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182For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across CulturesFrontiers in Psychology 10. 2019.Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and…Read more
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21Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and NormativityInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4): 231-235. 2020.
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36Minimalism, Trivialism, AristotelianismTheoria 89 (3): 280-297. 2023.Minimalism and Trivialism are two recent forms of lightweight Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics: Minimalism is the view that mathematical objects arethinin the sense that “very little is required for their existence”, whereas Trivialism is the view that mathematical statements have trivial truth‐conditions, that is, that “nothing is required of the world in order for those conditions to be satisfied”. In order to clarify the relation between the mathematical and the non‐mathematical dom…Read more
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87For Better and for Worse. Abstractionism, Good Company, and PluralismReview of Symbolic Logic 16 (1): 268-297. 2023.A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism (also in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism). To do t…Read more
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5Review of Erich H. Reck and Georg Schiemer: The Pre-History of Mathematical Structuralism (review)Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (2): 412-415. 2021.
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29Origins and Varieties of Logicism: On the Logico-Philosophical Foundations of Logicism (edited book)Routledge. 2021.This book offers a plurality of perspectives on the historical origins of logicism and on contemporary developments of logicist insights in philosophy of mathematics. It uniquely provides up-to-date research and novel interpretations on a variety of intertwined themes and historical figures related to different versions of logicism. The essays, written by prominent scholars, are divided into three thematic sections. The first section focuses on major authors like Frege, Dedekind, and Russell, pr…Read more
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22Geoffrey Hellman* and Stewart Shapiro.**Mathematical Structuralism. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Penelope Rush and Stewart Shapiro, edsPhilosophia Mathematica 28 (2): 277-281. 2020.HellmanGeoffrey ** and ShapiroStewart. **** Mathematical Structuralism. Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics, RushPenelope and ShapiroStewart, eds. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. iv + 94. ISBN 978-1-108-45643-2, 978-1-108-69728-6. doi: 10.1017/9781108582933.
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20Thin Reference, Metaontological Minimalism and Abstraction Principles: The Prospects for Tolerant ReductionismIn Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, Palgrave. pp. 161-181. 2018.A standard understanding of abstraction principles elicits two opposite readings: Intolerant Reductionism, where abstractions are seen as reducing talk of abstract objects to talk about non-problematic domains, and Robustionism, where newly introduced terms genuinely refer to abstract objects. Against this dichotomy between such “austere” and “robust” readings, Dummett suggested ways to steer intermediate paths. We explore different options for intermediate stances, by reviewing metaontological …Read more
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30On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s ConstraintPhilosophia Mathematica 27 (2). 2019.Foundational projects disagree on whether pure and applied mathematics should be explained together. Proponents of unified accounts like neologicists defend Frege’s Constraint (FC), a principle demanding that an explanation of applicability be provided by mathematical definitions. I reconsider the philosophical import of FC, arguing that usual conceptions are biased by ontological assumptions. I explore more reasonable weaker variants — Moderate and Modest FC — arguing against common opinion tha…Read more
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3825The Ship of Theseus PuzzleIn Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 158-174. 2014.Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-t…Read more
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1266Nothing at Stake in KnowledgeNoûs 53 (1): 224-247. 2019.In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some …Read more
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1A Dilemma for Benacerraf’s Dilemma?In Fabrice Pataut (ed.), Truth, Objects, Infinity: New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf, Springer Verlag. 2016.
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67Frege’s Constraint and the Nature of Frege’s Foundational ProgramReview of Symbolic Logic 12 (1): 97-143. 2019.Recent discussions on Fregean and neo-Fregean foundations for arithmetic and real analysis pay much attention to what is called either ‘Application Constraint’ ($AC$) or ‘Frege Constraint’ ($FC$), the requirement that a mathematical theory be so outlined that it immediately allows explaining for its applicability. We distinguish between two constraints, which we, respectively, denote by the latter of these two names, by showing how$AC$generalizes Frege’s views while$FC$comes closer to his origin…Read more
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125The varieties of indispensability argumentsSynthese 193 (2): 469-516. 2016.The indispensability argument comes in many different versions that all reduce to a general valid schema. Providing a sound IA amounts to providing a full interpretation of the schema according to which all its premises are true. Hence, arguing whether IA is sound results in wondering whether the schema admits such an interpretation. We discuss in full details all the parameters on which the specification of the general schema may depend. In doing this, we consider how different versions of IA c…Read more
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51Plato's Problem: An Introduction to Mathematical PlatonismPalgrave-Macmillan. 2013.What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on Benac…Read more
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197The Gettier Intuition from South America to AsiaJournal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3): 517-541. 2017.This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “…Read more
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303De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgmentMind and Language 34 (3): 317-338. 2019.Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment.…Read more
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93How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralismInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-24. 2017.How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical plura…Read more
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82Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-MentalizingThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 193-203. 2017.Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregard…Read more
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56Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics (edited book)Springer International Publishing. 2016.This volume covers a wide range of topics in the most recent debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and is dedicated to how semantic, epistemological, ontological and logical issues interact in the attempt to give a satisfactory picture of mathematical knowledge. The essays collected here explore the semantic and epistemic problems raised by different kinds of mathematical objects, by their characterization in terms of axiomatic theories, and by the objectivity of both pure and applied math…Read more
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20Significato, verità e passato: su alcuni scritti recenti di Michael DummettIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 21 (1): 213-224. 2008.
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82Equivalent explanations and mathematical realism. Reply to “Evidence, Explanation, and Enhanced Indispensability”Synthese 193 (2): 423-434. 2016.The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Inference to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathematical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equiv…Read more
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112Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean HeritageDisputatio 4 (32). 2012.Indispensability arguments for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA. We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial,…Read more
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76Frege, Indispensability, and the Compatibilist HeresyPhilosophia Mathematica 23 (1): 11-30. 2015.In Grundgesetze, Vol. II, §91, Frege argues that ‘it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science’. Many view this as an in nuce statement of the indispensability argument later championed by Quine. Garavaso has questioned this attribution. I argue that even though Frege's applicability argument is not a version of ia, it facilitates acceptance of suitable formulations of ia. The prospects for making the empiricist ia compatible with a rationalist Fregean…Read more
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28Mathematical Realism: What’s New?Quaestio 12 551-566. 2012.The recent debate on new realism has been widely influenced by Putnam’s views, especially by the distinction between scientific realism and natural or common seense realism. I locate the discussion on mathematical realism in the context of this wider debate. I suggest that a parallel distinction between science-based arguments for realism and more immediate forms of realism is avaiable for mathematics too. I point to differences between contemporary empiricist and intellectualist positions, and …Read more
Andrea Sereni
Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS Pavia
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Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS PaviaAssociate Professor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mathematics |
Epistemology |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Language |