Andre Leo Rusavuk

Proponents of gender transition procedures argue that parents have a moral obligation to support and facilitate a child or adolescent in the decision to transition medically. In this paper, we challenge this idea. We contend that parents of children and adolescents have a moral obligation to oppose medical transition. To argue for this claim, we present and draw conclusions from a series of cases that are similar in their morally relevant details to cases involving medical transition for children and adolescents. Given such similarity, we contend that, on pain of irrationality, one must issue the same judgments across the board. If one does not make the same judgments about the cases, then the onus is on the defender of medical transition for children and adolescents to highlight a morally significant asymmetry. We argue that no such asymmetry exists.

Traditionally, theists have understood divine actions as satisfying libertarian conditions on free will. However, theists have not explored whether God’s actions are subject to present luck, i.e., luck present at or around the moment of action. Some critics of libertarian accounts of free will argue that if an action is indeterministically caused, then it’s a matter of luck whether the agent performs the action: this is the notorious luck objection to libertarianism. In this paper, I consider an argument that some divine actions occur as a matter of luck. Since what occurs as a matter of luck is at least partly beyond the agent’s control, God’s control over his actions is diminished. I reply to several objections to this reasoning and conclude that present luck poses an enthralling challenge to divine freedom as traditionally conceived and merits further exploration.

Traditionally, theists have understood divine actions as satisfying libertarian conditions on free will. However, theists have not explored whether God’s actions are subject to present luck, i.e., luck present at or around the moment of action. Some critics of libertarian accounts of free will argue that if an ac- tion is indeterministically caused, then it’s a matter of luck whether the agent performs the action: this is the notorious luck objection to libertarianism. In this paper, I consider an argument that some divine actions occur as a matter of luck. Since what occurs as a matter of luck is at least partly beyond the agent’s control, God’s control over his actions is diminished. I reply to several objections to this reasoning and conclude that present luck poses an enthrall- ing challenge to divine freedom as traditionally conceived and merits further exploration.

Philosophers interested in better understanding the divine nature have explored God’s relationship to time, space, creation, morality, sin, and other features of reality; largely unexplored is God’s relationship to luck. The question I investigate in this doctoral thesis is the following: is the greatest possible being, i.e., a being who is perfect or maximally great, subject to luck? Although luck’s role in God’s life is mostly uncharted territory, plausibly, pre-philosophical reflections would elicit the following intuition: God is not subject to luck as finite, frail, and contingent beings are. It might seem that subjection to luck would stain divine greatness, perhaps by diminishing God’s responsibility, creditworthiness, and praiseworthiness. Hence, a lucky God would not be maximally great. Here’s the thesis that captures this view: Perfect Immunity Thesis (PIT): Necessarily, God is perfectly immune to luck However, I argue that there are good reasons to think that PIT is false and thus, even a perfect being cannot escape luck. I begin by offering an account of divine luck and control that I will employ throughout my investigation. With this analysis in place, I examine whether God could be exposed to various kinds of non-moral and moral luck. First, I set out to show that God is lucky—with some qualifications—to be perfect, and thus God is subject to constitutive non-moral luck (which is luck in one’s constitution). Then, I argue that if divine actions satisfy libertarian conditions on free will, God is subject to present luck, i.e., luck found at or around the moment of action. Thirdly, I make the case that a perfect being could be subject to circumstantial non-moral luck (luck in one’s circumstances) and resultant non-moral luck (luck in the consequences of one’s actions). I use certain popular views within perfect being theism to make my case. Lastly, I argue that God is also subject to moral luck. I also consider whether subjection to certain varieties of moral luck is potentially problematic for theists. I conclude that some forms of luck affect all versions of perfect being theism, some affect a large subset of perfect being theism, and some affect only specific models of perfect being theism. Accordingly, the falsity of PIT is established. At the end of the thesis, I offer two alternatives to PIT and invite theists to inquire further and deeper into God’s relationship to luck.

According to Molinism, logically prior to his creative decree, God knows via middle knowledge the truth value of the counterfactuals or conditionals of creaturely freedom (CFs) and thus what any possible person would do in any given circumstance. Critics of Molinism have pointed out that the Molinist God gets lucky that the CFs allow him to actualize either a world of his liking or even a good-enough world at all. In this paper, I advance and strengthen the popular critique in two ways. First, I specify the kind of luck to which God is subject, which is circumstantial moral luck. Second, and more importantly, I argue that exposure to this luck is problematic because something external to God and beyond his control determines the degree of praiseworthiness he deserves in relevant possible worlds. My main contention is that divine subjection to circumstantial moral luck raises the theoretical costs of Molinism.

Proponents of the duty to vote (DTV) argue that in normal circumstances, citizens have the moral duty to vote in political elections. Discussions about DTV analyze _what_ the duty is, _who_ has this duty, _when_ they have it, and _why_ they have it. Missing are answers to the Specification Question: to _which_ elections does DTV apply? A dilemma arises for some supporters of DTV—in this paper, I focus on Julia Maskivker’s work—because either answer is problematic. First, I argue that it is implausible that DTV applies to _all_ elections because this makes the duty too costly for the voter. Second, I argue that there are no good reasons why under normal circumstances DTV applies only to _some_ elections. I consider objections but conclude that the dilemma is successful and therefore the case for DTV is incomplete.

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings.

Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding that Optimistic Molinism is undefeated and merits further exploration.