Andreas Liland

Currently, the consensus among interpreters of Heidegger is that Heidegger’s account of intentionality in Being and Time and concurrent writings is inconsistent with the view that perception is a propositional attitude in which a perceiver stands in to abstract entities that mediate between a subject and its environment, a view I call representationalism. This paper argues that Heidegger’s view of intentionality is inconsistent with representationalism only if Dasein’s ontological constitution entails a non-representational relational conception of what Heidegger calls the ‘as structure’ of veridical perception, and that interpreting Heidegger’s account in accordance with that condition is exegetically and philosophically problematic. I suggest that we adopt an alternative, metasemantic view, according to which Heidegger’s account of perceptual intentionality explains what it means to experientially represent the world.

This paper challenges a key assumption shared by current readings of Heidegger's account of assertions in Being and Time §33 and provides a Heideggerian analysis of predication. Previous readings disagree about whether assertions can make us aware of or be about beings in the mode of Zuhandensein (practical significance) because they disagree about whether a principle of determination that characterizes assertions, Vorhandenheitsbestimmung, is supposed to apply to all assertions or only extreme cases. I argue that while Vorhandenheitsbestimmung is responsible for bringing about an awareness of properties entities might instantiate independently of the practical significance they have for us (Vorhandenheit), Vorhandenheitsbestimmung does not stop a practically significant context from contributing to the contents assertions convey. This allows us to accept Heidegger's analysis of assertions without endorsing a conception on which assertions cannot bring about an awareness of the kinds of beings that Heidegger claims we for the most part have to do with, and lets us better understand the relationship between assertions, perceptions, and truth in the context of Being and Time.