My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no As a contextualist in theory of meaning, I believe that the contribution of literal meaning to "What is Said" is much lesser than the analytic tradition thought. The distinction makes sense for someone working with a strong conception of meaning.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism I accept externalism because it gives a much better account of our practices of knowledge attribution. But if linguistic understanding is a kind of knowledge (of truth-conditions or satisfaction conditions), here externalism, especially reliabilism, is not enough. I can know the content of an utterance through a reliable translation without understanding the utterance.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism I think common sense realism is ok but in the philosophy of science, I would accept a brand of anti-realism as a careful position.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical The question is too unclear to answer I accept both! It depends on the kind of inference you want to formalize. If an argument is intuitively valid, there could be a logic enabling us to justify that intuition. Why should we impoverish our tool box by limiting oneself to only one logic. In general,classical logic is not enough, but it depends on what you are aiming at.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism I do not believe that it is possible to reduce intentionality, semanticity, normativity ou rationality. I think the very project of reducing these notions is ill-conceived. This does not mean that physicalism is on the wrong track.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Skip
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Other As a contextualist, I believe that the way we represent to ourselves what we ought to do depends on our understanding of the situaton, and that the options presented are all alternatively acceptable under suitable circumstances.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: disjunctivism On that score, I am incline to accept direct realism. What's make a perception veridical is that it contains the very that causes the perception itself.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Other I'm incline to accept a "narrativist theory": our identity is partly but importantly constructed through what we (believe) say repeatedly about ourselves.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death The question is too unclear to answer
Time: A-theory and B-theory Skip
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible