate such issues is relevant to ongoing debates about the ethics of extending the human lifespan.

We propose to expand the conversation around moral enhancement from direct brain-altering methods to include technological means of modifying the environments and media through which agents can achieve moral improvement. Virtual Reality (VR) based enhancement would not bypass a person’s agency, much less their capacity for reasoned reflection. It would allow agents to critically engage with moral insights occasioned by a technologically mediated intervention. Users would gain access to a vivid ‘experience machine’ that allows for embodied presence and immersion in a virtual world that meaningfully replicates relevant aspects of real life. We explore how VR can train empathy and foster moral growth in complex ways that would be inaccessible even for traditional moral education. Virtual Reality Perspective Taking is a unique medium for making empathy more reflective.

In this paper, I argue that virtual manifestations of selfhood in VR environments have a transformative effect on the users, which in turn has spillover effects in the physical world. I will argue in favor of extending our notion of personal identity as to include VR avatars as negotiable bodies that constitute a genuine part of who we are. Recent research in VR shows that users can experience the Proteus Effect and other lasting psychological changes after being immersed in VR. An extended theory of the self, modeled after the extended mind thesis advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998), can offer a deeper understanding of how and why immersive virtual experiences have such a transformative effect on users. The early VR scholars had a similar intuition- that “VR is a medium for the extension of body and mind” (Biocca and Delaney 1995), acting like a genuine “reality engine” (Biocca and Levy 1995).