André Barata

The discrimination between two points of view, or perspectives, in respect to consciousness, one on the first-person other on the third-person, deals with two concepts of consciousness- respectively, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness (sections 1 and 2). I will accept, generally, this idea. However, I will argue that are not two, but three kinds of consciousness and typ of experience, making my point introducing the concept of different characters of experience (section 3). These characters are ‘experience’, ‘signification’ and ‘reference/object’, and when all of them occur I say that we have an intentional experience. If it lacks the last one, we have a meaningful experience, but without reference. Finally, if the only occurrence is ‘experience’, then the type of experience we live is a meaningless or mute experience. This ‘taxonomy’ allows classifying a perceptum as an intentional experience, a quale as a meaningful experience and a sense datum as a mute experience. On the other hand, it represents, as I claim, an approach much more clear, than those usually appears, to the question ‘what qualia really are? ‘ (sections 4 e 5). Moreover: it makes possible talk about objectivity of qualia, an objectivity without object (section 6).

No último quartel do Séc. XX, instalou-se na Filosofia da Linguagem um vivo debate entre duas teorias acerca da referência, a teoria descritivista, formulada por Bertrand Russell e com raízes na filosofia de Frege, e, a desafiar esta, a teoria causal da referência, sob o impulso de Putnam e de Kripke. Há, por outro lado, importantes estudos do pensamento de Husserl, centrados sobretudo em Ideias I, que dão conta da possibilidade de uma sua leitura fregeana. O intuito desta comunicação reside, primeiramente, em mostrar que, não obstante essas leituras, os aspectos semânticos mais originais na fenomenologia de Husserl e, além disso, também mais interessantes para o debate sobre o problema da referência, se encontram logo na Primeira das Investigações Lógicas. Com efeito, nesse texto, cremos ser possível mostrar que a teoria da expressão de Husserl não se ajusta nem à teoria descritivista nem à teoria causal da referência. As razões do desajustamento, segundo tese que propomos, prendem-se com o facto de ambas as teorias da referência, descritivista e causal, disputarem entre si o problema da frxação da referência das expressões como se esse fosse o problema de saber o que faz com que as expressões refiram. Mostrar que não é assim com Husserl, conduz-nos a um terceiro problema, na obra póstuma Experiência e Juízo, sobre a constituição dos referentes, enquanto objectos de uma relação directa ao individual, ou seja, enquanto objectos de experiência. Quererá isto dizer, concluindo, que o problema da referência, antes de respeitar às expressões referenciais, respeita à própria experiência e que tal problema deverá, por isso, resolver-se na constituição passiva e ante-predicativa da experiência.

Historically, phenomenology started to face the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as an objection to its own transcendental aspiration to constitute apodicticity. In fact, since Husserl’s very influential Fifth Cartesian Meditation, the risk of solipsism threatened the possibilities of a genuine phenomenology of the other. This problem ‘s discussion was continued by all of the most significant phenomenologists, such as Max Scheler, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marc Richir, Ricœur, Lévinas, and others, all having made explicit reference to that starting reflection by Husserl in The Cartesian Meditations. In this paper, I will approach the problem of intersubjectivity, not by attending to the already mentioned traditional phenomenological motive, but, instead, by trying to bring to light the variety of ways of how relationships to others are faced phenornenologically, and its implications for a debate about the psychotherapeutic relationship. Under the assumption that there is no psychotherapy without a psychotherapist/client relationship, it is particularly relevant the contribution of phenornenologies of intersubjectivity to the effort of answering the question «What do our relational experiences with others mean?»

Contemporary societies are regulated by a complex system, which tends to be exhaustive, supported by growing social and technical interdependence. This system is composed of subsystems: global economic production, liberal political institutions and a social organization based on labour. As a whole, these three dimensions – political, economical, social – tend to compress contemporary life forms into a single way of life, primarily structured by systemic functionality. Although it admits variations of degree (or even, to some extent, qualitative differences), the functional codes (of systems) guide actions daily and impose severe limitations on lifestyles, which are particularly noticeable when the struggle for survival, both economically and socially, mobilizes all of one’s time and energy. The means obliterate the ends, functioning obliterates meaning, survival obliterates the proper human “life”. At the political level, liberal thought masks the “malaise of modern civilization” resulting from these limitations by evacuating the question on forms of life to the private sphere, concurrently with the insistence on an abstract political ethic of the “just”, ultimately determining the form and functioning of the institutions, which overrides any and all ethics of “good”.

Social democracy based on welfare and the redistribution of social contributions is failing. The accumulation of wealth and the increase in inequalities are the two faces of Janus that social democracy has not been able to contain over the recent decades. In this context, it matters to discuss John Rawls’s influential difference principle. According to the maximin criterion put forth by Rawls, it does not suffice that no one becomes worse off; those who are worse off must also become better off than they are. Here, we note that the existence and growth of inequality find no opposition in the maximin rule. Despite appearances, strictly speaking it merely introduces a factor of social compensation, a sort of “assistencialism” to the victims of the greatest inequality. Even the most robust formulation of the principle of difference, according to which the greatest advantage to the less advantaged is indispensable, does not per se preclude an aggregate growth of inequalities. It seems clear that it was an egalitarian goal what Rawls had in mind in A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s critical comments on welfare capitalism must indeed not be forgotten—especially in his further explanations about the application of the principles of justice in a property-owning democracy. Here, as in liberal socialism, the dispersion of property, capital and resources prevents economic and political powers from being concentrated into the hands of a minority. However, the egalitarian aim does not strictly follow from the difference principle as stated, whether taken literally as an application of the maximin rule or inferring from its strongest formulation. A reformulation that does justice to the egalitarian aim of the principle of difference is, however, possible: namely, a degrowthist reformulation, truly requiring a degrowth in accumulation and inequalities, making explicit a brake clause that hinders the aggregate growth of inequalities. Such a degrowthist conception of the difference principle may justify some concrete rules that are able to enforce the egalitarian commitments of social democracy.

No último quartel do Séc. XX, instalou-se na Filosofia da Linguagem um vivo debate entre duas teorias acerca da referência, a teoria descritivista, formulada por Bertrand Russell e com raízes na filosofia de Frege, e, a desafiar esta, a teoria causal da referência, sob o impulso de Putnam e de Kripke. Há, por outro lado, importantes estudos do pensamento de Husserl, centrados sobretudo em Ideias I, que dão conta da possibilidade de uma sua leitura fregeana. O intuito desta comunicação reside, primeiramente, em mostrar que, não obstante essas leituras, os aspectos semânticos mais originais na fenomenologia de Husserl e, além disso, também mais interessantes para o debate sobre o problema da referência, se encontram logo na Primeira das Investigações Lógicas. Com efeito, nesse texto, cremos ser possível mostrar que a teoria da expressão de Husserl não se ajusta nem à teoria descritivista nem à teoria causal da referência. As razões do desajustamento, segundo tese que propomos, prendem-se com o facto de ambas as teorias da referência, descritivista e causal, disputarem entre si o problema da fixação da referência das expressões como se esse fosse o problema de saber o que faz com que as expressões refiram. Mostrar que não é assim com Husserl, conduz-nos a um terceiro problema, na obra póstuma Experiência e Juízo, sobre a constituição dos referentes, enquanto objectos de uma relação directa ao individual, ou seja, enquanto objectos de experiência. Quererá isto dizer, concluindo, que o problema da referência, antes de respeitar às expressões referenciais, respeita à própria experiência e que tal problema deverá, por isso, resolver-se na constituição passiva e ante-predicativa da experiência.

Desde un punto de vista conceptual, el tiempo es independiente respecto de la experiencia del tiempo. Es decir: puede darse una descripción conceptual del tiempo sin referencia ninguna a términos relacionados con la conciencia subjetiva del tiempo. Pero en lo concerniente a una fenomenología de esa experiencia subjetiva del tiempo, puede revelarse que tal experiencia de tiempo es, ella en sí misma, temporal? Los mismísimos términos empleados en una descripción conceptual del tiempo, como “cambio” y “duración”, están implicados en la descripción fenomenológica de toda percepción, incluida la percepción del tiempo. Esto autoriza una caracterización de la experiencia subjetiva del tiempo como tiempo subjetivo. Finalmente, sobre la base de la naturaleza temporal de la percepción del tiempo, sugeriré una explicación racional de nuestra experiencia común de asimetrías entre el tiempo subjetivo y el tiempo objetivo.