Andre Martins

Dans Logique du pire, Clément Rosset analyse une causalité conçue sans l’ombre d’une loi transcendantale, qui se fait par l’enchaînement des choses dans l’immanence actuelle. Rosset aperçoit cette causalité immanente dans la psychanalyse de Freud, non dans le concept lacanien du réel. Une telle conception de la causation recoupe celle du hasard, qui indique que les choses sont, tout simplement, sans raison d’être – ce en quoi consiste le tragique. Dans toute l’histoire de la philosophie, le philosophe qui a le plus radicalement compris ce qu’est le hasard fut paradoxalement celui qui le définit comme nécessité absolue : Spinoza, « penseur tragique par excellence ». Nous énonçons et analysons les implications épistémiques et thérapeutiques qui découlent de cette compréhension.

I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call theoretical omniscience (a stronger version of logical omniscience), a problem with non-commutativity of the learning theories follows. Therefore, scientists, when trying to behave as close to rationality as possible, should behave in a way close to the counterfactual strategy. The concept of theoretical omniscience will be applied to the problem of Jeffrey conditionalization, as an example, and we will see that a more complete theoretical model can provide a classical conditionalization where you can learn that data was wrong and all you will not unlearn is your memory.

Humans make mistakes in our decision-making and probability judgments. While the heuristics used for decision-making have been explained as adaptations that are both efficient and fast, the reasons why people deal with probabilities using the reported biases have not been clear. We will see that some of these biases can be understood as heuristics developed to explain a complex world when little information is available. That is, they approximate Bayesian inferences for situations more complex than the ones in laboratory experiments and in this sense might have appeared as an adaptation to those situations. When ideas as uncertainty and limited sample sizes are included in the problem, the correct probabilities are changed to values close to the observed behavior. These ideas will be used to explain the observed weight functions, the violations of coalescing and stochastic dominance reported in the literature.

Preface de Pierre-Francois Moreau Beaucoup l'ont constate: il y a un air de famille entre spinozisme et psychanalyse. Meme remise en cause des attributs classiques de la subjectivite (libre-arbitre et transparence de la conscience a elle-meme); meme valorisation de l'affectivite du sujet (et notamment de la force de son desir); meme apprehension materialiste des phenomenes theologico-politiques (a travers l'analyse de la puissance de l'imaginaire); et dans une certaine mesure, meme visee therapeutique... Les deux grands noms de la psychanalyse, Freud et Lacan, n'ont d'ailleurs pas cache, au moins a une certaine periode de leur parcours intellectuel, une proximite avec la pensee spinoziste. Soit. Mais ces grandes lignes de rapprochement entre psychanalyse et spinozisme permettent-elles autre chose que de dessiner une vague parente, dont il serait tout aussi aise, sinon plus, de souligner les lignes de fracture? Pour ne pas en rester a ce niveau de generalite, il est necessaire d'analyser precisement les notions, les problemes, les theses et les textes a travers lesquels cette confrontation entre spinozisme et psychanalyse prend sens et devient fructueuse. C'est le defi qu'entend relever le present recueil, le premier consacre a une telle confrontation.

Este artigo pretende investigar se as teses que Clément Rossetapresenta em seus livros O real e seu duplo, de 1976, e Longe de mim,de 1999, são opostas ou complementares. Ambas discorrem sobre aquestão da imagem individual. Na primeira, Rosset defende que aimagem do indivíduo constitui uma ilusão psicológica. Na segunda, ofilósofo acrescenta que não somos nada além de nossa imagem social.Uma análise mais acurada nos mostra que ambas, mesmo seaparentemente contraditórias, se inserem em sua filosofia trágica deaprovação do real.This article presents Clément Rosset´s thesis about individualimage in his books Le réel et son double and Loin de moi .On the first one, Rosset establishes that personal image is apsychological illusion. On the second one, he adds that we are nothingabove our social image. Our analysis tries to show that both thesis,eventhough in a first look may seem to be in contrast, in truth areaccording to his concept of a tragical philosophy

The Lisbon Robotics Cluster is an initiative of the Lisbon City Council to federate and present under a common brand companies producing robot systems, end-users, existing research centres from several higher education institutions in the Lisbon area and high schools. In addition to the new brand, the LRC will be the starting point for the formal establishment of a network of strategic partners, including the creation of an incubator of companies, a structure of support and dynamisation of the robotics cluster in the municipality, a living lab and a network of hot spots throughout the city—spaces for testing and experimentation of robotics equipment and products, e.g., marine robots, drones and aerial robotics, and mobility equipment, developed by research centres and companies—open to professionals and in some cases to the general public. The LRC intends to leverage the research, development and innovation in the Lisbon area, through attraction of funding for projects and the identification of problems of interest for the municipality for which solution robot systems can be beneficial.