Andrea Lavazza

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional structures derived from human stem cells that model aspects of brain development and function, offering potentially unprecedented opportunities for studying neurological disorders and for developing treatments. This consensus paper presents recommendations from the Asia Pacific Neuroethics Working Group, developed through interdisciplinary collaboration among scientists, bioethicists, philosophers, and legal scholars who convened in Singapore in November 2024. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, legal, and sociocultural dimensions of HBO research, addressing both current realities and future possibilities. The paper examines key ethical considerations, including the potential moral status of HBOs, particularly regarding sentience and consciousness, while identifying and dispelling common misconceptions and “ethical red herrings” arising from sensationalized portrayals. We analyze consent frameworks for cell donation, privacy concerns, dual-use risks, and questions of distributive justice. Legal challenges are explored, including the categorical ambiguity of HBOs within existing regulatory frameworks, intellectual property issues, and cross-border inconsistencies in standards. Sociocultural perspectives emphasize the importance of public understanding, cross-cultural engagement, and empirical research on diverse community attitudes toward HBO research. In our recommendations, we advocate for evidence-based ethical discussions, anticipatory frameworks addressing potential future developments, contextualized analysis comparing HBOs to related experimental models, robust informed consent processes, proportionate responses to consciousness concerns, development of adaptive regulatory frameworks, responsible science communication to manage public expectations, and sustained interdisciplinary collaboration. We emphasize a balanced approach that promotes scientific innovation while maintaining rigorous ethical oversight, recognizing HBOs’ significant potential for advancing neuroscience and medicine. This represents the first comprehensive ethical framework for HBO research from the Asia Pacific region, helping to establish foundational principles for responsible development of this rapidly advancing field.

Many philosophers have made the distinction between two phenomenological aspects of consciousness, namely, the partition between clear and distinct contents/vague and peripheral feeling. Such a distinction is relevant for Husserl, while James (1890) provides the most comprehensive account of nucleus and fringe. A concept close to that of fringe, and in particular to the more recently proposed concept of non-sensory fringe, is that of qualia of meaning which I am here proposing. Qualia of meaning are experiences that relate to the holistic understanding of a certain set of elements of knowledge available to an individual and which as such can guide their thinking processes. These qualia have an intentional cognitive aspect connected to the phenomenal aspect. On the ground of these considerations, my main aim in this paper is to describe what qualia of meaning are and highlights differences and similarities with the non-sensory fringe.

A central research question in social epistemology concerns the nature of expertise, and the related question of how expertise in various domains (epistemic, moral, etc.) is to be identified. Entirely apart from this debate, recent research in bioethics considers whether and to what extent cognitive scaffolding via the use of artificial intelligence might be a viable non-pharmaceutical form of moral enhancement. A particularly promising version of this strategy takes the form of ‘Socratic AI’—viz., an ‘artificial intelligence (AI) assistant’ that engages in Socratic dialogue with users to assist in ethical reasoning non-prescriptively. My aim will be to connect these disparate strands of work in order to investigate whether Socratic-AI assisted moral enhancement is compatible with manifesting genuine moral expertise, and how the capacity of Socratic AI to improve moral reasoning might influence our criteria for identifying moral experts.

In Section “Introduction” we introduce the concept of quantum computing [QC]; in essence, the attempt to solve very complex computational problems characterized by numerous variables interacting simultaneously by using quantum mechanical effects (such as superposition and quantum interference). In Section “Applications of QC”, we summarise some applications of QC developed to date and discuss some of the benefits that this technology may bring about for individuals and society. In Section “Ethical Issues underlying QC”, we evaluate some of the downsides (or ethical challenges) arising from the possible wide-scale implementation of this technology. We claim that QC poses utterly new ethical challenges that will likely require novel conceptual tools and methods to be fully and properly tackled. However, we note that QC is not only crucial for the challenges it poses to ethics but also because it affords unique opportunities for enhancing our cognitive abilities and therefore for improving our cognitive profiles. Thus, in Section “QC and the Extended Mind Thesis”, we explore possible points of contact between QC and the extended mind thesis [EMT]. We argue that QC can provide solid evidence to validate some of the claims underlying EMT. Finally, we wrap up the paper (Section “Conclusion”) by summarising what we have achieved and by pointing out possible future research directions.

In Sect. 1, we describe a forthcoming technological revolution (the advent of 6G wireless technology). We then look at the increasingly close ties between the development of this type of technology and the emerging new field of embodied artificial intelligence (EAI). After quickly surveying (Sect. 2) recent advancements in EAI we focus (Sect. 3) on how the close integration between 6G technologies and EAI research might reshape the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and on what benefits and dangers in may pose for our societies. Specifically, we analyze (Sect. 4) important philosophical ramifications related to this new, much promised, holistic and hyperconnected experience, in various domains. While we draw our readers’ attention to the potentially unexpected or unwanted nefarious consequences related to the implementation of this combined technology (6G + EAI), we also see in it a path for human flourishing. We connect this research (Sect. 5) with works on the extended mind thesis (EMT) in the cognitive sciences and argue that the future of our species will likely be one in which we will see increasingly holistic reliance on bio-artificial unions, thereby confirming EMT seminal intuition. We reflect on the risks and benefits underlying this scenario and claim that EMT could be used to guide the positive realization of the revolution underlying the development of 6G-EAI ecosystems. We conclude (Sect. 6), by summarizing what we have achieved and by pointing out future research directions.

Generative AI is increasingly integrated into scientific knowledge production, reshaping how information is generated, circulated, and legitimised across research ecosystems. This paper conceptualises generative AI as a Knowledge Distribution System (KDS): a socio-technical infrastructure that mediates access to epistemic resources at scale and thereby influences what counts as credible knowledge. While Large Language Models (LLMs) enable unprecedented forms of automation and synthesis, their deployment raises concerns about opacity, accountability, epistemic bias, and the concentration of informational power in the hands of a few dominant actors. Against this backdrop, the paper argues that relying primarily on centralised LLMs is neither ethically neutral nor epistemically sustainable. It proposes an alternative governance-oriented design approach based on Small Language Models (SLMs) as a distributed ecosystem of specialised models, trained on well-curated datasets and accountable to distinct institutional and community-based norms. Such an architecture could support pluralism, reduce systemic vulnerabilities, and enable more transparent and auditable forms of AI-assisted knowledge mediation. By reframing generative AI as a KDS rather than merely a productivity tool, the paper highlights the ethical stakes of emerging AI infrastructures and outlines a feasible pathway towards more sustainable and democratically aligned knowledge distribution.

A central concern of the book is the importance of being able to distinguish “trustworthy subjects - who increase the epistemic welfare of our communities - from those untrustworthy individuals, who instead do not deserve our epistemic credit”. This question is addressed from the perspective of the cognitive psychology of expertise. It is argued that trustworthy subjects, or “true experts”, are different from “untrustworthy subjects” in three ways. First, true experts can only develop in a regular environment in which there are reliable relationships between cues and outcomes that are “learnable”. Second, individuals need to have the opportunity to learn relationships between cues and outcomes. This requires a kind learning environment, which provides continuous, fast, and accurate feedback. Third, individuals need the opportunity to engage in long periods of structured practice. Over time, performance becomes more accurate (less bias) and less variable (less noise). It is noted that accuracy is easier to define in some domains than others. The chapter also compares human experts with machine experts. Overall, true experts can be found in regular learning environments when they have had the opportunity to learn relationships over a long period. These individuals, who are accurate and consistent, deserve our epistemic credit.

This paper examines the potential of memory augmentation devices and neuromorphic computing systems as empirical supports for the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT). By integrating recent advancements in brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) and memory-augmented neural networks (MANNs) with a detailed case study in neuromorphic computing, we illustrate how brain-like external memory systems can functionally complement and extend biological cognitive processes. Our analysis utilizes a three-stage framework—encoding, storage, and retrieval—to critically assess the dynamic interplay between internal neural mechanisms and engineered memory modules. We also address a potential objection to extended memory questioning whether the extension pertains to the memory process or relearning process. Ultimately, this study not only refines our theoretical understanding of the mind-technology interfaces but also lays the groundwork for practical applications in cognitive enhancement, neurorehabilitation, and next-generation artificial intelligence.

A central concern of the book is the importance of being able to distinguish “trustworthy subjects - who increase the epistemic welfare of our communities - from those untrustworthy individuals, who instead do not deserve our epistemic credit”. This question is addressed from the perspective of the cognitive psychology of expertise. It is argued that trustworthy subjects, or “true experts”, are different from “untrustworthy subjects” in three ways. First, true experts can only develop in a regular environment in which there are reliable relationships between cues and outcomes that are “learnable”. Second, individuals need to have the opportunity to learn relationships between cues and outcomes. This requires a kind learning environment, which provides continuous, fast, and accurate feedback. Third, individuals need the opportunity to engage in long periods of structured practice. Over time, performance becomes more accurate (less bias) and less variable (less noise). It is noted that accuracy is easier to define in some domains than others. The chapter also compares human experts with machine experts. Overall, true experts can be found in regular learning environments when they have had the opportunity to learn relationships over a long period. These individuals, who are accurate and consistent, deserve our epistemic credit.

In their article, Smith and Mackie argue that vaccine mandates do not impair the voluntariness of informed consent, even when refusal entails significant consequences, such as the loss of employment.1 Drawing on Kiener’s interpersonal consenter–consentee justification, they claim that consent remains valid because third-party coercion does not vitiate voluntariness; what matters is whether the consent receiver wrongs the consent giver.2 Since clinicians neither impose nor collaborate in the relevant threats, consent obtained under a mandate—though motivated by pressure—remains voluntary. On this view, the tension between mandatory vaccination and informed consent dissolves once voluntariness is conceptualised within the clinical dyad. This argument is internally coherent, yet its very precision reveals the limits of a narrow interpersonal account when assessing consent in coercive contexts. If informed consent embodies the principle that individuals have a moral right to decide freely about their bodies and health, it is difficult to restrict its ethical relevance to the behaviour of the physician alone.3 The central issue is not whether the clinician threatens or manipulates the patient, but whether the broader context preserves the individual’s capacity for meaningful self-determination. When refusing vaccination means losing one’s job, it is problematic to claim that no coercion is present merely because the formal act of consenting remains intact. The first difficulty concerns the reduction of voluntariness to an interpersonal property. …

This essay critically examines whether ethical naturalization – understood as the grounding of moral inquiry in empirical sciences – can resolve enduring normative disputes. Focusing specifically on the conflict between retributivist and consequentialist justifications of punishment, we investigate whether naturalistic approaches (drawing on evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics), in addition to explaining the origins and persistence of moral intuitions and practices, can also justify their normative authority. Scientific naturalists seek to reduce or replace normative ethics with descriptive accounts, often deploying evolutionary debunking arguments to challenge moral realism. Liberal naturalists, by contrast, integrate empirical insights without eliminating irreducible normativity. Through analysis of punishment theories, this article argues that, while naturalization sheds light on the evolutionary roots of retributive intuitions (e.g. adaptive cooperation mechanisms) and highlights neuroscientific challenges to free will, thus reinforcing consequentialist explanations, it nevertheless fails to adjudicate which theory is morally superior, since empirical explanations do not bridge the is-ought gap (Hume’s problem). The resulting stalemate highlights naturalization’s explanatory adequacy but normative insufficiency. The essay concludes by advocating a pluralistic integration in line with liberal naturalism, where science informs, but does not replace, philosophical reflection on ethical justification.

In this paper, we examine the concept of free will in artificial intelligence (AI), with a focus on Large Language Models (LLMs) and autonomous AI agents. We evaluate whether these systems exhibit functional autonomy and moral agency by analysing their cognitive capabilities against legal criteria for responsibility. Our analysis reveals that state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4, perform at a human-like level in moral reasoning, theory of mind, social cognition, anticipatory reflection, and complex decision-making—all functions relevant to legal conceptions of free will. However, although these systems can generate contextually appropriate moral judgments and behavioural adaptations, they remain limited by their reliance on external inputs and their lack of intrinsic volition. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s epistemological insights, we argue that the legal system already attributes responsibility to human agents based on observable behaviour, without requiring access to their internal moral cognition. This perspective challenges the traditional exclusion of AI from legal responsibility solely because it lacks subjective moral consciousness. Furthermore, as AI systems increasingly move beyond predictable input–output relationships, assigning liability in legal contexts becomes both necessary and conceptually challenging. We propose that highly autonomous AI systems should be considered within a new legal framework that accounts for their functional, but not phenomenological, agency. This model could introduce a specialized category of AI liability, ensuring accountability while addressing the unique nature of AI decision-making. As AI capabilities continue to evolve, rethinking legal and ethical frameworks is crucial to manage their role in high-stakes decision-making across domains such as criminal justice, corporate responsibility, and autonomous military systems.

This article investigates the philosophical legacy of _synderesis_—an ancient concept referring to the innate and universal capacity of the soul to perceive the first principles of moral law—and explores its conceptual afterlife in two distinct strands of contemporary moral intuitionism. While the term has largely vanished from modern discourse, the problem it addressed—how human beings access moral truth immediately, without inferential mediation—persists in both rationalist and naturalist accounts of moral judgment. The first part reconstructs the medieval structure of _synderesis_ as a non-discursive moral orientation grounded in practical reason, distinct from conscience but inseparable from it. The second part examines two modern reconceptualizations of moral intuition: one, intellectualist and non-naturalist, exemplified by W. D. Ross and later intuitionists; the other, emotion-based and naturalized, including empirical theories such as Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model and normatively proposals like Leon Kass’s defence of moral disgust. The article also discusses Martha Nussbaum’s critique of the normative use of disgust and considers recent empirical findings on its plasticity. In conclusion, the paper argues for a pluralist view in which moral intuition—whether rational or affective—can be integrated into normative ethics not as a foundation for justification, but as a source of motivational and epistemic support for deliberative moral reasoning.

This paper explores the potential of memory modulation techniques (MMTs) to alleviate psychological distress among veterans and active-duty soldiers, particularly in cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and moral injury. While conventional treatments have shown limited success, emerging pharmacological and neurotechnological interventions—such as propranolol, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and optogenetics—offer new possibilities for mitigating the emotional burden of traumatic memories. For this reason, there appears to be an obligation to invest in the research of such techniques to ensure relief for veterans, toward whom society seems to bear a responsibility. However, these techniques raise important ethical concerns related to personal identity, moral responsibility, and the preservation of war memories. The paper examines the implications of memory modulation in military contexts, not only as a therapeutic tool but also in relation to potential risks, including its misuse for desensitizing soldiers or erasing accountability. A distinction is drawn between PTSD and moral injury, emphasizing that the latter, rooted in guilt and self-recrimination, presents specific ethical challenges. To ensure responsible implementation, the study suggests the necessity of independent ethical oversight, including specialized professionals (gatekeepers) tasked with guiding decision-making. By addressing both individual well-being and broader societal concerns, particularly regarding the role of memory in the context of war, this paper aims at contributing to the ongoing ethical debate on the future of memory modulation in military and clinical settings.

Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.

This commentary builds on Davide Battisti’s proposal of second-person authenticity as a moral standard challenged by AI-mediated romantic communication. While endorsing the ethical concerns raised, I explore whether such mediation—if used reflectively and with a degree of co-authorship—can in fact enhance moral engagement. Drawing on examples and theories from moral philosophy and cognitive science, including Kant’s concept of moral worth and the extended mind framework, I argue that generative AI may support, rather than undermine, relational authenticity under certain conditions.

There are several well-established theories of criminal punishment and of its justification. The quarantine model (advocated by Pereboom and Caruso) has recently emerged as one of the most prominent theories in the field, by denying the very idea of criminal justice. This theory claims that no one ought to be criminally punished because fundamentally people do not deserve any kind of punishment. On these grounds, the quarantine model proposes forms of incapacitation based on public safety considerations. In this article, we briefly review a series of objections raised against the quarantine model and propose some new or revised arguments, which are aimed at showing its inconsistencies and weaknesses. These arguments are related to (a) the lack of a reliable way of determining who is dangerous and the consequent need to make judgments about confinement based on probabilities, and (b) the prospect that the quarantine model may encourage certain crimes. Given the arguments we present in this paper, the quarantine model proves to be less solid, humane, and desirable than its proponents claim.

The quarantine model, recently proposed by Pereboom and Caruso, is one of the most influential models developed to date in the context of criminal justice. The quarantine model challenges the very idea of criminal punishment and asserts that nobody deserves punishment on a fundamental level. Instead, in order to deal with offenders, it proposes a series of incapacitation measures based on public safety concerns. In this article, we examine several objections to the quarantine model that demonstrate how, in our view, it can be improved. These mainly pertain to (2.1) the difficulty of reliably identifying dangerous individuals and consequently the need to base confinement decisions on probability, and (2.2) the potential for the quarantine model not to properly deter certain crimes. Three additional objections are raised with respect to (3.1) the rights that are potentially suppressed in the quarantine model; (3.2) the role of “genetic justice”; and (3.3) the difficulty it faces accommodating reasons-responsiveness. Whereas these objections do not constitute knock-down arguments against the quarantine model, they highlight issues that invite closer scrutiny, at least if it is to be considered as a credible framework for the development of viable policies in criminal justice.

Pereboom and Caruso propose the quarantine model as an alternative to existing models of criminal justice. They appeal to the established public health practice of quarantining people, which is believed to be effective and morally justified, to explain why -in criminal justice- it is also morally acceptable to detain wrongdoers, without assuming the existence of a retrospective moral responsibility. Wrongdoers in their model are treated as carriers of dangerous diseases and as such should be preventively detained (or rehabilitated) until they no longer pose a threat to society. Our main concern in this paper is that Pereboom and Caruso adopt an idiosyncratic meaning of quarantine regulations. We highlight a set of important disanalogies between their quarantine model and the quarantine regulations currently adopted in public health policies. More specifically, we argue that the similarities that Pereboom and Caruso propose to substantiate their analogy are not consistent—despite what they claim—with the regulations underlying quarantine as an epidemiological process. We also notice that certain quarantine procedures adopted in public health systems are inadequate to deal with criminal behaviors. On these grounds, we conclude that Pereboom and Caruso should not appeal to the quarantine analogy to substantiate their view, unless they address the issues and criticism we raise in this paper.

This article discusses recent advancements in neurotechnologies and how they seem to support the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), while also raising concerns about the mental integrity and privacy of individuals. In Sect. 1 we review recent research carried out at the frontiers of Brain Machine Interfaces (BMIs) and neuromorphic computing. Taking inspiration (Sect. 2) from research in these fields we present -with the help of some imagination- a futurist scenario of complete human-computer integration. We discuss a set of practical benefits and risks associated with the implementation of such a scenario, which -despite being fictional at the time of writing- is likely to be realized soon. We frame our discussion (Sect. 3) in the context of research conducted in the cognitive sciences on the extended mind thesis (EMT). We reflect on the epistemic and ontic aspects underlying such a scenario and argue that EMT finds supports in it. We further problematize (Sect. 4) around the significance of this envisaged scenario for research on neuro-rights. We therefore also discuss a series of ethical challenges related to their potential infringement. We conclude the paper (Sect. 5) by showing that the development of specific neurotechnologies can make the extension of the mind an increasingly pervasive and transformative phenomenon, while raising important concerns about the potential consequences for certain characteristics of individuals that may be crucial to preserve through the introduction of neurorights.

This volume offers a new framework for understanding expertise. It proposes a reconceptualization of the traditional notion of expertise and calls for the development of a new contextual and action-oriented notion of expertise, which is attentive to axiological values, intellectual virtues, and moral qualities. Experts are usually called upon, especially during times of emergency, either as decision-makers or as advisors in formulating policies that often have a significant impact on society. And yet, for certain types of choices, there is a growing tension between experts’ recommendations and alternative views. The chapters in this volume critically assess the idea of whether possessing epistemic authority can automatically make someone’s assertions necessarily more grounded than others. They not only evaluate the epistemological implications of this idea but also reflect on its ethical, socio-cultural, and political consequences. The interdisciplinary framework advanced across the chapters seeks to overcome certain limitations that underlie current models of expertise by adopting more inclusive and representative decisions that can improve the perceived neutrality of experts’ decisions. Increasing neutrality means reducing cases in which an unidentified bias – be it a scientific one or not – puts any of the individuals involved in a specific public choice at a systematic disadvantage. Philosophy, Expertise, and the Myth of Neutrality will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of the social sciences, public policy, and sociology.

Embora a extensão da dependência entre teorias da estética e modelos da mente seja urna questão de aceso debate, é justo afirmar que as abordagens actuáis da consciência sugerem novas perspectivas sobre a natureza da experiência estética. As recentes descobertas da neurociência têm afetado a nossa forma de ver a estética e a arte. Todavia, enquanto é frequentemente sugerido que a neurociência vai, em breve, obter urna descrição completa da natureza da mente e, portanto, da experiência estética, aqui consideram-se as consequências da recente bifurcação teórica a respeito da localizacão da mente (ou seja, as posições externalistas versus internalistas). A partir deste ponto de vista, as questões da unidade e do significado são usadas para investigar a natureza da experiência estética e da arte. A discussão baseia-se na distinção de William James entre núcleo e periferia, levando a uma perspectiva de convergência entre a psicologia, a fenomenologia e a neurociência. Por fim, a arte é explorada como urna janela para olhar para dentro de aspectos fundamentais da vida mental, quer por meio dos recentes resultados de imagens do cérebro, quer através dos modelos mais abrangentes da mente. While the extent of the dependence between theories of aesthetics and models of the mind is a matter of lively debate, it is fair to claim that current approaches to consciousness suggest new perspectives about the nature of aesthetic experience. Recent findings of neuroscience have affected how we see aesthetics and art. Nevertheless, while it is often suggested that neuroscience will soon offer a comprehensive account of the nature of mind and thus of aesthetic experience, here we consider the consequences on the recent theoretical bifurcation as to where mind is located (namely the externalist vs. the internalist stance). From such a view, the issues of unity and meaning are used to probe into the nature of aesthetic experience and art. The discussion draws upon William James' distinction between nucleus and fringe and puts forward a converging perspective between psychology, phenomenology and neuroscience. Eventually, art is exploited as a window to peer inside fundamental aspects of mental life by means both of recent brain imaging results and more extended models of the mind

Human extinction is something generally deemed as undesirable, although some scholars view it as a potential solution to the problems of the Earth since it would reduce the moral evil and the suffering that are brought about by humans. We contend that humans collectively have absolute intrinsic value as sentient, conscious and rational entities, and we should preserve them from extinction. However, severe threats, such as climate change and incurable viruses, might push humanity to the brink of extinction. Should that occur, it might be useful to envision a successor to humans able to preserve and hand down its value. One option would be to resort to humanoid robots that reproduce our salient characteristics by imitation, thanks to AI powered by machine learning. However, the question would arise of how to select the characteristics needed for our successors to thrive. This could prove to be particularly challenging. A way out might come from an algorithm entrusted with this choice. In fact, an algorithmic selection both at the social and at the individual level could be a preferred choice than other traditional ways of making decisions. In this sense, reflecting on human extinction helps us to identify solutions that are also suitable for the problems we face today.