Andrea Gentili

What do we mean when we talk about the “environment” inside the ecological discourse? Do we really have a clear and distinct notion of it? This paper argues that the “environment” is not a single object approached from different disciplinary angles, but a stratified epistemic field in which distinct models produce distinct results. Against the assumption of a unified environmental referent, the article reconstructs four major models of understanding: (1) the scientific model of the ecosystem, (2) the moral model of nature as value, (3) the aesthetic model of landscape, and (4) the juridical model of territory or land. Each of these models is shown to function as a specific device of objectivation, unifying heterogeneous elements according to its own rationality: systemic regulation, axiological orientation, experiential appearance, or the normative ordering of living space. Through historical and conceptual analyses, the paper demonstrates that these models are neither mutually reducible nor merely complementary perspectives on the same object. Rather, they generate different environmental objects, each governed by its own epistemic logic. What the paper suggests is that the environment remains (as it should) a polyvocal concept, and that a critical epistemology of the environment, precisely because of this polyvocality, must concern itself with mapping these models and explicating their architecture and techniques of functioning.

This article critically reassesses the alleged intrinsic connection between Jakob von Uexküll’s _Umweltlehre_ and the biopolitics of National Socialism, as recently advanced by Gottfried Schnödl and Florian Sprenger. Against the claim that Uexküll’s biological theory structurally entails totalitarian outcomes, the paper develops a twofold argument. First, it reconstructs Uexküll’s political writings, particularly the _Staatsbiologie_ (1920/1933), showing their fragmentary, inconsistent, and largely occasional character. Rather than constituting a coherent political philosophy, these texts reflect shifting historical contingencies and biographical circumstances, thereby undermining the thesis of a systematic ideological program. Second, the paper offers a detailed analysis of the metaphysical foundations of _Umweltlehre_, focusing on the concept of _Planmäßigkeit_. It argues that this notion functions as a regulative, non-empirical principle akin to a Kantian idea, grounding the harmony between organism and environment without prescribing normative or political order. By emphasizing the primacy of functional activity over fixed form and the plurality of subject-specific _Umwelten_, the paper demonstrates that Uexküll’s framework resists both holistic reductionism and authoritarian unification, proving that there is no necessary derivation from Uexküll’s theoretical biology to totalitarian biopolitics. While acknowledging the problematic aspects of his political views, they ultimately remain theoretically inconsistent with his biological system. Consequently, the wholesale dismissal of _Umweltlehre_ on political grounds is unwarranted, and a critical but nuanced engagement with Uexküll’s work remains both possible and philosophically productive.

The article aims to reconstruct the core of Jacob von Uexküll’s scientific project by placing it within the history of transcendental philosophy. Uexküll’s fundamental position is thus examined through three guiding theses. The first concerns the subjectivity of the animal and the constitution of its experience in a Kantian sense. The second addresses the question of relation, and namely how Uexküll constructs that experience ab initio through a continuous formative exchange between the animal and its Umwelt. The final question seeks to justify the very possibility of this relation by introducing a principle that is not itself relational, yet architecturally overarching with respect to individual interactions. This foundational element is Nature itself as an idea, ensuring the harmony of the relations between organisms and their environments, continually generating and aligning them without recourse to any transcendent solution. From this reconstruction, Uexküll’s work can be critically reassessed and situated as a transcendental philosophy of biology, whose implications for contemporary ecological thought remain far from exhausted.

Artificial intelligence has become a central topic in multidisciplinary debates, particularly in relation to the climate crisis. This paper critically examines the dual role of AI as both a contributor to environmental challenges and a potential tool for climate mitigation and adaptation. Although AI-based technologies, especially generative models, consume significant energy and contribute to CO2 emissions, they also offer innovative solutions for energy optimization, disaster prediction, and sustainable resource management. The article takes a critical account of the current risk-based regulatory approach, exemplified by the EU AI Act ((AI 2024)), arguing that it prioritizes harm prevention over proactive responsibility. As a form of integration, it proposes the concept of a Sustainability Alignment Tax (SAT) as a conceptual framework to balance AI development with environmental and socio-economic sustainability. The SAT encourages stakeholders to weigh the benefits of AI technologies against their environmental and social costs, fostering a more ethical and responsible approach to AI deployment. By integrating principles of responsibility and sustainability, the document advocates for a regulatory shift that aligns AI innovation with global climate goals, ensuring that the benefits of AI are equitably distributed although minimizing its socio-ecological footprint.